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ABSTRACT 
In the winter of 1890-1891, Robert Bond, the 
Colonial Secretary of Newfoundland, attempted to negotiate 
a reciprocal trade agreement with James G. Blaine, the 
American Secretary of State~ Although Blaine accepted an 
amended draft treaty, the Imperial Government, in London, 
withheld ratification from the proposed treaty when it 
received a series of protests from the Canadian Government 
through its High Commissioner in London. 
In order to understand the significance of these 
negotiations, it was necessary to provide the background 
to both the problems of the Newfoundland economy and 
fishery, as well as to describe the various attempts to 
achieve a permanent settlement of the North West Atlantic 
Fisheries Question. The fishery was the basis of 
Newfoundland's export trade in 1890, and any reciprocity 
treaty would have been design'ed to increase Newfoundland 
fish exports to the United States. 
The negotiation of a reciprocity treaty between a 
British colony and a foreign country was conducted through 
the British Minister in the foreign capital. In addition, 
the power to permit these negotiations and their 
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ratification rested in London. /The Imperial Government 
refused to ratify the Convention because of the objections 
of the Canadian Government. Therefore, a large portion of 
this study was given over to a discussion of how the 
relations between the various members of the British Empire-
Newfoundland, Canada and Great Britain- affected the Bond-
Blaine negotiations. Although this discussion of 
reciprocity has been broadened to encompass an analysis of 
Bond's and Blaine's motives for commencing the talks, the 
basic problem remained - whether Newfoundland should be 
allowed to negotiate bilaterally with the United States or 
in concert with Canada as an Imperial unit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If one factor determined the nature of Newfound-
land's life, it was the success or failure of the cod 
fishery. To be more specific, the prosperity or poverty of 
Newfoundland was closely related to the prices obtained for 
dried cod fish in the export markets of Southern Europe and 
Latin America. ~n the late nineteenth century, the 
increasing competition Newfoundland dried cod fish met in 
its traditional markets from the subsidized fisheries of 
France and Norway was a cause of concern. In the past, 
Newfoundland's fish exports bad been increased by the 
signing of reciprocal trade agreements between Great 
Britain and the United States. With the abrogation of the 
Treaty of Washington in 1884, which included reciprocity in 
fish products, efforts were made to revive the idea of the 
free entrance of fish into the United States} When the 
abortive Bayard-Chamberlain negotiations of 1887-8 failed 
to provide a new, limited reciprocity treaty between the 
United States and the British colonies in North America, 
it was obvious that other attempts might follow. Indeed, 
the reciprocity nego·~iations described in this paper 
followed only a little more than a year after the rejection 
of the Bayard-Chamberlain talks • 
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These Bond-Blaine negotiations covered a period of 
not much more than one year: 1890-1891. But to appreciate 
their significance, ·it is necessary to describe the 
diplomatic negotiations on fishing rights and the trade in 
fish which were conducted between the United States and 
British North America in the previous century. This study 
of fishery diplomacy will be concentrated upon the events 
of the 1880's, as prelude to 1890.1 To understand the 
desire for a new reciprocity agreement, it will be necessary 
to provide relevant background on the conditions existing 
in the fisheries and the economy of Newfoundland. 
The fisheries of Newfoundland were divided into two 
classes: the Inshore and Offshore fisheries. The Inshore 
fisheries were conducted along the shores ·of Newfoundland 
and Labrador on grounds which extended three to seven miles 
from the shore. The inshore fishery<~ on the Island was the 
chief source of the best grades of dried cod fish. Being 
a small-boat fishery, it was conducted from the shore by 
family groups, and dried by them. The 'shore'-produced fish 
1 J• :' C0llins, and R. Rothburn, "The Fishing Grounds", 
Section III, Ft. 1 of u.s. Senate. 47th Congress, 1st Sess., 
Miss. Doc. 1241 Ft. 4; The Fisheries and Fisher Industries 
of the United States, G. • oo e e • as 1ngton: Government 
Printing Office, 1887), p. 12. ~Hereafter to be cited as 
G.oode, III). This Report is indispensable for an understand-
ing of the North American Fisheries, and is the principal 
source £or this section of the paper. See also Map. 
. .. .,, ...... ~--
· . . ': .. . _:;- ..•. ;· :_. :·· .. :·,::>" 
4 
in Labrador was usually of inferior quality mainly due to 
the unsuitable drying weather along that coast. This 
inshore cod fishery was usually conducted along the coasts 
of Newfoundland and Labrador from the first of June until 
November with the length of the fishing season coinciding 
with the supply of bait !ishes. 
For the inshore fishery, bait was supplied by the 
caplin, the squid, and the herring. When these bait fishes 
swarmed along the shores of Newfoundland, the cod usually 
follot'led so that the success of the fishery was linked with 
the availability of the kind of bait on which the cod was 
feeding. In this small-boat fishery, caplin was the most 
important bait although herring and squid were also taken. 
However, the squid and herring were sold to vessels fishing 
on the Banks of Newfoundland, and in the case of the 
herring was exported to the United States in a frozen form. 
For the banking vessels, squid and caplin could be obtained 
in Conception and Trinity Bays while herring was available 
in Fortune Bay, St. George's Bay, and Bay of Islands. 
In fact, the sale of bait, especially herring, on 
the South and West coasts of the Island was an industry 
which supplemented the earnings of the fishermen engaged in 
the shore fishery. In Fortune Bay, the centre of the herring 
fishery, the money received for herring from the Canadian 
and American banking vessels was the only cash the fishermen 
' 
5 
received: in the inshore fishery they exchanged their fish 
for provisions. Particularly encouraging was the trade in 
frozen herring to the United States which was conducted when 
the weather in Fortune Bay was cold enough to permit the 
freezing of the fish. 
On the West Coast, there was a thriving trade 
carrying bait to St. Pierre, but the major industry was the 
production of tinned lobsters. By 1890, lobster factories 
2 stretched the length of the coast. Also, the seventy 
lobster factories on the West Coast were consumers of large 
quantities of herring and other fishes for baiting lobster 
traps. 
However, when considering fishery relations between 
Newfoundland and the United States, the fishery on the banks 
of Newfoundland was the most important branch of the 
fishery. The bank fishery, in 1890, was conducted by 
schooners on most of the continental shelf of North America 
between Massachusetts and Newfoundland. These schooners 
varied in the size and in quality of their construction, 
the best schooners being built in Massachusetts. As they 
were replaced by schooners of a more advanced design, or 
2 Great Britain. Colonial Office Papers, Series 194, 
Volume 216 (c.o. 194/216), "Report of the Lobster Fisheries 
of Western Newfoundland" Nov. 22, 1890. (Future references 
to this entire series of papers as in brackets). 
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later by steamers, they were sold in Nova Scotia. As these 
'second-hand' ships became obsolete in Nova Scotia, they 
were sold in Newfoundland.3 Besides the sale of schooners 
within the bank fishing area, there were internal ship-
building programs in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, nourished 
by government subsidies. In general, American schooners 
ranged in size from 50 to 150 tons, especially from 65 to 
105 tons.4 The Nova Scotia bounty-built schooners averaged 
from 37 to 38 tons, as did the Newfoundland vessels.5 
Despite the late inauguration of the Newfoundland bounty 
system in 18?6, by 1888 there were 330 bankers in 
Newfoundland, mostly built in the Colony.6 If these 
bankers were inferior in displacement and construction to 
the American ships, they had shorter voyages than the long 
3 H.A. Innis, The Cod Fisheries: The History of an 
International Economy. Revised ed. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1954), p. 919. 
4 Canada. House of Commons. Sessional Pavers. 1891, 
no. 38, vol. 17, pp. 31-5. {Hereafter, this ser1es is to 
be cited as CSP. 1891/38). 
5 CSP., 1890/17, "Report of the Department of 
Fisheries", Appendix 2, _pp. 23-5. Newfoundland. House of 
Assembly. Journal Appendix, "Return of Bounty Ships," 
1886, p. 596 ff. ~Hereafter to be cited as Nfld., Assembly, 
Journal). 
6 F~·F .• -. ~hompson, The French Shore Problem in 
Newfoundland: An Im}erial Problem (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1961 , p. ?6. · 
~:~--~~:"':--.. ... -.. .. · . .. -~~ 
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•trips' of the 'Gloucestermen' to the Grand Bank; 
particularly the bankers sailing from the towns at the foot 
of the Burin Peninsula. 
The banking methods of the period were those of 
the trawl fishery~ Each schooner carried stacks of small 
boats - dories - which were used by individual fishermen on 
the fishing ground. Each dory was supplied with a number 
of trai'lls, each neatly coiled in half a wooden barrel, 
known as a ;tub'. Each 'tub' of trawl consisted of a rope 
about one mile in length to which shorter lines, three 
feet in length with a book at the end, were attached at 
intervals of six feet. This arrangement allowed the trawl 
to be raised every day to remove the catch and rebait the 
hooks. Each fisherman raised one end of his trawl, passed 
the trawl line across his dory, reset the buoy and anchor, 
and slowly 'worked' along the trawl removing the fish and 
rebaiting the hooks. Each trawl usually consisted of 
several thousand hooks.? 
These trawling methods were employed on the various 
fishing banks off the continental shelf between Newfoundland 
and New England. By far the most important of these 
7 McFarland, New En~land Fisheries, pp. 360-1. See 
also, Goode, Pt. III, pp. 1 3-5, and D.J. Davis, "Bond-Blaine 
Negotiationsl 1890-1891", unpublished Graduate Term Paper, 
Memorial University of Newfoundland, Spring, 1969, p. 2 • 
.... ·._, 
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fishing grounds were the Grand Bank of Newfoundland and 
George's Bank in the Gulf of Maine. The Grand Bank, lying 
off the southeastern tip of the Avalon Peninsula of 
Newfoundland, was the chief summer cod-fishing ground for 
Newfoundland, Canadian and American banking schooners. The 
immense size of the bank, 37,000 square miles, with its 
abundant supply of cod from April until September made it 
"the most important fishing bank in the world".8 The ready 
bait supplies available in Newfoundland did much to enhance 
the value of the bank. Between the Grand Bank and George's 
Bank, lay many large and small banks, especially important 
were Banquereau and Sable Island Bank, off Nova Scotia. 
George's Bank extended east of Cape Cod and the Nantucket 
Shoals for an area of 8500 square miles. Most of the bank 
was within the 50 fathom line, ranging from 2 to 50 fathoms. 
One aspect of this ground was the 1100 square mile winter 
cod fishing ground within the area of the bank.9 This 
winter ground was most productive in February, March and 
April when it was visited by a fleet of more than lGO 
schooners from Gloucester. The effectiveness of the winter 
8 Goode, III, pp. 6?-8. 
9 Goode, III, pp. 7~-5. 
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fishery depended upon the supplies of frozen herring 
carried to Gloucester from Fortune Bay, Newfoundland. The 
fresh-frozen bait would ensure the schooners leaving 
Gloucester a quick trip; indeed, the outward bound schooners 
often waited to buy frozen bait from the newly~arrived 
ships from Newfoundland. The close proximity of George's 
Bank to both Gloucester and Portland made it the principal 
fishing ground for tbese areas.10 
In addition to its interest in Newfoundland bait 
supplies, the United States held treaty rights on a portion 
of the coasts of Newfoundland from the Rameau Islands on the 
South Coast to the Quirpon Islands at the northerly tip of 
the Island. American fishing privileges were first 
established by the .peace treaty which ended the American 
Revolutionary War on September 3, 1783. The Third Article 
of the treaty11 set forward the Americans right to fish on 
the banks, to fish along the coasts-inshore and to dry 
their cod on the unsettled coasts of British North America, 
including Newfoundland. Disputes concerning the 
definitions of the words 'right' and 'liberty', and the 
10 Goode, IV, pp. 5-20. The Georgesmen, as the 
bankers were named, were usually from 45 to 80 tons with an 
average of 60 tons. Fishing was carried out from the ships 
by the use of handlines let down over the side of the 
schooner. Fishermen usually used 900 feet of line. 
11 See Appendix A. 
11 
clarification of the terms of the Article led to the 
signing of a convention on the fisheries in 1818. Article 
1 of this convention was to be the guide on fishing rights 
until the settlement of the question in 1909-10. 
In addition to these American treaty rights, the 
French possessed similar guarantees to protect their 
habitation of the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon and 
the use of the 'treaty shore' from Cape Ray to Cape St. John. 
French rights were established by the Treaty of Utrecht in 
1713.12 However, the definitive treaty on the 'French Shore' 
was signed at Paris in September, 1783. On their trea~y 
shore, the French were to have the right to bring their 
catch ashore and to dry it; also, they were permitted to 
construct those buildings necessary for the prosecution of 
the fishery.13 Yet there was a very gradual influx of 
English settlers along the West Coast despite the 
prohibition issued by the British Government in December, 
1866. It was not until 1881 that Great Britain conceded 
territorial control on the French Shore to Newfoundland 
although this action did not change French rights.14 By 
12 For the Newfoundland terms of the Treaty of 
Utrecht, and treaties affecting the French Shore, see 
Appendix B. 
l3 See Appendix B. 
14 Innis, Cod Fisheries, p. 399. 
~. 
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1891, with two Newfoundland electoral districts organized 
on the West Coast,15 the actual policing of the treaty 
shore was still in the hands of the Anglo-French naval 
officers. These officers were usually supplied with very 
vague instructions by their governments, leaving -to them 
the settlement of individual disputes between fishermen, 
and the creation of a set of mutually acceptable guidelines 
for their actions during each fishing season. Their 
greatest problem was the attempts of the newspapers in 
Newfoundland to turn every problem into a dispute and 
every action by the officers into an outrage. 
The French fishery in Newfoundland was mainly 
concentrated on the island of St. Pierre. In 1850, St. 
Pierre exported 8,305,475 kilos (162,256 qtls.) of dry fish 
and 2,085,303 kilos (40,951 qtls.) of green fish, but by 
1886 exports had risen to 11,198,342 kilos (219,986 qtls.) 
of dry fish and 35,042,475 kilos (688,388 qtls.) of green 
fish. 16 The tremendous rise of the French fishery in 
Newfoundland was due to a comprehensive system of bounties 
which not only made peyments to. the fishermen .but also 
subsidized the cost of fish exported. So remunerative were 
l5 The population of these ridings was some 13,000 
in 1891. 
16 Innis, Cod Fisheries, pp. 382-3. 'Green fish' 
was not dried until the fishermen returned to France • 
.. 
0•.: . . ·=.· . .• . .. : ' 
13 
the French bounties that by 1886 Newfoundland fish exporters 
claimed the French sold fish in Spain for nothing: the 
Spanish importers merely paid the duties and cartage.17 
This growth of the French. fishery was a source of concern 
in Newfoundland where competition increased the dislike 
engendered by the treaty rights. 
The success of the French dried cod fishery pointed 
to the need to reduce Newfoundland's dependence on the 
dried cod. In an effort to achieve greater balance in the 
economy many farsighted people in Newfoundland placed great 
confidence in the sale of the light salted, 'green cod'. 
There was a market for 'green fish' in Nova Scotia and New 
England where it was deboned to make 'boneless fish'. 
Although there appeared continual interest in extending 
Newfoundland's production of green cod, the economy was 
geared to the production of 'hard-cured' cod, and any 
change in habit came slowly or not at all. 
Also of considerable importance was the herring 
whiich Newfoundland merchants hoped to export to ·,the United 
States in their own ships. Like the herring, the lobster-
canning industry gave promise of future prosperity but it 
was controlled from outside Newfoundland. Also there were 
other fish such as the salmon, the trout, ·and the declining 
17 Thompson, French Shore, p. 84. 
1.:. 
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seal fishery. However, none of these fish had modified 
Newfoundland's dependence on the dried cod. 
In the 1880's, there were two allied efforts to 
reduce the importance of the fishery in the form of 
railroad-building and mining. The first contract for the 
railroad was let in 1881 with the objective of providing 
work for the impoverished population, and ultimately to open 
up the interior of the Island to development. Many hoped 
that the building of the railroad would carry with it 
capital for the exploitation of the Island's mineral · 
resources. Already in the 1880's there existed mines on 
the Burlington Peninsula where copper was mined in 
sufficient quantities to make Newfoundland a major world 
producer. There also existed hopes for deposits of iron, 
oil, and other minerals. However, despite these efforts 
to diversify the Newfoundland economy, in 1890, the age-old 
fishing economy was still the basis on which the Island of 
Newfoundland operated, and as such it should be described. 
The cod fish economy of Newfoundland was based on 
the relationship between the merchant-supplier and the fish-
erman. In the case of the small-boat fishermen, the 
merchant supplied the fisherman with any equipment he might 
need to begin fishing. The supplier also provided the 
fisherman's family with all the necessities of life until 
the fisherman's account could be balanced with his catch at 
15 
the end of the fishing season. The merchant, who might 
support a group of fishermen and their families for a year 
on the expectation of a good catch of fish, the weather 
being suitable for curing, and market price remaining high, 
faced a precarious existence. In fact, the absence of any 
of these conditions depressed the economy, leaving the 
fishermen near starvation and the merchants near bankruptcy_.-
However, on the East Coast of the Island, a large 
number of fishermen 'shipped' on schooners for the Labrador. 
The fishermen remained on that coast until they loaded their 
ships in the fall, leaving the supplier as well as the 
fishermen dependent on the success of the schooner's crew. 
The task of supplying these Labrador 'floaters' and those 
who were carried north to fish from stations ashore often 
strained the merchants and the Newfoundland banks which 
supplied them with working capital. As might be expected, 
the system carried with it a self-contained inefficiency 
to protect the supplier. To survive the possibility of 
failure, the merchant raised the prices on his supplies to 
allow him to absorb the loss incurred when one or more of 
his debtors had an unsuccessful fishery. High prices could 
only protect a merchant against a partial failure of the 
fishery in any one year; a complete failure or a glutted 
market would force him to draw upon his reserves accumulated 
in the 'good years 1 or to go into liquidation. Thus the 
i 
'·· ·· ~ 
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prices which the supplier attached to the goods he sold to 
the fisherman were primarily a result of the supplier's 
determination to remain solvent. However, these high 
prices allowed only the most ruthless merchants to survive 
thus committing to fishermen to perpetual debt in a money-
less society. By the 1880's, the principal suppliers in 
Newfoundland were concentrated in St. John's with a few in 
Conception Bay, especially Harbour Grace. The control 
exercised by the· lerger suppliers acted directly on the 
fishermen or through small merchant-suppliers throughout 
the rest of the Island. 
Despite this concentration of economic power in St. 
John's, the herring fishermen of Fortune Bay were trading 
with the French on St. Pierre, a practice which reduced the 
quantities of high-priced goods the St. John's suppliers 
could sell. Also there was a i·.considerable trade with 
Canadian coasting vessels along the Northeast Coast. The 
position of the West Coast was equally unfavourable to the 
control of St. John's as the fishermen tended to sell their 
herring directly to the Canadian, American and French 
schooners and to buy their supplies from the cheapest 
source. In addition, the lobster fishery was mainly control-
led from Halifax .rather than St. John's and the plants 
controlled from St. John's were limited to those of Harvey & 
Co. and James Baird. In practice, the economic power of 
17 
St. John's stretched along the Northeast Coast and the 
Labrador where it was very heavily committed to the 
production of the dried cod. 
If Newfoundlanders were to exploit the resources 
of the interior of their island, they desperately needed a 
system of communication across the Island. In the late 
nineteenth century, this could only be a trans-insular 
railway. In Newfoundland, the railway was closely 
associated with negotiations to join the Canadian 
Confederation. As early as 1865, the Carter Government18 
was both favourable to confederation and toward a railway, 
but the victory of C.F. Bennett•s19 anti-Confederate forces 
in 1869 destroyed both the dream of early union with Canada 
and the commencement of a railroad. 20 AlthoMgh Carter 
regained power in 1875, he was not able to take any concrete 
action leading to railroad construction, mainly due to 
French treaty rights on the West Coast of the Island. The 
letting of the first rai~way contract was the responsibility 
18 Frederick Carter (1819-1900), Member of Newfound-
land Assembly (1855-78), Speaker (1861-5) 1 Prime Minister (1865-70 and 1874-78), Chief Justice (1890-1900). 
l9 Charles F. Bennett (1793-1883), Premier of 
Newfoundland (1870-74). 
2° F. Cramm, "The Construction of the Newfoundland 
Railway, 1878-1898", Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Memorial 
Univers1ty of Newfoundland, 1961, pp. 1-2. 
18 
of William V. Whiteway whose wife turned the sod for a line 
from St. John's to Carbonear on August 16, 1881. By 1885, 
this line had reached Harbour Grace when the Whiteway 
Government collapsed after religious rioting in that town. 21 
Whiteway's Administration was succeeded by Thorburn's all-
Protestant following which set to work building the branch 
line to Placentia.22 The return of Whiteway in 1889 led 
to the signing of a contract to extend the existing end of 
steel from Placentia Junction to the Hall's Bay Line in 
the centre of the Island.23 
By 1890, there were a number of reasons for the 
expansion of the railroad system. The most obvious was the 
need of a make-work project to lift the crushing poverty of 
the people and also repay an election promise mn 1889 to 
.· 24 
create a large number of jobs for the winter of 1889-90. 
Not only would several hundred men be employed building the 
railroad, at wages of $1.00 per day, 25 but contracts to cut 
21 Cramm, "Newfoundland Railway", pp. 84-5. 
22 Ibid., pp. 84-112. 
23 Ibid., p. 113. Construction in the 1889-93 era 
is treated on pp. 113-37. 
24 For Whiteway's use of the promise of railway 
work in the Election of 1889, see c.o. 194/212, O'Brien to 
Knutsford, Dec. 10, 1889. 
25 The men later went on strike to receive $1.50 
per day. 
19 
sleepers created vitally needed work in the winter. Beyond 
these immediate economic and political necessities lay the 
hope that a railroad would uncover mineral deposits in 
addition to those already exploited along the coast. 
Furthermore, a railroad would give access to the timber 
stands of the interior of Newfoundland. 26 
With the production of minerals and Whiteway's 
promise to start construction on an extension to the 
·-..... 
railroad, there was hope for an improvement in the economic 
condition of Newfoundland. Despite this hope, there was a 
need for new markets for Newfoundland's products, and 
reciprocity with the United States could provide these 
markets. However, a reciprocity treaty could only be 
achieved by diplomatic negotiations between Great Britain 
and the United States. 
26 Cramm, 11Newfoundland Railway", p. 5. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE DIPLOMATIC PRELUDE TO 1890 
To understand the importance of reciprocity 
negotiations between the United States and Newfoundland, 
it is essential to recapitulate the history of the fishing 
relations between the two countries.1 For practical 
reasons this survey w~ll begin when the United States 
ceased to be a part of the British Empire,2 and end in 
1890. The main emph~sis will be placed on the negotiations 
between 1885 and 1890. 
Before the treaty of 1?83, American fishermen 
possessed nominally the same fishing rights off Nova Scotia 
and Newfoundland as did the other British fishermen.; .The 
1 Any reference to relations between the United 
States and Newfoundland is meant to understand the United 
States was an independent, federal republic, and 
Newfoundland was a self-governing colony of the British 
Empire which could not conclude diplomatic agreements 
without British approval. 
2 By the Treaty of September ;, 1?83,· Great Britain 
acknowledged the independence of the United States. 
3 These rights would have been circumscribed by 
the conditions resulting from the Revolutionary War. For 
the fishing terms of the Treaty, see Appendix A. 
. . .. ::-:; ·· . . - -·: ~-· · . ;. ·. 
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treaty, however, made two main alterations in the status 
of American fishermen; namely, they had only the 'liberty' 
to dry their cod on the unoccupied shores of Newfoundland, 
and as soon as these areas were occupied, the fishermen 
would relinquish their use of the area.4 In 1783, the main 
American concern would have been the dry cod fishery which 
required the beaches of Newfoundland for the curing of the 
fish. The gradual limiting of areas available to them for 
drying cod was a serious threat to their fishery. This 
was not the only problem inherent in the treaty, for the 
use of the terms 'right' and 'liberty' caused the 
Americans to claim that 'liberty' bad been used in the 
treaty with the same force as 'right', whereas the British 
replied that 'liberty' referred to a withdrawable 
privilege granted by the British Government. Indeed the 
British held this opinion until the Hague Arbitration of 
1909-1910.5 
These considerations caused dissatisfaction with 
the fishery terms of the treaty of 1783. However,' even 
4 See Appendix A. 
J ·-. .. -~ 
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more serious for Anglo-American relations were the 
problems created by British involvement in the Napoleonic 
Wars 1798-1814: and the Anglo-American War of 1812-1814~· 
Subsequently, it was not until 1818 that the two countries 
could sign a convention defining their respective rights 
and privileges with regard to the North-West Atlantic 
fisheries. 6 
The Convention itself contained a number of 
changes from 1783. The word 'right' in the first sentence 
of the treaty of 1783 became 'liberty'; although the 
'liberty' was to be exercised 'for ever', the principle 
had been carried that a 'liberty' was involved, not a 
'right'. The substitution in some clauses of 'privilege' 
indicated the American negotiators acknowledged that the 
operative word was 'liberty', not 'right'.? However, the 
American fishermen were permitted to cure their fish on 
the settled coasts of Newfoundland, by "previous 
agreement ••• with ••• (the) possessors of the ground."8 
Despite this concession, the Conv&ntion _stipulated:that the 
American fishermen renounced all 'liberties' to those 
portions of the coast not specifically included within 
6 See Appendix E. 
7 See Appendix E. 
8 See Appendix E. 
• . - 1 
23 
the provisions of the Article.9 The last sentence or the 
Article placed the American fishermen on the same level 
with the local fishermen in Newfoundland, in regard to 
the enforcement or regulations created by the various 
British colonies.10 Such a statement may have been 
necessary for the enforcement or the treaty provisions, 
but the extent to which the American fishermen were 
liable for prosecution under its terms was a constant 
source of debate. Indeed, the vagueness or the sentence 
led the United States Government to object to almost all 
fishery legislation passed in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland • 
Since the Convention had been signed between the United 
States and Great Britain, the British Government was in 
the difficult position of either supporting fishing 
regulations enacted by the colonies, and thus annoying the 
United States, or vetoing the legislation and suffering 
the outcry from the colonies. British policy throughout 
was directed toward supporting colonial officials unless 
their legislation was thought to be so restrictive as to 
embitter relations between the United States and Great 
Britain. 
Whatever the imperfections of the Convention of 
1818, it remained the main guide to fishing rights until 
9 See Appendix E. 
10 See Appendix E. 
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it was superseded, but not replaced by tbe Reciprocity 
Treaty of 185~. Indeed, tbe Reciprocity Treaty was 
conceived as a broad mutual trade agreement between 
British North America and tbe United States. The impetus 
for tbe agreement came from tbe Canadians11 wbo hoped to 
sell their grain and timber in tbe United States, and to 
open up tbe Canadian mineral resources. Fishing rights 
were likely to enter into any negotiation since tbe 
Canadians always considered tbe Atlantic fisheries a 
useful make-weight to compensate tbe Americans for 
concessions given to Canadian primary goods. Tbe specific 
clauses of tbe treaty indicate just bow United States 
fishermen bad been accommodated. Tbe first paragraph of 
Article I continued the status of American fishermen on a 
level with British colonial fishermen; thus being given 
tbe free use of all fishing grounds and beacbes.12 
Likewise, the British colonial fishermen were to receive 
tbe same rights along tbe American coast north of the 36th 
parallel of latitude which was tbe south shore of Albemarle 
11 Before 1867, Canada was the United Province of 
Canada East (Quebec) and Canada West (Ontario). 
12 
"Fishery Articles of tbe Reciprocity Treaty of 
185~", in Great Britain. Foreign Office. British and 
Foreign State Papers, Vol. 44, pp. 25-9. (Hereafter this 
series is to be cited as BFSP. 
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Sound, North Carolina.13 This compensation was of 
questionable value as British colonial fishermen very 
rarely entared United States fishing grounds, especially 
as far south as North Carolina. 
However, the main section of the treaty was the 
Third Article, the schedule .of those products which were 
to be admitted into the United States free of duty.14 The 
schedule contained only those products which might be 
considered raw materials; such as grains, animals, ores, 
and timber • . However, as far as Newfoundland was concerned, 
the important items were fish, fish-products, and fish oil. 
Fish was added to the 'free list' to compensate Nova 
Scotians and Newfoundlanders for the extension of American 
fishing rights.15 Such was the manner of the compromise 
embodied in the treaty. 
The effect of the treaty on Newfoundland was by 
no means as sati~factory as it might have been thought. 
Although exports to the United States rose sharply, 
I 
imports into Newfoundland grew almost as extraordinarily; 
for in 1850, Newfoundland's exports to the United States 
were ~20,000 while her imports were i153,000. By 1860, 
l3 BFSP, Vol. 44, PP• 25-9. 
14 See Appendix F(l). 
l5 D.C. Masters, The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., n.d.), p. 87. 
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while exports bad risen to £81,000, imports were£ 364,000.16 
At no time from 1850 to 1866 did exports exceed £113,000, l? 
while imports exceeded£ 300,000 for nine of the years, 
reaching£ 388,000 in 1856.18 These results were only 
satisfactory in the view of the considerable increase in 
exports to the United States which occurred during the 
treaty period.19 Although even these exports, mainly 
fish, were still subject to violent fluctuations. 
Nevertheless, Newfoundlanders tended to look back to this 
period as one Qfr:great prosperity, a prosperity which 
succeeding governments hoped to emulate when they sought 
trade agreements with the United States. Newfoundland was 
not included within the provisions of the first articles 
of the treaty but only by a special enabling clause. This 
was to be a major source of discontent in Newfoundland 
where the government objected to the method of carrying 
out negotiations \'lith the United States. If Newfoundland 1 s 
16 See Appendix F(2). The valuation of the British 
pound (~) is a difficult matter, it was certainly less than 
its theoretical value of $5.00, often the figure of $4.86 
is quoted. 
l? In 1858, see Appendix F(2). 
18 See Appendix F(2). 
19 The Treaty was terminated in 1866. 
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fishing rights were to be bartered away, it had the option 
of joining the treaty to take advantage of any reciprocal 
privileges extended or to remain outside the agreement and 
accept American exploitation of the fisheries around the 
Island. 
The reciprocity treaty did not survive the 
difficulties of the 18501is. In the last of this decade, 
Canada was in an economic depression. Alexander Galt, the 
Canadian Minister of Finance, revised upward the tariffs 
levied on American goods entering Canada, especially manu-
factured goods. The intent of this measure was to raise · .: .. 
the revenue of the Canadian government, but the effect was 
to excite the American business community against the idea 
of reciprocity. In addition, British actions during the 
American Civil War led to hostility in the United States 
toward Great Britain and her colonies. Also, in Canada, 
Galt20 feared the closer commercial ties created by 
reciprocity would weaken the so-called 'British connection'. 
This latter consideration, intensified by the desire of 
Canadian businessmen to avoid competition from the larger 
American firms, probably influenced Galt's decision to 
raise tariffs. The United States Senate acting under 
pressure from American business interests, agreed to the 
20 Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt (1817-189~). 
Canadian Minister of Finance (1858-62, 1864-66). High 
Commissioner to London (1880-8~). 
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termination of the reci~rocity agreement on January, 1865. 
On March 1?, the British Minister in Washington received 
notification of the termination of the treaty, after the 
proscribed interval of one year.21 
With the termination of the reciprocity treaty, 
regulation of the fishery was based on the treaty of 1818, 
the terms of which were not easily interpreted in 1866. 
The anti-British sentiment of the leadership in Washington 
after the United States Civil War, and the determination 
of the new Canadian nation22 to enforce the treaty of 1818 
'to the letter' indicated worsening relations between 
, 
Canada and the United States. However, after the depths 
to which Anglo-American relations had slip~ed during the 
Civil War, the British Government was eager to im~rove 
relations after the end of the War. The British tried to 
mollify the Americans when the Canadians raised their 
fishing licenses from 50¢ per ton of ship to $2 per ton 
in 186?-8.23 Further Canadian rules appeared in 1868 and 
22 The Confederation of Canada, Nova Scotia, and 
New Brunswick in 186?, transferred the name Canada to the 
new nation. 
23 Fishing licenses permitted Americans to enjoy 
the privileges of the Treaty of 1854 for the payment of .a ·· 
fee. See Tansill, Can.-Am. Relations, ~p. 6-9. 
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1870 which permitted the seizure of American ships not 
observing Canadian regulations. The resulting seizures 
were often based on infringements of minor technicalities 
of the fishing rules. The exacerbation of relations 
caused by thes~ rul~s made it essential to send the whole 
problem to a Joint High Commission before some incident 
led to violence. The High Commission was appointed in 
February, 1871 with the power to look into Canadian-
American relations generally.24 
The result of this commission was the Treaty of 
Washington, signed May 8, 1871. The fishery terms of the 
Treaty were Articles XVIII to XXI and XXXII.25 In Articles 
XXII-XXV were set forth the rules for the establishment or 
a three-man commission to decide the amount of compensation 
to be paid by the United States for her fishing privileges. 
The commission sitting at Halifax, Nova Scotia, awarded 
the British colonies $5 million. Qre million of this award 
was paid to Newfoundland. The idea of a claims commission 
had not been popular in the United States from the 
beginning. This attitude was intensified when the British 
delegates demanded that the third and deciding arbitrator 
should be a Belgian, a country whose territorial integrity 
24 Tansill, Can.-Am. Relations, pp. 10-11. 
25 See Appendix G. 
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had been guaranteed by Great Britain. When the Belgian, 
Maurice Delfosse, voted with·Alexander Galt, the British 
Commissioner, against the American Arbitrator, a furore 
arose in the United States. 26 Further, the chief British 
scientific witness at Halifax, Henry Youle Hind, wrote a 
pamphlet asserting that much of the Canadian evidence 
presented to the claims comission had been falsified so 
as to make Canada's losses ;by the treaty seem greater than 
they were.27 
Unfortunately for the sur~~val of the treaty, the 
.· 
dissatisfaction due to the terms of the treaty and the 
hearings at Halifax were only the specific complaints 
associated with the treaty. The atmosphere of the period 
was inimical to any reduction of the Anglophobia in the 
United States. Indeed, in Canada, the Government believed 
that the United States would not accept any settlement of 
the fisheries question which was unfavourable to her inter-
28 ests. However, this attitude was also adopted by the 
other countries which participated in fishery discussions. 
26 See especially, William Evarts (Secretary of 
State) to John Welsh (u.s. Minister1 London), Sept. 27, 18?8, BFSP., Vol. ?2, 1878, pp. 121~-41. 
27 Tansill, Can.-Am. Relations, n. 42, p. 12. 
28 D.M.L. Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 
1867-87 (Toronto: University Press, 1955), pp. 86-? • 
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In fact, no solution was possible to the fishery problem 
because both the New England fishermen and the Nova Scotian 
and Newfoundland authorities were determined to gain the 
maximum advantage from any treaty provisions. 
In these circumstances, any minor incident could 
become a confrontation between Great Britain and the United 
States. The major crisis of this period was the FortUne 
Bay Incident of 1878. This crisis arose when a fleet of 
American schooners attempted to seine herring on Sunday, 
an act forbidden by a Newfoundland statute.29 All would 
have been well if the Americans had allowed the Newfound-
landers to catch the herring and then bought the fish from 
them. When the Newfoundlanders saw a substantial profit 
being lost, they attacked the American fishermen when they 
came ashore, cut their nets, and released their herring.30 
When news of this event reached the United States, a 
prolonge·d official correspondence ensued which was not 
terminated until Great Britain agreed to compensate 
29 Newfoundland. Consolidated Statutes, 1872, 
cap. 52, sec. 2. 
30 For a report on the Fort~ne Bay Incident by the 
Senior British Officer on Fisheries Patrol, see enclosure 
in, Marquis of Salisbury (Foreign Secretary) to Welsh, 
August 23, 1878, BFSP., Vol. 72, 1880, pp. 1267-9 • . 
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American fishermen for their damage.31 As might be expected, 
the dissatisfaction in relations between Great Britain and 
the United States caused the latter to terminate the 
Washington Treaty at the earliest moment, July 1, 1885.32 
With the end of the treaty in sight, and a return 
to the terms of 1818 imminent, there were hasty negotiations 
in Washington to conclude a temporary agreement, a 'modus 
vi vendi 1 , which would continue the.-·terms of the Treaty of 
Washington until December 31, 1885. The 'modus vivendi' 
was concluded by the British Minister in Washington, Sir 
Lionel Sackville-West, and United States Secretary of 
State, Thomas Francis Bayard.33 The purpose of the 'modus 
vivendi' was both to avoid changing the fishing regulations 
in the middle of the season and to create time for 
negotiations between Great Britain and the United States 
3l The amount of compensation was! 15,000. On 
official correspondence, see Evarts to Welsh, Aug. 1, 18?8, 
BFSP., Vol. ?2, 1880, pp. 12?2-90; Earl Granville (Foreign 
Secretary) to J.R. Lowell (u.s. Minister, London), Oct. 2?, 
1880, BFSP., Vol. ?2, 1880, pp. 1298-1301, and Evarts to 
Lowell~. 4, 1881, ~., pp. 1301-5. 
32 Anglo-American relations were further strained 
by the passage of the Coercive Acts by the House of Commons, 
London. These acts were designed to tighten British control 
over Ireland in the 1880's. They aroused the Irish in the 
United States and those who desired thei.r votes. 
33 Thomas Francis Bayard was secretary of State in 
President Cleveland's First Administration (1885-1889). 
Sir Lionel Sackville-West was British Minister to Washington 
from 1881 to 1888. 
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toward a new treaty. The need for haste was obvious for 
the United States Senate was considering a bill to 
prohibit fishing within two miles of the coast of the 
United States, including the previous treaty coast.34 
Similarly as early as 1877 and 1878, after the Fortune Bay 
Incident, the Newfoundland Legislature sent memorials to 
the Colonial Secretary in London demanding the prohibition 
of bait sales to American fishermen.35 In 1886, Governor 
Sir George DesVoeux sent a recently passed bait bill to 
the Colonial Office for study before he signed it. The 
bill had been designed to restrict the sale of herring to 
foreigners.36 
At the same time, the ap~roach of the Congressional 
Election of 1886 in the United States permitted the New 
England fishing interests, opponents of fish imports from 
Newfoundland, to force the incumbent Cleveland Administration 
to accede to their demands. The New England interests had 
the support of the New York-based American Fishery Union, 
34 u.s. 48th Congress, 1st Sess., Report 365, March 
241 1884, in Newfoundland. Legislative Council. Journal, 18~5, Appendix, p. 314. (In future this series will be 
cited as Nfld. Council, Journal.) 
35 Sir J.H. Glover (Governor of Newfoundland) to 
Earl of Carnarvon (Colonial Secretary), Oct. 31, 1877, in 
Nfld. Council. Journal, Appendix, p. 77-8 and Glover to Sir 
Michael Hicks-Beach (Colonial Secretary), June 18, 1877, 
in Nfld. Council. Journal, 18?8, Appendix, p. 222. 
36 Sir G. DesVoeux (Governor) to Earl of Granville (Colonial Secretary) May 26, 1886, Nfld. Council. Journal, 
1886, App., p. 682. 
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and the Republican senators from New England. George 
Steele, the President of the Union, vigorously supported 
the idea of tariff protection to keep foreign fish out of 
the United States market.37 The senatorial support for 
the fishing interests came from the Republicans: William 
P. Frye and Eugene Hale of Maine, George F. Hoar of 
Massachusetts and George F. Edmunds of Vermont.38 
However, the guiding force behind the senators was James 
G. Blaine who had been the unsuccessful Republican 
presidential candidate in the Election of 1884.39 Blaine 
certainly wanted to use all the available issues to injure 
the Democrats in the forthcoming election. 
38 William P. Frye (1831-1911) 7 Member of the United States Senate (1881-1911), Pres1dent Pro-Tempore 
of the Senate (1896-1911). Eugene Hale (1836-1918), 
Member of the United States Senate (1881-1911). George 
F. Hoar (1826-1904), Member of the United States Senate (1877-1904). George F. Edmunds (1828-1919) Member of 
the United States Senate (1886-1891), Candidate for the 
Republican Presidential Nomination in 1880 and 1884. 
39 James G. Blaine (1830-1893), Member of the 
United States House of Representatives (1863-1875), 
Speaker (1869-1875) United States Senator (1876-1881). 
Candidate for Repubiican Presidential Nomination in 1876 
and 1880. United States Secr&tary of State (18811 1889-92). Unsuccessful Republican ~esidential Candidate (1~84). 
For Blaine's motives, see T.F. Bayard to E.J. Phelps (U.S. 
Minister, London), March 7, 1886~ Tansill, Ba~ard, p. 210. 
See also, D.S. Muzzey, James G. ~laine: A Political Idol 
of Other Days (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1935), p. 24. 
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When President Cleveland40 sent the names of the 
American members of the proposed fishery commission to the 
Senate for approval, Senator Frye, Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, brought forward a resolution that the 
President's commission "ought not to be provided for by 
Congress".41 This resolution was approved by the Senate 
with the support of the Democratic senators from the 
Atlantic Seaboard.42 To reinforce this point, in the 
Spring of 188?, Senator Hoar introduced the following 
resolution: "••• it is the judgement of the Senate that 
under the present circumstances no negotiations should be 
undertaken with Great Britain in regard to existing 
difficulties with her province of Canada which has for its 
object the reduction, the change, or abolition or any or 
our present duties on imports."43 The intransigence or 
the Senators persuaded Cleveland and secretary Bayard to 
appoint the American Commissioners without the approval or 
the Senate.44 Support for this scheme came from Senator 
40 Grover Cleveland (1837-1908) Mayor of Buffalo, 
N.Y. (1881-2), Governor of New York (18S3-5J, President or 
the United States (1885-9, 1893-?). 
41 Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Stud~ in 
Courage (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1962), p. 40 • 
42 Nevins, Cleveland, p. 41?. 
43 U.S. Con~essional Record, 49th Congress, 2nd 
Sess., Vol. 18, p. 91. 
44 Nevins, Cleveland, p. 408. 
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John T. Morgan of Alabama,45 leading Democratic member of 
the Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Morgan noted 
that Congressional approval was not required in appointing 
the commissioners.46 Furthermore, Sir Lionel Sackville-
West notified Bayard that the Marquis of Salisbury, 
British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, would 
recognize the Executive-appointed American commissioners.47 
The chief delegates were Bayard, for the United 
States, and Joseph Chamberlain,48 for Great Britain. The 
other British commissio~ers were Sackville-West and Sir 
Charles Tupper,49 the Canadian High Commissioner in London. 
45 John T. Morgan (1824-1911), United States 
Senator from Alabama (1877-1907). 
46 Phelps to Bayard, June 1, 1877, Tansill, 
Bayard, p. 266. 
47 Marquis of Salisbury to Sackville-\ve.st, July 
117 1881; in Tansill, Ba~ard1 p. 267. Lord Salisbury was Pr~me Minister (1885, 18 6-9~, 1895-1902). 
48 Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914), Liberal until 
1886 when be left Gladstone's Ministry over Home Rule for 
Ireland. In 1895, Colonial Secretary in Salisbury's 
Administration. 
49 Sir Charles Tupper (1821-1915). Premier of 
Nova Scotia (1864-67), Canadian MP. (1867-84) Cabinet (1870-83), High Commissioner, London (1883-96~, Prime 
Minister ~1896). 
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With Tupper, as advisors, were John S.D. Thompson,5° 
Canadian Minister of Justice, and James s. Winter,51 
Attorney-General of Newfoundland. The actual negotiations 
were long and arduous, stretching from November 27, 1887 
to February 15, 1888. The main conflict came when Tupper 
wanted the Commission to consider a very complete system 
of reciprocal trade between Canada and the United States. 
Bayard knew any hint of general reciprocity would damn 
the treaty's chances of being accepted by the Senate.52 
After twenty-three plenary sessions and many personal 
conferences between Bayard and Chamberlain, the treaty was 
sent to the Senate for consideration on February 20, 1888. 
In many ways its fate could have been foreseen. In the 
subsequent hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, 
on the floor of the Senate, and in the press, the 
Republicans were determined to turn the treaty into a 
political weapon to be used against the Democratic 
50 John S.D. Thompson (1844-1894), left Supreme 
Court of Nova Scotia to become Minister of Justice (1885-92). 
Prime Minister (1892-4). 
5l James s. Winter (1845-1911). Attorney-General 
of Newfoundland (1885-9), Judgel_Supreme Court (1893-6), 
Premier· of Newfoundland ~1897-1~0). 
52 Tansill, Can.-Am. Relations, pp. 62-3. 
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Administration in the Presidential Election. The Senate 
finally rejected the treaty on August 21, 1888 by a vote 
of yeas-27, nays-30, absent-19.53 Despite this defeat, 
Bayard was able to institute the 'modus vivendi' attached 
to the draft treaty in order to provide a basis for 
regulating the fishery.54~ 
While these Anglo-American negotiations were in 
progress, Sir Ambrose Shea55 tried to initiate talks 
leading to a separate reciprocity treaty between 
Newfoundland and the United States. In April, 1885, with 
the blessing of the St. John's Chamber of Commerce, Shea 
proceeded to Washington to determine the attitude of the 
United States Government on a separate treaty since the 
Treaty of Washington was due to lapse on July 1. The 
United States Government favoured a settlement of the 
fishery question, but felt it could take no action while 
Congress was in recess.56 When questions were asked about 
Shea's powers, Fredrick Carter, the Administrator of 
53 Tansill, Can.-Am. Relations, p. 83. For a 
close study of these negotiations, see ~., ~~· 60-82. 
54 For Text of 'modus vivendi', see Appendix H. 
55 Sir Ambrose Shea (1815-1905), Member of 
Newfoundland Legislature (1848-87), Governor of Bahamas 
(1887-92). 
56 c.o. 194-/208, "Re~ort of the St. John's 
Chamber of Commerce", Aug. 12, 1885. 
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Newfoundland, noted that Shea had not been deputized by 
the Newfoundland Government as he was Opposition Leader.57 
Shea was not discouraged for on August 15, he sent a 
letter to Bayard claiming credit for persuading the 
British to accept the 'modus vivendi' of 1885.58 To 
.understand Shea's motivation for these actions, one should 
note that he was attempting to be appointed Governor of 
Newfoundland or British Consul-General at New York.59 
In February, 1887, Shea and Robert Thorburn, the 
Premier of Newfoundland, were in London to persuade the 
Colonial Office to accept a bait bill passed by the 
Newfoundland Legislature.60 Shea did not let the visit 
to London slip without l'II'iting to the American Minister, 
E.J. Phelps, to press his case for reciprocity.61 Phelps 
57 c.o. 194/208, Fredrick Carter (Administrator) 
to Colonial Office, Dec. 21, 1885. 
58 Shea to Bayard, August 15, 1885, in Tansill, 
Bayard, p. 202. 
59 c.o. 194/208, Robert Thorburn to Colonial 
Office, Dec. ;1, 1885, and c.o. 194/209, Sir G. DesVoeux 
to Earl Granville, June 7, 1886. 
60 c.o. 194/210, Sir G. DesVoeux to Sir Henry 
Holland (Colonial Secretary), Feb. 21, 1887. 
61 Shea to ·.:Phelps, May 10, 1887, in Tansill, 
Bayard, p. 26;. 
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was sympathetic to Shea's proposals and wrote to Bayard 
on May 11, suggesting Shea's overtures might be a "most 
important step toward the solution of existing difficulties." 
The United States Government could hardly ignore this very 
promising initiative.62 Despite Phelps' high hopes, 
Bayard was not willing to commence separate negotiations 
with Newfoundland while he was working to bring all the 
parties to the fisheries together on a Joint High 
Commission.63 The abortive nature of Shea's advances 
toward Bayard and the defeat of the Bayard-Chamberlain 
Treaty ·left only the 'modus vivendi' of 1888 to regulate 
the relations between British North America and the 
United States.64 Such a temporary arrangement was to 
serve-as an invitation for the leaders from all the parties 
to secure a new, permanent fishery treaty in the form of 
a larger reciprocal trade agreement, as in 1854 or a 
separate fishing treaty as in 1871. 
62 Phelps to Bayard, May 11, 1887, in Tansill, 
Can.-Am. Relations, p. 54. 
63 Bayard to Phelps, May 31, 188?, in Tansill, 
Bayard, pp. 265-6. 
64 See Appendix I. 
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CHAP.PER II 
NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN 
In 1889 there was a change of government in 
Newfoundland. The administration of Robert Thorburn had 
been elected in 1885 on a conservative, Protestant policy 
with financial reentrenchment as its objective. The 
Executive Council1 of the Government was commercially-
oriented, with the exception of J.S. Donnelly and Maurice 
Fenelon. They were appointed to the Council on July 26, 1886 
in an effort to revitalize the Government, and both were 
Roman Catholics.2 This was the curse of the Government 
which was filled with men of sound mercantile principles, 
but lacking in the experience to direct Government Policy. 
Thorburn, the Premier, had been in the House of Assembly 
for less than one year after spending more than fifteen 
years in the appointive Legislative Council.3 When 
1 The Executive Council approximated the position 
of a cabinet. 
2 D.W. Prowse, Histor~of Newfoundland (London: 
MacMillan & Co~. 1895), pp. 51 5. See also, Nfld. ~ 
Book: 1888, "Executive Council". 
3 c.o. 194/210, Sir G. DesVoeux to Sir Henry 
Holland., Feb. 21, 1887 • 
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Thorburn's followers presented themselves for reelection 
in November, 1889, there was reason to expect they would 
be returned. However, the results of the election were 
disastrous for the Government. The Opposition, Whitewayite 
Party won 28 of the 36 seats in the Assembly, defeating 
the whole of the Executive Council, in many ridings by 
overwhelming majorities.4 
To understand this disaster, the opinions of the 
Governor, Sir Terence 0 'Brien, are of significance. 0 'Brien i.' 
had arrived in Newfoundland in January of 1889, following 
a period as Governor of the British possession of Heligoland 
until that Island was traded to Germany for Zanzibar in 
1890.5 O'Brien's experience on Heligoland, with its area 
of 150 acres, did not prepare him for the incredibly 
complex political situation in Newfoundland. As a 
consequence, he was continuously outmanoeuvered by local 
politicians with whom be quarrelled when they refused to 
follow his suggestions. However, O'Brien is the only 
relatively neutral observer whose opinions of the Election 
4 c.o. 194/212, Enclosure in Sir Terence O'Brien 
to Lord Knutsford (Sir Henry Holland) Colonial Secretary, 
Nov. 14, 1890. See, especially Appendix I ,. 
5 c.o. 194/212, O'Brien to Knutsford, Jan. 19, 
1889 (O'Brien was Governor of Newfoundland from 1889 to 
1895~ See c.o. 194/212, Memorandum: Colonial Office, 
Jan. 22, 1889. 
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1889 are recorded for consultation. On October 21, he 
thought the election would produce a small majority for the 
Government; however, he feared the newly-passed Ballot Act 
(suffrage to males of 25 years) might damage the Govern-
ment's chances.6 The Governor considered the election 
results i~ a report he sent to Lord Knutsford,7 the 
Colonial Secretary, dated November 14, 1889. O'Brien 
noted that Whiteway8 had left Newfoundland in 1885 when he 
was defeated by Thorburn and did not return until 
September, 1889. Whiteway was opposed by the Government, 
most of the Roman Catholic clergy and the 'ruling class', 
mainly made up of the 'merchant princes'. Victory was won 
because Whiteway was personally popular among the electorate 
which had been enlarged by the Ballot Act and incensed by 
the attacks of the "merchants and the priests". Whiteway 
was not slow to e~loit this attitude. He also pressed the 
idea that a change of government might bring 'better times'. 
Fu~ther, the people of the South Coast of the Island were 
aroused because Thorburn's Bait Act had attempted to 
eliminate their valuable trade with the French on St. 
6 c.o. 194/212, O'Brien to Knutsford, Oct. 21, 
1889. 
7 Sir Henry Holland (1825-1914) after 1888t Baron 
Knutsford; after 1895, Viscount Knutsford; Secretary of 
State for the Colonies (1888-92). 
8 Sir William Valence Whiteway (1826-1908), Premier 
of Newfoundland (1878-85, 1889-94, 1895-97). 
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Pierre. The fishermen were refused permission to sell bait 
to the French in return for the cheaper French manufactured 
goods.9 Finally, Whiteway used the anti-confederate slogans 
as many before him had done to arouse the inherent xenophobia 
of Newfoundlanders.10 
The results of the election created a crisis in 
Newfoundland and further illustrated O'Brien's naive 
attitude toward politics. On November 18, twelve days after 
the election, Whiteway as the incoming Premier wrote O'Brien 
to demand that some action be taken to relieve the heavy 
burden of unemployment which existed in Newfoundland.11 
At the same time, a poster had been displayed in St. John's 
which offered two thousand jobs at $1.25 per day, signed 
Whiteway and Bond.12 Here was the favourite tactic of 
Whiteway and Bond; request action on some issue, and at the 
same time present the petitioned person with a 'fait 
accompli', making it almost impossible for him to object 
without losing prestige. At the same time, Thorburn h~d 
been asking O'Brien to institute a plan for the distribution 
of relief jobs by means of a committee made up of one 
9 Any trade between the South Coast and St. Pierre 
was trade lost by St. John's. For the Treaty on the 
French in Newfoundland, see Appendix B. 
10 c.o. 194/212, O'Brien to Knutsford, Nov. 14, 1889. 
lL.c.o. 194/212, Whiteway to 0 'Brien, Nov. 18, 1889. 
12 c.o. 194/212, Evening Mercury, Nov. 18, 1889. 
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Government member, a Whitewayite, and the Surveyor of 
Works.13 The result of this suggestion was a long 
correspondence between the two men. Thorburn reminded 
O'Brien that his government remained in power until it 
resigned; in return, O'Brien refused any new public works 
programs after the election results were known.14 Not only 
did O'Brien quarrel with Thorburn but also with Wbiteway 
over appointments. The Governor soon found the notice of 
November 18 was only one example of the use of job promises 
to secure votes during the election. By December, a very 
bitter controversy broke out between O'Brien, Whiteway 
and Thorburn on this subject with recriminations 
intensified by the participation of the partisan press.15 
At the same time, a large group of unemployed men descended 
upon St. John's due to promises made during the election 
by Whiteway. However, to avoid possible trouble, O'Brien 
forced Thorburn's Government out of power before the 
Legislature met, and Thorburn could resign on a vote of 
confidence.16 As a postscript to the period between the 
n.d. 
l3 c.o. 194/212, Memorandum: O'Brien to Thorburn, 
14 c.o. 194/212, Memorandum: O'Brien to Thorburn, 
n.d.; Thorburn to O'Brien, Nov. 221 1889; Memorandum: Government to the Governor, Dec. lb, 1889. 
15 See ·also note .. 14. c.o. 194/212, \vhiteway to 
O'Brien, Dec. 4, 1889, Evening Telegram, Dec. 4, 1889l Dec. 
5, 1889, Dec. 6, 1889; Evening Mercury, Dec. 5, Dec. ·1, 1889, 
Dec. 9, 1889. 
16 c.o. 194/212, O'Brien to Knutsford, Dec. 10, 1889. 
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election of November 6 and the formation of the Whiteway 
Government on January 1, O'Brien received a reprimand from 
Lord Knutsford. The Governor was criticized for taking 
too active a role in the government of Newfoundland \'lhich 
was not becoming to his position. He was especially 
censured for criticizing government policy, acting as if 
the Governor were the Government, presiding over meetings 
of the Executive Council, and communicating directly with 
government departments instead of through the Executive 
Council.17 In Lord Knutstord's words, O'Brien was "too 
dictatorial" in his attitude to government, especially in 
a colony with responsible government.18 
When Whiteway formed his administration in January, 
1890, it was obvious that only a small proportion of his 
following possessed legislative experience.19 For this 
reason, a large part of the responsibility for directing 
government policy and administering that policy would 
rest with Whiteway who was Premier and Attorney-General, 
/Robert Bond his Colonial Secretary, and Opposition Leader 
during the Thorburn Administration, and Edward Morris, a 
Member of the Executive Council who had been an extremely 
17 C.O. 19~/212, Memorandum: John Anderson to John 
Bramston, Dec. 19, 1889. 
18 c.o. 19~/212, Anderson to Bramston, Jan. 26, 1890. 
l9 Only 6 members had sat in the House of Assembly, 
see Appendix I. 
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active promoter of reform legislation during his first 
term in the Assembly (1885-9).20 The relationship between 
Bond and Morris was to dominate Newfoundland politics from 
the fall of Whiteway in 1897 until the end of the Great 
War. Within the Administration, Whiteway appears to have 
been satisfied to remain the master politician who kept 
the disparate groups within his administration from 
tearing the party into fragments. 21 Whiteway's attitude 
left much of the initiative for policy to his young 
subordinates. In 1890, Morris was eager to implement some 
of his reform legislation which had been blocked while he 
was in opposition between 1885 and 1889. 
The interests of Whiteway and Morris left Bond 
with a wide range of action beyond the routine administration 
of the hodge-podge of duties · incumbent upon a Colonial 
Secretary. These duties were by no means onerous since the 
origin of the Office was that of an Imperial civil servant 
who acted as Secretary to the Governor's Council. By 1890, 
20 On Morris, the reformer, see J.P. Greene, ·' 
"Edward Patrick Morrl.s11 (Unpublished Honours Thesis, 
Memorial University of Newfoundland) ., pp. 1-22. Edward 
Patrick Morris (1859-1935) entered Whiteway's Cabinet (1889), Leader, Independent Liberals (1898-1900), Attorney-
and M:i.nister of Justice under Bond (1902-7), Leader, 
People's Party (1908), Premier (1909-18). Robert Bond (1857-
1927) entered House of Assembly (1882)~ Speaker (1884), 
Colonial Secretary (1889-94 and 1895-7J, Premier and 
Colonial Secretary (1900-9), Leader of the Opposition (1909-14). 
21 Greene, "Morris", pp. 61-83. 
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in the older colonies like Newfoundland, the Colonial 
Secretary became a member of the elected Administration in 
the Colony, while in the Crown Colonies which were still 
ruled directly by the Governor, the Colonial Secretary was 
still an Imperial official • .Arolding this important but 
ill-defined office, Bond was able to look out from 
Newfoundland to the British Empire, and to carve a role 
for himself in this greater arena.22 ~t is only natural 
that Bond should be dissatisfied with the very limited 
opportunities offered by Newfoundland politics. 
The classic example of the politician~ response to 
this situation was given in the attitude of the politicians 
of the British Maritime Colonies before the formation of 
the Dominion of Canada. These politicians, particularly 
Charles Tupper of Nova Scotia, were well aware their 
future within the Maritime Colonies could only be limited; 
indeed a part to play on the stage of the new nation was 
not an inconsiderable factor in their choice of 
Confederation.23 In fact, the most recalcitrant opponent 
of Confederation, Joseph Howe, was brought over to 
Confederation by the promise of a seat among the mighty 
22 P. Neary and S.J.R. Noel, "Newfoundland's Quest 
for Reciprocity~ , 1890-1910", u~publi~hed l!lanuscript in 
Centre for Nfld. Studies, Memor1al Un1vers1ty, St. John's, 
p. 1. 
23 P.B. Waite, Life and Times of Confederation 
(Toronto: University Press, 1962), p. 89. 
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in Ottawa.24 However, if there was an example for the 
colonial politician, it was Tupper who was a country doctor 
in Nova Scotia, Premier of that Colony, member of the 
Canadian Government, and finally, High Commissioner to 
Great Britain, Baronet,- and owner of a country seat in 
England. 
Aside from this path there was the chance a 
promising colonial might be able to enter the Imperial 
civil service directly as a Governor or lesser official. 
Sir Ambrose Shea bad received this honour, after long 
service in Newfoundland, by an appointment to the 
Governorship of the Bahamas. If a person could gain 
entrance into the civil service at an early age, he could 
rise to a position of some importance, ultimately to 
aspire to a peerage. 
Finally, a politician could remain in his colonial 
setting, but by some success in aiding or advising the 
Imperial Government might rise to become a confidential 
adviser to the British Government, such as Jan Christian 
Smuts25 was to become in the •entieth century. In such a 
position, one could reasonably expect to receive honours 
24 D • . Creighton, John A. Macdonald: Old Chieftain 
(Toronto: MacMillan & Co., 1966), pp. 24-32. 
25 Jan Christian Smuts (1870-1950), Premier of 
South Africa (1919-24, 1939-45). 
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in excess of those normally bestowed upon officials of 
minor colonies. In fact, Bond's rival, Morris, received 
a peerage for just these reasons. 
Whether Bond actually considered these alternatives 
specifically is a matter of some question, but his actions 
indicate that he was not unconscious of these possibilities. 
Indeed, Bond's motives in looking outward may have been 
influenced by Augustus W. Harvey, a leading member of 
Whiteway's Administration, and Government Leader in the 
Legislative Council, who saw the solution of Newfoundland's 
problems in the removal of French fishing rights in 
Newfoundland. 1ffarvey was the leading banker of the Island, 
and a spokesman for the large merchants who opposed any 
reduction of Newfoundland's political autonomy by 
confederation with Canada, presumably because of possible 
competition from Canadian businessmen,?6 
Thus, whether Bond decided on the advocation of 
the renewal of reciprocity immediately or by a process of 
elimination of other possible means of injecting new 
vitality into the Newfoundland economy is unclear; 
although the latter was more likely than the former. Bond's 
interest in reciprocity must be equated with the fact that 
26 Newfoundland Archives. MacKenzie Bowell Papers, 
Senator Howlen to MacKenzie Bowell (Prime Minister), June 
16, 1891, pp. 4405-16. 
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be was now in the position of initiating policy. In 1887, 
as Leader of the Opposition, be stated the following at 
the time of Shea's mission to Washington; "••• for the 
paltry consideration of free admission into American 
markets of fish and ~il valued at about one hundred and 
fifty thousand dollars, to allow the Americans to come 
here and catch for themselves all the bait that they 
desired ••• " was an outrage. 27 Bond's reaction to Shea's 
mission in 1887 was dictated by the old maxim that 'the 
duty of the Opposition is to oppose' any government action. 
Shea's mission may not have bad official government 
approval but the close relations between Thorburn's 
Administration and the Chamber of Commerce indicated that 
their interests were similar. 
Even if Bond bad been motivated by political 
expediency in his previous action, the economic crisis 
which faced Newfoundland in 1890 would force him to seek 
some immediate method of improving the Island's economy. 
The Report of the Chamber of Commerce for 1889 was not 
encouraging. The inshore cod fishery had been a partial 
failure; copper prices were depressed; the Labrador cod 
fishery and the spring seal fishery bad only been average • 
Only the Bank fishery and the Lobster trade had been good 
although there was evidence the average size of lobsters 
27 c.o. 194/210, Evening Telegram, n.d., 1887. 
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was falling. 28 The fishery was not only plagued by a 
partial catch, but also many of Newfoundland's customers 
in the all-important dried cod trade were imposing tariff 
barriers against imports of fish. In 1887, Brazil. raised 
its duty on cod imports by 55 per cent to 0/7/1 per 
hundred weight.29 
The sluggish condition of the fishery had an effect 
on Newfoundland's precarious banking system. The banks 
were:. the Union Bank, controlled by Harvey~ the Commercial 
Bank, controlled by leading members of the Opposition·,- · 
J.S. Pitts, and A.F. Goodridge, and the Government-controlled 
Newfoundland Savings Bank. The Savings Bank's assets were 
deposited in the two private banks or held in the form of 
Government of Newfoundland Debentures.3° These private 
banks had guaranteed loans to merchants to allow them to 
prepare for the fishery. These loans were made to men who 
were directors of these banks and were often backed with 
money deposited by the 'Savings Bank'. Likewise these 
guarantees were many times in excess of the resources of 
28 c.o. 194/212, "Report of Chamber of Commerce, 
1889", signed A.F. Goodridge, Pres. For ~obst~r s~ze, see 
also: ·o.o. 194/216, "Report of Lobster FJ.sherJ.es J.n 
Western Newfoundland." See Appendices C and D. 
29 c.o. 194/210, Minute of Executive Council, Aug. 
20, 1887. 
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the banks. In short, the directors of these banks used 
their positions to defraud the depositors of their own 
banks and the Savings Bank, and then expected the Savings 
Bank and ultimately the Government to advance them the 
capital to avoid bankruptcy.3l The Newfoundland Government 
could aid the banks temporarily, but only increased sales 
of the remaining stocks of dried codfish could return the 
economy and banks to solvency. 
These are some of the factors which faced Bond and 
his colleagues in St. John's. To understand Bond's motives 
it is not only essential to discuss his personal ambitions, 
to note some of the immediate economic problems of 
Newfoundland, but also to consider the very amorphous 
position occupied by colonies within the British Empire. 
This lack of definition of the status of a colony like 
Newfoundland made it extremely difficult for these colonies 
to initiate a program of trade promotion with foreign 
countries, for ultimately any negotiations would have to be 
approved by the Imperial Government in London. The people 
at Whitehall were concerned with the problems of British 
Foreign policy and the internal harmony of the Empire. 
Any negotiations carried on by Newfoundland would be 
considered in view of their compatibility with the needs 
of Britain and the Empire. If the Newfoundland Government 
chose to submit their trade proposals to the British 
3l Thompson, French Shore, p. 121. 
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Minister accredited to the government involved, then there 
was the possibility that the proposals would be torn to 
shreds by the officials in London and the other, large 
colonies even if the prospective consumer country agreed 
to the terms. The futility which accompanied any attempt 
by Newfoundland to expand her foreign trade was emphasized 
by the cavalier manner in which British and Canadian 
officials continually ignored Newfoundland proposals. 
Canada, under the firm control of Sir John A. Macdonald, 
treated Newfoundland as if it were within the Canadian 
sphere of influence. Sir Charles Tupper of Nova Scotia 
as Canadian High Commissioner in London was ever alert to 
detect and neutralize any attempts by Newfoundland to 
infringe upon Canadian prerogatives. 
The Administration in St. John's needed a clear 
definition of its powers to negotiate with foreign 
countries and a careful exposition of those steps to be 
taken in conducting trade talks with nations outside the 
Empire. The various initiatives of Sir Ambrose Shea in 
London and Washington were directed toward the 'de facto' 
acceptance of Newfoundland's right to reciprocity 
regardless of the interests of the rest of the Empire. If 
Bond was successful in securing a trade treaty from the 
United States, it would establish for the Newfoundland 
Government the right to enter into a bilateral agreement 
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with a country outside the Empire, even if the agreement 
had to be ratified by London. 
Whatever Bond's reasons for advocating reciprocity, 
he was given an opportunity to press his views almost 
immediately after the election of the Whiteway Party.· The 
Imperial Government, in London, was anxious to discuss the 
whole series of fishery problems in Newfoundland with 
Whiteway, early in the new year.32 The immediate cause of 
anxiety at the Colonial Office was the opposition of the 
Newfoundland Government to its inclusion within a renewal 
of the modus vivendi of 1888.33 With this attitude in 
Newfoundland, the modus vivendi expired on February 15, 
and returned the fishery to the terms of 1818.34 In 
London, much greater interest was focused on the most 
recent irritant in the French Shore Problem, namely, the 
Lobster Factory Question. The immediate crisis arose over 
the building of lobster factories on the French Treaty 
shore along the West Coast of Newfoundland. The lobster 
canning industry was increasing rapidly in Newfoundland by 
1890, exclusively on the treaty shore. This development 
32 c.o. 194/212, c.o. to O'Brien, Dec. 7, 1889, 
see also Memorandum: E.F. Pennell to Bramston, Dec. 10, 1889. 
33 See Note 54, page 38. 
1890). 
34 c.o. 880/11, O'Brien to Knutsford (Rec. May 16, 
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forced the local naval officers representing both England 
and France to decide on the merits of eaeh factory. The 
lack of guidance provided by the Treaty of 1783 led to 
confusion and conflicting interpretations of each country's 
rights. As might be anticipated, the Newfoundland 
Government was infuriated when the right of its people to 
set up factories on the West Coast was dependent upon an 
agreement between the naval officers present. The 
Newfoundland Government was equally adverse to any 
suggestion of a 'modus vivendi' between Britain and France 
which would not include Newfoundland. Lord Salisbury was 
sufficiently concerned about Anglo-French relations to be 
determined to settle the question regardless of Newfoundland's 
objections.35 
This lobster controversy, together with the ending 
of the Bayard 'modus vivendi' made the Colonial Office 
anxious to hold discussions with Whiteway as early as 
possible. Indeed, the authorities in London were non-
committal toward any separate talks between Newfoundland 
and the United States until they could engage in 
comprehensive talks with Whiteway on all aspects of the 
fisheries.36 However, instead of the early meeting 
advocated by the Colonial Office, Whiteway, who bad to 
35 Thompson, French Shore, pp. 93-119, esp. PP· 100-5. 
36 c.o. 880/11, c.o. (Bramston) to F.0. 1 April 2, 1890; F.O. (P.W. Currie) to c.o., April 10, 189o; Knutsford 
to O'Brien, April 12, 1890. 
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face a session of the Assembly, was not able to leave for 
London until June 20.37 
The delay in Whiteway' s arrival in London allo\>ted 
the Opposition to act. Before the Thorburn Administration 
resigned, some of its chief members had formed the 
'Patriotic Society' with its own newspaper, the Evening 
- Herald. The leading members of the society were Thorburn, 
James Winter (Attorney-General), James Pitts and Moses 
Monroe (prominent merchants and Members of the Legislative 
Council), Maurice Fenelon (Colonial Secretary and personal 
representative of the Roman Catholic Bishop), and finally 
A.B. Morine (Editor of the Herald and Leader of the 
Opposition in 1890). The Society was an amalgam of the 
merchants and the Roman Catholic Bishop, aimed at the 
French holdings in Newfoundland and Confederation with 
Canada.38 In May of 1890, the Patri~tic Society sent a 
delegation to London to protest the possible extension of 
French rights in Newfoundland. 
It was not until July 16 that Whiteway and A.W. 
Harvey arrived in London. Bond was to follow later after 
he made a tour of the French Shore in his capacity as 
37 c.o. 880/11, O'Brien to Knutsford, June 20, 1890. 
38 c.o. 194/214, O'Brien to Knutsford, Mar. 28, 1890. 
39 c.o. 880/11, James Winter to c.o., London, May 
16, 1890. 
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Colonial Secretary. He arrived in London on July 26 and 
with him came George Emerson, Speaker of the House of 
Assembly.40 
At the same time, when Whiteway and Harvey had 
been in London for six days, John Bramston, Assistant 
Under Secretary in charge of the North Ame~ican Department 
at the Colonial Office, asked for Whiteway's observations 
on American rights under the Convention of 1818.41 In 
response to this request, a memorandum, containing the 
terms for a potential agreement with the United States, 
was drafted by Harvey and sent to the Colonial Office on 
July 12. The Newfoundland Executive Council had resolved 
on February 27 that Newfoundland could gain more from 
bilateral negotiations with the United States than from a 
renewal of reciprocity.42 This memorandum became the 
basis on which further negotiations took place, it is 
essential, therefore, to reproduce the text in full: 
1890. 
40 c.o. 880/11, O'Brien to Knutsford, June 20, 
41 c.o. 880/11, c.o. (Bramston) to Whiteway, July 
10, 1890. 
42 c.o. 880/11, Minute of txecutive Council, Feb. 
27, 1890, in O'Brien to Knutsford, Feb. 28, 1890. 
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American vessels to have the privilege of 
purchasing bait at all times on the same terms 
and in same quantities as Newfoundland vessels 
and to ha'tJ'·a all privileges of touching and trading, 
selling fish, oil, &c., getting supplies without 
other changes than light and barbour dues and 
customs duesi such as are levied on Newfoundland 
vessels simi arly employed. 
American vessels procuring bait from 
Newfoundland to give bonds1 similar to bonds given by Newfoundland vessels, W1th like penalties; 
provision to be made for enforcing penalties in 
United States territory. 
In return, United States to admit cod fish, 
cod oil! seal oil, herrings, salmon, &c., from 
Newfoundland, the produce of Newfoundland fisheries, 
free of duty. 43 
These terms would give Newfoundland a 'pro quid quo' (free 
fish) in exchange for the admission of American ships in 
search of bait on the same terms as Newfoundland ships; 
whereas, under the 'modus vivendi' system, Newfoundland 
bait was given to the Americans as a makeweight in Anglo-
American negotiations. 
An intriguing feature in this note was its being 
drafted by Harvey. Why Whiteway did not do the work 
himself, be was Attorney-General as well as Premier, is 
unclear as the terms enclosed were general and by no means 
erudite. It seems likely the terms of the memorandum were 
decided upon at the Executive Council meeting of February 
2? and Whiteway merely delegated Harvey to draw up the 
43 c.o. 880/11, "Memorandum with regard to United 
States~ in Wbiteway to Knutsford, July 12, 1890. 
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recommendations into the form of a draft agreement.44 
The delegation in London waited for nine days 
without receiving a reply from the Colonial Office, not 
even confirmation of the Colonial Office's reception of 
the memorandum. · The need for action in Newfoundland led 
Whiteway to dispatch a new note to the Colonial Office.45 
Whiteway asked the British Government to guarantee a loan 
off5 million to help extend the Newfoundland Railway 
from Placentia Junction to the Hall's Bay Line in the 
Interior of Newfoundland. The railroad had been one of the 
main planks in Whiteway's election platform in 1889.46 
The railway was to be the sheet anchor in plans for the 
development of the Island of Newfoundland as railwayG were 
in other under developed areas. However, John Bramston at 
the Colonial Office wanted any railway guarantee linked 
with the Colonial Government's acceptance of an Anglo-French 
settlement of the French Shore problem; in effect, the 
Newfoundland Government's acceptance of the rights of the 
French and a guarantee that Newfoundlanders would observe 
French rights.4? It is illustrative of the relative 
44 See note ~ • 
45 Canada. House of Commons. 8essional Papers1 1891, 
no. 38 ( CSP., 1891/38), Whi teway to C ~0. ,. -July 21, 18';10. 
46 See note 1~. 
47 CSP. 1891/38, c.o. (Bramston~ to Whiteway, J~ly 
311 1890; c.o. S80/ll, c.o. to F.O., August 2, 1890; c.o. 88u/ll, F.O. to c.o., Aug. 6, 1890. 
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importance which the British Government attached to the 
French Shore question and the Newfoundland-United States 
fishing dispute that the guarantee of a railroad loan was 
tied to the settlement of the French Shore Question. 
Even though the Imperial Government was interested 
principally in the successful solution of the French 
Question, there was an interest in the possibility of a 
Newfoundland-American agreement. On August 8, Thomas V. 
Lister, Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, sent a note 
to the Colonial Office concerning American-Newfoundland 
relations. Lister stated Lord Salisbury's willingness to 
consult Sir Julian Pauncefote,48 British Minister in 
Washington, on the appropriateness of negotiations. 
However, Lister interjected two preconditions: Canada 
should be consulted before negotiations began, and there 
should be some improvement in the French Shore problem.49 
Again Salisbury's concern with the French Shore problem 
made a concession by the Newfoundland delegation almost 
inevitable. 
On August 15, all four delegates from Newfoundland 
signed a note to the effect that they had received no 
48 Sir Julian Pauncefote (1828-1902), Permanent 
Under SecretarY., Foreign Office (1882-9), Minister to the 
United States (1889-93), Ambassador to the United States 
(1895-1902~ 
1890. 
49 c.o. 880/11, F.O. (Lister) to c.o., August 8, 
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definite plan from the Colonial Office for the settlement 
of any of Newfoundland's problems.5° This letter had the 
desired effect, for on the 18th., Assistant Under Secretary 
R.H. Meade,5l on Lord Knutsford's orders, sent a note to 
the Foreign Office asking permission for Newfoundland-
American negotiations without Canada. The negotiations 
would be conducted by Pauncefote in Washington.52 To 
reinforce the point, Knutsford sent a personal note to 
Lord Salisbury on August 24. He noted: 
I hope you will assent to the Newfoundlanders 
being allowed to make separate & independent 
treaty with the U. States ••• ! do not see that 
Canada bas any grounds for interfering in such a 
question. It is quite certain she would not 
allow Newfoundland to interfere an objection to 
any arrangement which she might make with the u. 
States. 53 
This is an important statement which is not in the official 
correspondence and will be considered later in the light of 
the Imperial Government's actions. 
50 c.o. 880/11, Colonial Delegates (Whiteway, Bond, 
Harvey, and Emerson) to c.o., Aug. 15, 1890. 
5l R.N. Meade was Assistant Under Secretary, 
Colonial Office (1871-92). 
52 c.o. 880/11, c.o., to F.o., August 18, 1890. 
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In the interim, Sir Julian Pauncefote had reported 
that he did n·ot think there was any hope of success in 
negotiating reciprocity with the United States; however, 
he saw no reason not to approach the Secretary of State, 
James G. Blaine, \'lith a proposal. The Foreign Office 
instructed Pauncefote to commence preliminary negotiations.54 
No official at the Colonial Office appears to have 
communicated this information to the Newfoundland 
delegates since ~n September 9 Whiteway informed the Office 
that Bond was leaving for the United States on the next 
day. Could Bond be supplied with the necessary 
authorization to negotiate with the United States 
Government? Could these documents be sent to New York? 
Instead of following Whiteway's suggestion, there 
was a great rush to supply Bond with his orders before he 
left England. Indeed, by the next day, a letter of 
introduction to Pauncefote was sent to Bond at Queenstown 
(Cobh), Ireland.55 There subsequently arose a debate when 
Bond claimed he had received a second, and more extensive 
set of instructions from the Colonial Office upon his 
arrival in New ,York.56 Bond claimed his power to vreat 
54 C.O. 880/11, F.O. to C.O., Sept. 4, 1890. 
55 C.O. to F.O., Sept. 9, 1890; F.O. to C.O., 
Sept. 10, 1890; c.o. to Robert Bond, Sept. 10, 1890. 
56 Bond Speech, House of Assembly, March 6, 1891, 
in Evening Telegram, Mar. 13, 1891. 
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with Pauncefote came from these orders. It would appear, 
however, the orders Bond received in New York were indeed 
the communication, already discussed, which was sent to 
him at Queensland, but because Bond left for New York via 
Moville, in the North of Ireland, the letter had to be 
redirected to Bond at New York.57 Although Bond in his 
speech of March 6, 1891, attempted to justify his actions 
in Washington by citing his correspondence with Whiteway 
and the Colonial Office, there was no communication of 
powers from the Colonial Office to Bond beyond those 
enclosed ~n Salisbury's letter of September 10, 1890. 
It is necessary to consider Bond's powers of 
negotiation as embodied in his letter of introduction to 
Pauncefote. The text of the Marquis of Salisbury's 
dispatch to Sir Julian Pauncefote was as follows: 
Sir, this dispatch will be delivered to you 
by the Honourable Robert Bond, Colonial Secretary 
of Newfoundland, who is about to proceed to New 
York~ and has been commissioned by Sir. W. Whiteway, 
the ~rime Minister of the Colony, to communicate to 
you the views and wishes of the Newfoundland 
Government with regard to an arrangement for the 
admission of fish and other products of Newfoundland 
to the United States free of duty, in return for 
concessions as to the purchase of bait by the United 
States fishermen. 
Sir W. Whiteway has requested that you may be 
informed that Mr. Bond had authority to speak to you 
on the subject in the name of the Newfoundland 
Government, and have accordingly furnished him with 
this introduction to you. 58 
57 c.o. 194/218, Minute: Bramston, Feb. 4,- 1891. 
58 CSP., 1891/381 Salisbury to Pauncefote, Sept. 10, 1890; F.O. to c.o., oept. 10, 1890. 
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This dispatch, certainly more cautious than 
Knutsford's already mentioned, indicated only an extremely 
limited field of action for Bond. If Bond possessed only 
authority to c9mmunicate to Pauncefote Newfoundland's 
problems, this did not permit Bond to negotiate with any 
officially commissioned agent of the United States and 
certainly not without Pauncefote's approval. It is a 
matter of question whether Bond's letter empowered him to 
negotiate with the United States even if Pauncefote had 
given him permission to act as his deputy. In ·the literal 
meaning of the letter, Bond was to present Newfoundland's 
case to Pauncefote who would conduct the negotiations. 
However, subsequent events indicate that a 'local expert' 
such as Bond was given very consi~erable freedom of action 
by British ministers in foreign capitals obviously because 
of their knowledge of the problems involved. The 
permission granted to Bond to meet Pauncefote cannot in 
the light of Pauncefote's careless handling of the 
negotiations, be considered as anything other than an 
unmitigated blunder. The decision to permit the Bond 
Mission showed an appalling lack of foresight into the 
damage to American- Canadian-British relations if it proved 
abortive. 
This lack of direction in the conduct of official 
business which extended to British governmental departments 
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explains many of the problems which arose in both Imperial 
and international affairs. As an example of this 
:i.neptness, T.V. Lister's note from the Foreign Office, 
August 8, 1890 suggested Canada should be informed of the 
Newfoundland-American talks; yet R.T. Meade's note from 
the Colonial Office, August 18, contains no mention of 
notifying Canada, nor does any of the correspondence until 
Pauncefote's note of October 17.59 This confusion 
indicates a lack of co-ordination between both departments. 
In conclusion, the decision to provide Bond's 
letter of introduction was the result of Knutsford's 
supineness in the face of the importunities of the 
Newfoundland delegates. Indeed, Knutsford was known for 
his in&bility to persuade other people to adopt his views 
or resist forcefully-pressed opinions.60 It should also 
be noted that Knutsford was disadvantaged by the low 
status of the Colonial Office in comparison with other 
departments. 61 During this period, Knutsford suffered 
59 c.o. 880/11, F.O. (Lister) to c.o., August 8, 
1890; c.o. 880/11, c.o. (Meade) to F.O., August 18~ 1890; 
CSP.J 1891/38, Pauncefote to Salisbury, Oct. 17, 18~0. 
60 B.L. Blakeley, "The Colonial Office: 1870-1890", 
unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Duke University, 1966, pp. 
264-5. 
61 Blakeley, "Colonial Office", p. 322. 
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from recurring ill-health.62 
In accordance with Lord Salisbury's note of 
September 10, Sir Julian Pauncefote sent a note to 
Secretary Blaine to intimate that a reciprocity treaty 
between the United States and Newfoundland was possible.63 
Bond arrived in Washington at the end of September, after 
having waited in New;York until September 28, for the 
misdirected instructions from London.64 When Bond 
discovered Pauncefote had left Washington, he wrote to the 
Minister who was vacationing in Magnolia, Massachusetts, 
setting out his thoughts on reciprocity. Pauncefote 
answered this letter on October 7. 65 With an introduction 
from Pauncefote, Bond met Blaine to discuss the question 
of reciprocity. Then Blaine asked Pauncefote to transmit 
a draft convention for official consideration by the 
United States Government.66 Following his meeting with 
62 Blakeley, "Colonial Office", pp. 264-5. 
63 Pauncefote to J.G. Blaine, Sept. 15, 1890, in 
United States, Department of State, Notes to Foreign 
Legations: Great Britain, Vol. 118, in A.B. Spatter, 
"Harrison and Blaine: Foreign Policy: 1889-9311 , unpublished 
Doctoral Thesis, Rutgers University, 1967, p. 82. 
64 Bond's Speech, March 6, 1891, Evening Telegram, 
March 13, 1891. 
65 Bond's Speech. 
. 
66 Bond's Speech, and C.O. 880/12, Pauncefote to 
Sal~sbury, Oct. 1890. 
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Blaine, Bond visited New York and Boston to gain support 
for reciprocity between Newfoundland and the United States. 
Both the New York Board of Trade and the Commercial Club 
of Boston passed resolutions supporting the idea of 
reciprocity with Newfoundland.67 Both groups would gain 
by any increased trade with Newfoundland. Bond then 
proceeded to Magnolia where with Pauncefote's introduction 
he was able to talk to some of the prominent Gloucester 
fishing magnates on October 13 and October 15. However, 
Bond received a cool reception from the Gloucester Board of 
Trade.68 Despite the attitude in Gloucester, Bond 
submitted a dra.ft convention to Pauncefote who transmitted 
it officially to Blaine with little change.69 Bond returned 
to St. John's on October 31, 1890. 
With the draft treaty under consideration by 
Secretary Blaine some understanding of his :objectives is 
essential. It has already been noted that James G. Blaine 
was a major candidate for the Republican Presidential 
nomination in 1876 and 1880, Republican nominee in 1884, 
67 Bond's Speech. 
68 Boston Globe, Oct. 15, 1890; Gloucester Times, 
Oct. 15 & 18, 1890; oa~e Ann Advertiser, Oct. 14, 1890; 
Cahe Ann Breeze, Oct.$, . 1890; in Daily Colonist (St. 
Jo n1s), Nov. 1, 1890. 
1890. 
69 c.o. 880/12, Pauncefote to Blaine, Oct. 18, 
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and President-maker in 1888, by leading Benjamin Harrison's 
successful election campaign. As the leader of the 
powerful New England faction in the United States Congress, 
Blaine supported a policy of high tariffs against imports, 
hostility to the South, and hatred for Great Britain.7° 
Blaine,carried the reputation of being a 'jingo' 
with him when he became Harrison's Secretary of State in 
1889. This 'jingoism' was no doubt largely the result of 
the political expediency engendered by the biennial 
election system in the United States. Every American 
politician was aware that Presidential elections would be 
won or lost in the cities of the Atlantic Seaboard. 
Republicans tried to control these cities by creating a 
solid bloc of votes among the immigrant groups, especially 
the Irish, who were violently anti-British.7l Blaine, as 
a representative of New England w·ould obviously be 
7l Blaine, Political Discussions, pp. ~79-80. 
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extremely sensitive to the wishes of the voters in these 
cities. In addition, Blaine himself was the object of 
tremendous adulation within the Republican Party; indeed, 
be far outshone Harrison in popularity within the party, 
a fact which did nothing to enhance relations between 
Harrison and: bis Secretary of State.72 As with many 
political leaders when they receive an appointive position, 
Blaine temporarily lost most of his contentiousness and 
seemed to have pictured himself as a statesman divorced 
from ":_;politics.73 This 'new statesmanship' indicated that 
Blaine was more inclined to compromise in international 
affairs than President Harrison.74 
A distinct aspect of American politics was the 
annexation of Canada to the United States. The source of 
this policy was the United States Civil War, or 
specifically the idea that Great Britain bad given aid 
and comfort to the Confederate cause both in Canada and in 
England. If Great Britain had given aid to the South, and 
thus prolonged the Civil War, Britain, it was reasoned, 
72 Muzzey, Blaine, p. 390. 
73 A.F. Tyler, The Forei~ Polict of James G. 
Blaine (Camden: Archon Press, 19 ), p.83 • 
74 Tyler, Foreign Policy of Blaine, p. 150. 
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should compensate the United States Government for the 
cost of waging the latter half of the Civil War. Senator 
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts had advocated the payment 
of this debt by ceding British North America to the 
United States. These extreme claims were not pressed by 
Blaine but he, with other Republicans, certainly believed 
it was Canada's destiny to become part of the United 
States. There should be no doubt that Blaine only intended 
to achieve the annexation of Canada by 'peaceful ~eans' 
such as economic restrictions, and the encouragement of 
Canadian annexationists. These methods would only be 
employed if they did not harm the United States; in short, 
the annexation of Canada was supplementary to the normal 
course of affairs and was not allowed to interfere with 
the operation of these affairs. The possible effects of 
this type of economic pressure were described by Blaine 
in a letter to President Harrison: "the fact is we do not 
want any intercourse with Canada except through the medium 
of a tariff, and she will find she bas a hard row to hoe 
and will, ultimately, I believe, seek admission to the 
Union.n75 
Associated with Canadian-American relations were 
the relations between the United States and Newfoundland • 
75 James G. Blaine to Benjamin Harrison, Sept. 
1891, in G. Hamilton, Bio3fa9h~ of James G. Bla1ne (Norwich: Henry Bill Co., 8 5 , pp. 693-4. 
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A reciprocity treaty between the United States and 
Newfoundland would weaken Canada by forcing her to 
negotiate with the United States without the Newfoundland 
fisheries as a bargaining point.76 The problem of 
Blaine's attitude to reciprocity with Newfoundland is 
difficult to assess. In 1890, Blaine was attempting to 
promote good reiations between the United States and the 
Latin American nations by means of a Pan-American Congress 
in Washington, and bilateral reciprocity treaties with 
each country. Indeed, Blaine attempted to have Congress 
pass an amendment to the proposed McKinley Tariff Bill 
which would have given the President discretionary powers 
to either decrease or increase tariffs on a wide variety 
of goods by the device of Executive Order.77 This 
amendment, introduced by Senator Hale, was defeated, but 
the vigour with which Blaine pr~ssed his ideas shocked 
some of his colleagues.78 Subsequently, however, 
reciprocity treaties were signed with many Latin American 
countries and with the British Minister at Washington for 
the British Colonies ·in the Caribbean, among them were the 
Bahamas Islands, governed by Sir.Ambrose Shea • 
76 D.e·G. Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Old 
Chieftain (Toronto: MacMillan, 1966), pp. 548-9. 
77 Muzzey, Blaine, pp. 448-9. 
78 Tyler, Foreign Policy of Blaine, PP• 186-7. 
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Whether Blaine had any intention of including 
Newfoundland within his proposed reciprocity area can only 
be conjectured; however, there can be little doubt that 
Blaine had hoped to use the proposed amendment to force 
Latin American nations to buy more of their needs from the 
United States if they expected to sell their raw materials 
in the United States.79 If Blaine had planned to carry 
the Bond-Blaine negotiations into effect, then he would 
have found his supporters in New England opposed, and 
ready to show Blaine his own statements against the Bayard-
Chamberlain treaty.80 In the negotiations with Bond, 
Blaine could have had little expectation that the treaty 
would ever be ratified by the Senate in Washington after 
the treatment of his amendment to the McKinley Bill. As a 
comment on Blaine's limited objective of creating discord 
between Canada and Newfoundland, Alvey A. Adee, who was 
Second Assistant Secretary of State in .1890, noted: 
"Mr. B. (Blaine) enjoyed setting two dogs (Canada and 
Newfoundland) by the ears, ••• as much as any man I ever 
knew. Beside he had an idea that a starter in the 
direction would tend to bring about a movement in 
Newfoundland for Annexation to the United States, in which 
79 Muzzey, Blaine, p. 449. 
80 Nevins, Cleveland, p. 412. 
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I think he was oversanguine. 1181 This last section 
concerning annexationist sentiment in Newfoundland will 
be considered later. 
Bl A.A. Adee to John Hay, Sep~ •. 15, 1902, in~· 
Dennett, John Hat: From Poetry to Pol~t~cs (Port Wash~ngton: 
Kennikat Press, 963, p. 423. 
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CHAPTER III 
CANADA INTERVENES 
Whatever Blaine's motives, Sir Julian Pauncefote 
notified the Foreign Office that be had transmitted the 
draft convention to Secretary Blaine on October 17. 
Pauncefote suggested it should be sent to the Governor-
General of Canada, Lord Stanley of Preston,1 in order to 
permit the Canadian Government to decide if it wanted to 
be included in the negotiations.2 Pauncefote's note of 
the 17th was sent to Ottawa on October 22, while the 
Canadian High Commissioner in London, Sir Charles Tupper, 
was notified on October 25.3 
As bas been noted, Sir Charles Tupper was a former 
Premier of Nova Scotia and was considered the prime 
defender of that province's fishing rights in the Canadian 
Government. Tupper had already objected to Shea's 
1 Fredrick Arthur Stanley (1841-1908), British M.P. (1865-86), Colonial Secretary (1885-6), Baron Stanley (1886), 
Governor-General of Canada (1888-93). · 
2 CSP., 1891/38, Pauncefote to Salisbury, Oct. 17, 
1890, in Knutsford to Lord Stanley of Preston, Oct. 22, 1890. 
3 CSP. 1891/38, Knutsford to Lord Stanl ey of 
Preston, Oct. 22, 1890; (Bramston) to High Commissioner for 
Canada ~Tupper), Oct. 25, 1890. 
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overtures in Washington and to the Newfoundland Bait Act 
of 1886. When be thought the Newfoundland Government was 
attempting to deprive Nova Scotian fishermen of some of 
their privileges, Tupper sent a note to Sir Robert Herbert, 
protesting the Imperial Government's permission for Bond . 
4 to make a separate treaty. A further protest, to Lord 
Knutsford, was dispatched on October 27th. In this note, 
Tupper pointed to Canada's vulnerability to economic and 
political pressure from the United States. He objected to 
the Imperial Government's having given Bond the power to 
negotiate a separate treaty without consulting Ottawa until 
the draft had been presented to Blaine. To conclude the 
letter, Tupper quoted Sir John A. Macdonald: " ••• and how 
disasterous from a national point of view it would be for 
a separate Colony to effect an arrangement with the United 
States more favourable than could be given to the 
Confederated provinces."-' John Bramston acknowledged 
Tupper's protest on November 1.6 Tupper's protest forced 
officers at both the Foreign and Colonial Offices to 
consider some plan to avoid a dispute with Canada without 
4 CSP., 1891/38, Tupper to Sir Robert Herbert, 
Paris, Oct. 21, 1890. 
5 CSP., 1891/38, Tupper to Knutsford, Oct. 27, 1890. 
6 CSP., 1891/38, Tupper to c.o., Oct. 27, 1890, and 
c.o. to High Commissioner, Nov. 1, 1890. 
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arousing public opinion in Ne\'lfoundland. 7 As a consequence 
Pauncefote was ordered to hold the draft convention and 
send it to London before communicating it to Secretary 
Blaine. If the officials in London expected to slow the 
negotiations to permit time for an understanding between 
Newfoundland and Canada, they were disappointed for 
Pauncefote ·had already transmitted the draft treaty.8 
Blaine did not allow the differences between 
Newfoundland and Canada to dissipate for be informed 
Pauncefote of his willingness tO discuss reciprocity with 
both Newfoundland and Canada separately. Canada could not 
be included within the Bond-Blaine discussions.9 At the 
same time, Tupper received from his son Charles, Canadian 
Minister of Marine and Fisheries, an editorial from the 
New York Tribune, a newspaper which staunchly supported 
the Republican Party and especially James G. Blaine (the 
owner of the Tribune, Whitelaw Reid, was a personal friend 
of Blaine's). The editorial ran: "The United States will 
hardly be disposed to create a commerce for the people of 
Newfoundland, then to have the profits of that commerce 
7 C.O. : 194/215, Memorandum E.B. Pennell to John 
Bramston, Nov. 1, 1890. 
8 c.o. 880/12, Enclosure in F.O. (P.W. Currie) to 
c.o., Nov. ;, i890. 
9 c.o. 880/12 Paraphrase of Pauncefote to 
Salisbury, Nov. 12, 1B90 (secret). 
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go to Canada and France. The rights of the French, ••• 
must be closed out on some other basis than the concession 
of free bait to the men of St. Pierre. Free bait is no 
favour to us, if the French and Canadians can have it too, 
if Mr. Bond permits Sir William Whiteway and Mr. Harvey, 
or Lord Knutsford for them, to barter that away, he will 
find himself robbed of the key to Fulton Market."10 This 
statement certainly makes Blaine's purpose clear, if the 
United States gave reciprocity to Newfoundland, Newfoundland 
would have to eliminate all other claims to her bait 
fisheries, especially the Canadian, but also the French on 
the Island of St. Pierre. 
This was one of the many editorials which appeared 
in American newspapers advocating the elimination of 
Newfoundland's problems by closer relations with the United 
States. In some cases these closer relations implied 
annexation to the United States. This encouragement from 
the United States allowed local politicians and editors in 
Newfoundland to hint at annexation to the United States if 
the Islanders were not satisfied with their treatment by 
the Imper~al Government. The depth of annexationist 
feeling in Newfoundland is subject to question although the 
threat of annexation was often used when the objectives of 
Newfoundland were thwarted by the Imperial Government. · 
10 CSP., 1891/38, C~H. Tupper to Sir Charles 
Tupper, Nov. 1?, 1890. 
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Indeed, the annexationist movement seems to have been an 
individual crusade as in the case of Monseigneur Howley 
\-rho advocated the union of the \~est Coast of the Island 
with the United states.11 The large number of 
Newfoundlanders in the United States provided support for 
annexation although there is little evidence that there 
was st~ong support for the policy in Newfoundland. 
Annexation was but one method of compensating for 
the relative insignificance of Newfoundland within the 
British Empire or the rest of the world. Indeed, the 
officials in the Colonial Office may have genuinely 
favoured an agreement which would have improved the 
wretched condition of most Newfoundlanders; however, there 
were always the demands of a more important member of the 
Empire, Canada, or a foreign country like France or the 
United States. One can hardly imagine a more difficult 
position than Newfoundland's. Her interests were 
entangled in a triangle on the North American continent 
with the United States and Canada; and in a European 
triangle with Britain and France, and in an Imperial 
triangle with Great Britain and Canada. With the 
conditions in each group dissimilar in certain aspects, 
Newfoundland's interests in one set of negotiations might 
be in conflict with her relations within another set of 
negotiations. 
11 Evening Telegram, Jan. 17, 1891. 
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Given this complexity of relationships, Newfoundland 
could expect little aid outside her own borders. However, 
in Great Britain, the Parliamentary Opposition, especially 
the Irish members· asked questi.ons about Newfoundland 
affairs.12 This as we shall see later was also true of the 
Liberal Provincial Government in Nova Scotia which supported 
Newfoundland in its reciprocity negotiations, probably to 
attack the Federal Conservatives such as the Tuppers. 
It has been noted already that the immediate reason 
for Tupper's protest concerning the proposed reciprocity 
treaty was the disadvantage Canada would sustain in future 
negotiations with the United States. Knutsford had 
attempted to reassure the Canadians when he wrote to 
Stanley, in Ottawa, on November ~to explain that Bond's 
proposal to Blaine had been merely an agreement, under the 
McKinley Tariff, to exchange the free entrance of Newfound-
land fish products into the United States in exchange for 
the provision of bait in Newfoundland for American 
schooners. He further assured Stanley that Pauncefote had 
been instructed by the Foreign Office to look to Canadian 
rights.13 
.. -:. 
12 See, for example, Great Britain, Hansard's 
Parliamentary D~bates, CCCXLVII (1890), PP• 1678-9; 
CCCXLVIII (1890 , pp. 176-8, .,96-7, 1265. 
13 CSP., 1891/38i Stanley to Knutsford (Oct. 31, 
1890); Knutsford to Stan ey, Nov. 4, 1890. 
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The basis of the ~roblem facing Canada was its 
economic relationshi~ with the United States. How close 
should trade ties be allowed to draw Canada toward the 
j • 
United States? For the Conservative Party in Canada the 
answer to this question had.been only so far as Canadian 
trade was increased without a significant decline in 
Canadian autonomy from the United States. The Conservatives 
favoured freer trade between Canada and the United States 
if it was in Canada's favour. It allowed her to export 
her raw materials to the United States without ~roviding 
com~etition from the manufacturing industries of the 
United States. 
For the Conservative leader, Sir John A. Macdonald, 
the tariff issue was one of ~olitical manoeuver. As the 
leader of the party in ~ower, he could let his op~onents 
test the public's res~onse to the issue of increased trade 
with the United States. After observing public reaction 
to the reci~rocity issue be could modify his government's 
policy to reap any ~olitical advantage which might result 
from advocating some form of reciprocity. Macdonald's 
National Policy for an independent Canada had not satisfied 
the Country, and even the linking of the O~position Liberal 
Party with annexationists in the United States had only 
limited value as was shown in the Election of 1891. 
Although the Conservatives won:: the election by 31 seats, 
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they received only 51 ~er cent of the votes cast, not an 
overwhelming majority for the National Policy or the "Old 
Flag".14 
The strongest support for reci~rocity came from 
the farmers of Ontario who hoped to sell their grain in the 
large cities of the United States; the s~eculators who 
planned to develo~ the mines of Canada to su~ply the needs 
of the industrial plant of the United States, and the 
railroadmen who schemed to divert some of the trade of the 
Western United States along their own lines through Ontario 
and the New England wilderness to Portland, Maine. The 
leadershi~ of this movement fell to the Toronto Globe, the 
Canadian-American promoter Erastus Wiman, the prominent 
Liberal, Sir Richard Cartwright, and the Anglo-Canadian 
publicist, Goldwin Smith. This group of individuals were 
divided on many issues, particularly the issue of 
Annexation, sup~orted by Goldwin Smith. The association 
of annexationists like Smith with the cause of reciprocity 
made it an issue of questionable political value. However, 
after the Election of 188?, the Liberals, led by \~ilfred 
Laurier,15 had no real policy so that Laurier and the 
majority of the Party accepted the idea of unrestricted 
14 Brown, National Policy, pp. 161-211. 
15 Wilfrid Laurier (1841-1919), entered H?use of 
Commons, Ottawa (18?4), Liberal Leader (1888), Pr1me 
Minister (1896-1911). 
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reciprocity between Canada and the United States. Cartwright 
went further to advocate commercial union '"ith the United 
States in an effort to forestall the annexationism of 
Goldwin Smith. As the Election of 1891 indicated, this 
was by no means an unpopular policy.16 
In fact the rationale for Canada's objection to 
the Bond-Blaine talks lay in the problems of how to equate 
national autonomy and economic prosperity. The need for 
revenue and the fear of annexation to the United States 
forced Canada to raise tariffs, thus leading to American 
repudiation of the Reciprocity Treaty of 185~. With the 
increased economic pressure of the 1890's, the Canadian 
provinces were alive with many plans, all of which 
represented some economic relationship with the United 
States. The ideas implicit in these plans were no more 
clear than the plans themselves, so that the press used 
them with little regard to consistency of meaning. Of the 
expedients proposed to the public to settle the economic 
future of Canada, the two which were clearest in the public 
mind were 'Annexation' and the 'National Policy'. The 
former would imply absorption of Canada into the United 
States, presumably the division of the Canadian provinces 
into states. The National Policy indicated an independent 
economic and political plan to retain an independent course 
16 Brown, National Policy, pp. 161-9. 
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of action for Canada and a ~osition for it within the 
British Em~ire. However, the three other concepts which 
occu~ied the middle ground between Annexation and the 
National Policy were much less easy to define, and ,.,.ere 
often confused in the public mind. 'Reciprocity' was a 
general term which im~lied a trade agreement in which the 
participants agree to lower tariffs on specific trade 
items in return for similar concessions. Reciprocal 
agreements usually contain schedules of items ;to be 
admitted into each country free of duty. However, in 
1890, the term·. 'reciprocity' was confused with the term 
'Unrestricted Reciprocity', a term used by some members of 
the Liberal Party. The confusion of terms was increased 
by the use of the eoneept of 'Commercial Union'. Both 
'Unrestricted Reciprocity' and 'Commercial Union' were 
used interchangeably by the press and the people to imply 
the removal of all tariff barriers between Canada and the 
United States. Strictly speaking, it would seem by 
'Unrestricted Reciprocity' was meant the free flow of 
goods between both Canada and the United States. 
'Commercial Union' carried. the process further by 
advocating the formality of some international agreement 
making the two countries a commercial unit, and implying 
a common tariff against other countries.17 It was obvious 
1? I A Hodson "Commercial Union, Unrestricted 
Reciprocity ·a~d the Ba6kground to the E~ection of 1891", 
M.A. thesis' University of Western Ontar1o, 1952, PP• 12-24. 
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at the time that a common tariff would be aimed at Great 
Britain, preceding the end of Canada's relationship with 
the British Empire. 
On the possibility of reciprocity, the Conservatives 
were not sanguine after the election of the Republican, 
Benjamin Harrison in 1888. The Republican Party was 
connected in Canada with the protectionist interests in the 
United States so .. that no agreement favourable to Canada 
seemed possible. In the light of the immediacy of the 
Bond-Blaine negotiations, Macdonald was placed in the very 
position be wished to avoid; namely, of reacting to Blaine's 
initiative, thus allowing Blaine to manoeuver the .Canadian 
Government into an embarrassing position which might be 
disastrous at an election.18 
Whatever Macdonald may have thought of Blaine's 
motives, a · letter from Lord Knutsford obliged him to 
make a clear statement of the Canadian Government's 
reasons for objecting to the Bond-Blaine negotiations. In 
accordance with the request from the Colonial Office, the 
Canadian Privy Council deputized John Thompson, Minister 
of Justice, and t~e younger Tupper to draw up a report for 
the Privy Council defending Canadian rights. Since this 
report was the definitive statement of the Canadian 
Government's position concerning negotiations between 
18 Creighton, Macdonald, II, pp. 548-52. 
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colonies and the United States, it will be examined in 
detail.19 
At the beginning, Thompson and Tupper reproduced 
the events leading to the Canadian protest and large 
sections of Sir Charles Tupper's official protest to the 
Colonial Office of October 2?. 20 The '>lriters then 
proceeded to state that two main points were the basis of 
all discussion of the fishery; namely, "the competition 
in fishing between British subjects and foreigners, and 
the question of access to the markets of the United States 
for sale of the fish caught by British Subjects."21 Next, 
the various diplomatic agreements were listed up to the 
time of the writing of the report. 22 In order to validate 
the Canadian Government's contention that the Imperial 
Government had supported the idea of the British North 
American colonies negotiating as a bloc, Thompson and 
Tupper cited two precedents. In 1868, the Committee on 
Ways and Means of the United States House of Representatives 
had negotiated a reciprocity treaty with the Government of 
l9 CSP. 1891/38, Knutsford to Stanley, Nov. 25, 
1890; "Certified Copy of a Report of a Committee of the 
Honourable the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency 
the Governor-General in Council on the 12th December, 1890". 
Signed: John J. McGee, Clerk of the Privy Council. 
20 "Report of the Privy Council", 'PP• 38-40. 
21 ~., p. 40. 
22 ~·' pp. 40-2. 
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Prince Edward Island. However, the Lieutenant-Governor 
of Prince Edward Island believed this negotiation was 
beyond the power of the local government; therefore, he 
refused to sign the treaty, in this he ~as s~ppb~ted by 
the Colonial Secretary in London.23 The other case was 
Sir Ambrose Shea's correspondence in London with the 
American Minister, E.J. Phelps, in July, 1887, to obtain 
an introduction to Secretary Bayard on the matter of 
reciprocity with Newfoundland. The idea of Shea 
corresponding with the American minister did not meet the 
approval of the Colonial Secretary who had not been 
consulted.24 
From these examples, Thompson and Tupper pointed 
to Newfoundland's adherence to the principle of Imperial 
Unity in negotiations in the past. They cited the 
opposition of both Governor, Sir George DesVoeux and 
Premier, Sir Robert Thorburn to permitting United States 
fishermen to enter Newfoundland and Nova Scotia waters for 
the advantage of free entry of fish products into the 
United States. DesVoeux and Thorburn believed with 
reciprocity American ships could make as many trips as they 
wanted to Newfoundland thus competing for the markets in 
23 ".Report of the Privy Council", P• 42. 
24 llli· t p. 42. 
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the United States, and pursuing foreign markets in 
competition with Newfoundland.25 This opinion was 
supported by reference to the Newfoundland brief to the 
Halifa~ Arbitration of 1878 which stated that Newfoundland 
should be compensated for the loss of sales due to the 
free bait supplies given to American fishermen. 26 Indeed, 
to the McKinley Tariff was ascribed the same purpose, to 
force the British Colonies to o~en their bait supplies to 
the United States or suffer from high tariffs. Further, 
American actions were seen as a means of undermining the 
basis of Confederation by restricting trade with the 
United States.27 Thompson and Tupper noted the actions of 
American leaders who taunted Canadians about their 
inability to survive without reciprocity. 
The main assertion of this document was the claim 
of the Government in Ottawa that the actions of the 
Newfoundland Government deviated from the accepted 
practices of Imperial policy, and could only lead to an 
increase in the influence of the United States without 
compensating benefits to either Canada or Newfoundland. 
In fact, they saw a loss for British North America without 
compensation as in 1878. At the same time, the Canadians 
25 "Report of the Privy Council", P• 4-3. 
26 IQ!£·' p. 4-4-. 
27 ~·' p. 4-4-. 
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were aware that the possibility of Newfoundland joining 
Confederation would have been reduced if Newfoundland was 
successful in negotiating a trade treaty with the United 
States.28 Bond held this view: . without the reciprocity 
treaty, Newfoundland might be forced to join Canada. He 
could only favour such a course in the last extremity.29 
In the Canadian situation, although the completion 
of Confederation may have been important, the main 
consideration in objecting to the Bond-Blaine talks was 
the realization that if these talks were suecessful then 
Macdonald's Government would be forced to ask reciprocity 
upon Blaine's terms. · Macdonald was totally suspicious of 
Blaine's objectives and believed Blaine only desired to 
embarrass the Conservatives in order to create dissention 
in Canada. 
28 "Report of the Privy Council", 'PP• 45-6 • 
29 Bond to Whiteway, June 23, 1891, in Gosling 
Memorial Library, St. John's. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REACTION IN NEWFOUNDLAND 
Whatever Macdonald's suspicions of his intentions, 
Blaine asked Bond to return to Washington to ~rovide him 
with more ~recise information.1 Blaine also sent a note 
to Pauncefote stating his readiness to open parallel 
negotiations with the Canadians.2 If this ~lan had 'been 
commenced, the two British colonies would have been 
engaged in separate negotiations with the United States, 
~ermitting Blaine to intensify the rivalry between the two 
colonies by forcing t4tm to outbid each other for the 
~rivilege of reci~rocity. Des~ite this problem, the 
officials in London were satisfied with Blaine's suggestion. 
Sir Robert He!'bert noted that "Lord Knutsford is, u~on the 
whole, of o~inion that as the special requirements or· canada 
and Newfoundland are very different, it will be better in 
principle that any negotiations affecting Canada should 
1 c.o. 880/12 Paraphrase of Pauncefote to 
Salisbury, Nov. 20, 1B90, in Knutsford to O'Brien, Nov. 
14, 1890. (Secret). 
2 c.o. 880/12 Paraphrase of Pauncefote to 
Salisbury, Nov. 13, 1B90. 
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proceed separately, ••• "3 Lord Salisbury accepted the 
principle, ordering it transmitted to Lord Stanley on 
November 15, with a draft of the Bond - Blaine Convention.4 
However on November 19, Stanley protested, in the name of 
his government, the whole method of separate negotiations. 
"Sanction of the Newfoundland treaty by Her Majesty's 
Government would, Stanley noted~ materially aid the United 
States policy by placing Canada at a disadvantage with 
neighbouring Colony of Newfoundland and producing 
discontent bere•"5 Further, "the United States are waging 
commercial war in many ways against Canada to force 
Annexation, which idea Blaine bas never relinquisbed."6 
This note appears to have bad the desired impact on the 
Foreign Office for on November 20, Pauncefote received an 
order from Salisbury to suspend t~e negotiations due to the 
Canadian objections to the Convention.? 
1890. 
3 C.O. : 880/12, c.o. (H~rbert) to F.O., Nov. 14, 
(aecret) 
4 c.o . . 880/12, F.O. to c.o., Nov. 15, 1890 ('secret); 
Knutsford to Stanley, Nov. 15, 1890 ~secret). 
5 c.o . . 880/12, Stanley to Knutsford, (Nov. 19, 1890). 
6 Ibid. 
7 c 0 880/12 F.O. to Pauncefote (Paraphrase), 
Nov. 20, 1890~ Parapbr~se of Pauncefote to Salisbury, Nov. 
18, 1890; Pauncefote to Salisbury, Nov. 19, 1890. 
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In contrast to the attitude of Lord Salisbury, 
Knutsford did not accept the necessity of concurring with 
the Canadian protests. 8 Ho\t~ever, by this time the Foreign 
Office, after accepting the principle of dual talks, 
opposed the idea of bilateral talks between Newfoundland 
and the United States. In fact, Herbert received a note 
from T.H. Sanderson, at the Foreign Office, very critical 
of Colonial Office policy, and by implication, Lord 
Knutsford.9 
My Dear Herbert, I send, by Lord Salisbury's desire, 
a memorandum, by Bergne, on the Canadian objections 
to a separate fishery arrangement between the United 
States and Newfoundland. You will see that he 
thinks they are not without foundation. Have you 
consulted Tupper? I see that in the draft Telegram 
to Canada Lord Knutsford is made to say that he 
cannot understand how the injury, if any, could be 
serious. Surely it would be more judicious to put 
it in the form of an enquiry what the injury would be. 
Lord Salisbury wishes to bring the matter before 
the Cabinet to-morrow (Monday) at 3 before deciding 
the answer to the Canadian Telegram. 
The importance attached to good relations between Canada 
and Newfoundland was demonstrated by Lord Salisbury's 
intention to consult the Cabinet before he decided how to 
answer Stanley's letter. The decision to halt the 
negotiations was influenced by a memorandum drawn by Sir 
Henry Bergne ·' Superintendent of the Treaty Department at 
8 c.o •. 880/12, c.o. (Bramston) to F.O., Nov. 21, 
1890. 
9 c.o •. 880/12, F.O. (Sanderson) to c.o. (Herbert), 
Nov. 23, 1890. 
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the Foreign Office. Bergne believed granting free bait 
to the Americans fishing in Newfoundland would ruin the 
Canadian bait licensing system, :destroy Canadian trade in 
bait, and continue to permit American access to the 
mackerel fishery.10 /Behind this concern for Canadian 
dissatisfaction lay the realization that an angered 
Canadian government could seriously disturb Anglo-American 
relations.;,l The result of the cabinet meeting of November 
24 appears to have confirmed Salisbury·' s policy of delaying 
the negotiations until the Canadians decided if they 
wanted to join the talks.12 Although Macdonald realized 
that Blaine's motives in suggesting separate negotiations 
were not directed toward a reciprocity treaty favourable 
to Canada, the demands of the Liberals and the farmers of 
Ontario forced him to take some action toward reciprocity. 
The only option open to M~cdonald was to send a represent-
ative to Washington to meet with Blaine. The answer from 
Ottawa accepting separate talks arrived in London on 
10 Mackerel was an important bait fish in the cod 
fishery, caught outside the three-mile limit of territorial 
waters. 
11 c.o. , 880/12, Memorandum by Sir Henry Bergne 
(secret). 
12 c.o. 880/12, Knutsford to Stanley, Nov. 25, 
1890. 
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'November 2?, being acknowledged by Lord Salisbury, December 
3.13 Macdonald may have been forced to accede to a popular 
request for reciprocity, but he did not desist from 
protesting any continued negotiations between Newfoundland 
and the United States. The new protest of December 1, in 
. the form of a Minute of Privy Council, added a ne,., dimension 
by suggesting that the British Minister in Washington, 
Pauncefote, was not fulfilling his duties. In short, he 
avoided pressing Canadian claims in order to facilitate an 
. Anglo-American accord.14 Actually Pauncefote's main 
interest was the settlement of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 
dispute over an American desire to build a ship-canal across 
Isthmus of Panama. 
If Knutsford was preoccupied with the objections 
Canadian Government, O'Brien, in St. John's, did not 
. allow him to forget that the interests of Newfoundland 
awaited satisfaction.15 Colonial Secretary Bond had 
13 c.o. .. 880/12, Stanley to Knutsford, (Nov. 2?, 
1890); F.O. (Sanderson) to c.o., Dec. 2, 1890. 
14 c.o. 880/12, Stanley to Knutsford, (Dec. 1, 
1890) (secret). 
1890). 
15 CSP.,l891/38, O'Brien to Knutsford (Dec. 12, 
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returned to Washington on November 21, at Blaine's request, 
to supply further statistics pertaining to the fisheries~ 
However, when Bond returned to Washington he had only one 
t . •th Bl . 16 · mee 1ng w1 a1ne. The seem1ng futility of Bond's 
visit to Washington asks the question whether Blaine bad 
anything to inquire from Bond which could not have been 
communicated by letter. The visit indicates a further 
manoeuver by Blaine to raise the hopes of the 
Newfoundlanders, excite the jealousy of the Canadians, and 
incense both colonies against Great Britain for not 
satisfying their demands. 
In order to support Bond's mission, the Executive 
Council of Newfoundland dispatched a unanimous minute to 
London, via the Governor, requesting the signing of the 
draft convention by the British Minister.17 However, some 
of the problems were removed on December 16, when Blaine 
accepted Bond's proposal to insert unrefined minerals into 
the list of products to be admitted free under the Oon-
vention. Copper ore was an important export of Newfoundland. 
On the same evening Bond left Washington for St. John's.
18 
16 c.o. 880/12, JPauncefote to Salisbury, Dec. 7, 
1890. 
17 Newfoundland Archives, Minutes of the Executive 
Council (One volume: Nov., 1890-Sept., .1892), PP• 12-3. 
18 CSP 1891/38 Paraphrase of Pauncefote to 
Salisbury, Dec: 17, 1890, in F.O. to c.o., Dec. 18, 1890. 
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Now that Blaine had accepted the draft, the Executive 
Council in St. John's attempted to facilitate the 
ratification of the Convention by the-Imperial Government. 
The only method of achieving this goal was to guarantee 
the Colonial Office that Canada's interests in the fishery 
would not be injured by the American-Newfoundland 
agreement. The Council passed a resolution proposing a 
mutually beneficial understanding between Ne'\'rfoundland and 
Canada after the convention was signed.19 To mark Bond's 
return to St. John's, the Council sent a further 
resolution to London asking for the ratification of Bond's 
efforts.20 
By the New Year, the Imperial Government had 
adopted a policy of caution to avoid increasing the tension 
between Newfoundland and Canada. Officers at the Colonial 
Office were recognizing Blaine's desire to create animosity 
between Canada and Newfoundland as a vital factor in 
analyzing the situation.21 The desire to consider all the 
factors involved in the reciprocity treaty led the British 
to infuriate members of the Newfoundland Government by 
19 c.o •. 194/215, O'Brien to Knutsford, Dee. 21, 
1891. 
20 Minutes of the Executive Council,_ (1890-2)' 
p. 17 • 
21 See note ll• 
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what the Newfoundlanders considered excessive caution and 
dilatoriness. In an effort to placate the Newfoundlanders, 
Lord Knutsford reminded them that the occu~e of the 
dispute in the winter allowed time for consideration of 
the whole question before fishing recommenced in the 
Spring of 1891.22 His Lordship's words were abortive, for 
every member of the Executive Council in Newfoundland 
realized that the frozen herring fishery was in progress 
during the winter. Also Newfoundlanders feared exclusion 
from the frozen herring trade to the United States after 
the introduction of the McKinley Tariff.23 
Knutsford further exacerbated relations between St. 
John's and London when be asked O'Brien for information on 
modifications to the treaty conceded to Blaine before be 
accepted the draft convention.24 The reply from St. John's 
was immediate: "Executive\ Council do not understand 
meaning of modifications, and they cannot suppose that Her 
Majesty's Government will intervene objections" to the 
proposed treaty.25 If the Colonial Secretary spoke of 
22 CSP.,l891/38, Knutsford to O'Brien, Dec. 18, 1890. 
23 By order of John Pew, Collector o~ Custom~, 
Gloucester Massachusetts, Newfoundland herr1ng carr1ed to 
the United'states in Amer1can ships would be treated as 
produce of the United States and would be free of duty. 
See, Harbour Grace Standarq, Dec. 10, 1890. See also, CSP., 
1891/38, o'Brien to Knutsford, Dec. 18, 1890. 
24 CSP., 1891/38, Knutsford to O'Brien, Jan. 1, 1891. 
25 CSP., 1891/38, O'Brien to Knutsford, Jan. 3, 1891. 
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modifications to the draft, they could only be interpreted 
in St. John's as a threat by the Imperial Government to 
list the objectionable sections of the treaty, then to 
give the Newfoundland ~overnment the choice of accepting 
the revised draft or seeing the draft of December 27 
vetoed.26 
Indeed, modifications were being made to the treaty, 
but in Washington, not London. Blaine had presented 
Pauncefote with a counter proposal for the draft treaty. 
The basis of this draft lay in a return to an exchange of 
free entry of fish from Newfoundland in return for the 
removal of license fees from New England bait purchasers. 
The counter draft was communicated to St. John's on 
January 13.27 Both crude minerals and 'green' cod were 
eliminated from the counter draft. The removal of these 
two terms seriously reduced the value of the Convention to 
Newfoundland as much of the expansion of trade to the 
. h d"t" 28 United States would have taken place ~n t ese commo ~ ~es. 
26 CS;P~ .f 1891/38, 0 'Brien to Knutsford, Jan. 3, 1891. 
27 CSP., 1891/38, Pauncefote to Salisbury, Jan. 6, 
1891, in F.O. to c.o., Jan. 7, 1891; Knutsford to O'Brien, 
Jan. 13, 1891. · 
28 Of •crude minerals', copper was by far the most 
important. 'Green', undried cod was in demand in New 
England where it was made into 'boneless cod'. 
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The only response possible in N6wfoundland was to 
send a vituperative dispatch to London, in the name of the 
Governor. The Government in St. John's claime·d the loss 
of crude minerals was due to the hesitation of the Imperial 
Government in approving the draft. The time lag allowed 
the American mineral interests to lobby against foreign 
competition. Bond, it was claimed, had visited Glaucester, 
Boston, and New York to quiet the fears of the United 
States business community toward the treaty, but all his 
efforts were useless unless the Colonial Office approved 
the treaty.29 
Blaine's acceptance of the mineral clause on 
December 16 and rejection of it on January 6 illustrated 
Blaine's tactics of manipulating both Newfoundland and 
Canada for his own benefit. The dropping of the mineral 
clause may have been precipitated by the protests of the 
mineral interests, but after his defeat over the McKinley 
Tariff, it does not seem likely Blaine would have accepted 
a mineral clause knowing it would arouse o~position in the 
United States. Blaine probably had no expectations that 
the mineral clause would ever be accepted in the United 
States. 
Although .. the Imperial Government had decided not 
to ratify the Bond-Blaine negotiations, it was necessary 
29 CSP., 1891/38, O:'.Brien ·.to·Knutsford, Jan. 17, 
1891. 
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to find an expedient whereby the Newfoundland Government 
could be placated without acceding to its demands for 
ratification. O'Brien was notified of the Imperial 
Government's willingness to guarantee the railway loan 
Sir William Wbiteway had requested in his note of July 
21.3° The proximity of the treaty negotiations and the 
offer of a guaranteed loan indicated the intention of the 
Imperial Government to compensate the Newfoundland 
Government for the loss of reciprocity. Indeed with the 
continuing problem of the French Shore, London did not 
want to irritate the Newfoundlanders; although the 
Colonial Office appears to have given up the hope, 
temporarily, of a voluntary settlement of the French Shore 
Question.31 
On February 9, Knutsford sent O'Brien a dispatch 
terminating negotiations on the treaty. It read in part: 
"Her Majesty's Government have definitely decided not to 
proceed at this moment with the proposed convention between 
Newfoundland and the United States, ••• "32 The 
Newfoundlanders had been warned of this possibility two 
1891. 
30 CSP., 1891/38, Knutsford to O'Brien, Jan. 23, 
, 31 c.o. , 194/215, "Minute: John Anderson to John 
Bramston " Jan. 3, 1891; notes by E.B. Pennell, Jan. 3, 
1891, anA Knutsford, Jan. 6, 1891. 
1891. 
32 CSP., 1891/38, Knutsford to O'Brien, Feb. 11, 
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weeks previously when Knutsford had written: "If Canada 
assents, the difficulty now standing in the way of the 
ratification of the convention with the United States would 
be speedily removed~;; Despite these declarations of 
intent by the Imperial Government, correspondence flowed 
back and forth across the Atlantic on questions such as the 
legality of Bond's actions,34 and the significance of Bond's 
second trip to Washington.35 
The idea of a eonvention with the United States 
remained a vital issue as long as Robert Bond remained 
active in Newfoundland -politics. Indeed, although the 
Convention was postponed, the Executive Council of 
Newfoundland continued to importune the Colonial Office 
about the convention many months after Knutsford's dispatch 
of February 9, 1891. · Bond, in his letter to Whiteway of 
.June 2;, 1891, noted in regard to reciprocity with the 
United States "that nothing should be left undone to attain 
this". In fact'· Bond viewed reciprocity with the United 
States as the only alternative to an Im~erially-supervised 
loan; confederation with Canada, or continued economic 
stagnation.36 
;; CSP., 1891/38, Knutsford to O'Brien, Jan. 23, 1891. 
34 CSP., 1891/38, O'Brien to Knutsford, Feb. 14, 1891. 
35 CSP., 1891/38, Knutsford to O'Brien, Feb. 14, 1891. 
36 Bond to Whiteway, June 23, 1891, Gosling Memorial 
Library, St. John's. 
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When the Newfoundland Assembly met in St. John's, 
three days after Knutsford's dispatch arrived, economic 
conditions in Newfoundland gave little reason for hope • • 
The fishery, in 1890, could best be described as average, 
as was the seal fishery; only the Labrador cod fishery had 
been excellent. However, the salt fish markets were over-
stocked with cod; forcing both prices and demand to fall. 
Copper production was down due to the depressed condition 
of the copper markets throughout the world. The much-
discussed railroad had ~till not been extended beyond the 
Avalon Peninsula.37 The only positive feature of the 
economy was the contract to start construction of the 
railroad from Placentia Junction to the Hall's Bay Line. 
Also, a new company bad been created; the Newfoundland and 
Canadian Exploration Trust Limited to take control of the 
locally-owned Newfoundland Colonization and Mining Company 
Limited, and inject new capital into mineral exploration 
and exploitation in Newfoundland. The new company was 
controlled by the British, Patents Mining and Financing 
Trust Limited. Interestingly the Newfoundland committee 
of the new company consisted of ex-Premier Thorburn, ex-
Attorney-General Winter, Opposition Leader in the 
Legislative Council, Moses Monroe, and another Member of 
37 Newfoundland. House of Assembl~Journal, 1891, 
pp. 5-6. 
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the Legislative Council, Alexander M. Mackay, all members 
of the Opposition Party.38 
However the most serious crisis facing the 
government was the very unstable condition of the banking 
system in St. John's, which was irritated by the sluggish 
market for salt cod, the many outstanding loans to 
merchant-exporters, and the Government's failure to obtain 
a loan from the London and Westminister Bank. In addition, 
large deposits made by the Government-owned Newfoundland 
Savings Bank in the two commercial banks, the Union and 
Commercial, made them economically interdependent to a very 
high degree. Beyond this, the two commercial banks did not 
have a fraction of the specie necessary to repay their 
deposits from the Savings Bank, if these were recalled. 
After the recall of deposits the formality of bankruptcy 
would not be far away. This would be followed by the 
imagined effect of reducing the local economy to paralysis, 
bankrupting the government, wiping out the savings of many 
a Newfoundlander, and turning them against the whole idea 
of responsible government. Indeed, Anderson bad suggested 
that a number of the more prominent members of the colony, 
disturbed by the unstable condition of the economy, would 
have favoured the suspension of responsible government and 
the placing of the government of Newfoundland into 
38 c.o. 
. ' 194/220; 'Report of Merger of Compan~es 
Mar. 24, 1891. 
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commission.39 In the immediate crisis, the even greater 
liabilities made apparent by the closing of the banks in 
St. John's would force the government to seek an even 
greater, and even less possible loan. The immediate 
consequence would have been the appearance of an Imperial 
financial commissioner with dictatorial powers over the 
Newfoundland Government's spending. A full commission 
might not be far distant if the government's position did 
not soon improve.40 The Newfoundland Government was not 
ready for so drastic a measure as long as there was hope 
the Imperial Government might guarantee a loan or they 
might negotiate a loan on their own credit. Ultimately, 
the possibility of joining Canadian Confederation was 
always to be considered.41 
Tbese .were the prospects for Newfoundland when Sir 
Terence O'Brien opened the Second Session of the Sixteenth 
General Assembly of Newfoundland, in St. John's. O'Brien's 
speech was a perfunctory analysis of the Newfoundland 
economy in the previous year. While carefully avoiding 
the financial crisis, he did not, however, ignore the 
39 c.o. 194/218, Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
Feb. 27, 1891. 
40 See 0~0 • .. 880/12, O'Brien to Knutsf~rd, Feb. 3, 
1891; Knutsford to O'Brien, Feb. 5, 1891; 9'Br1en to 
Knutsford, Feb. 6, 1891; Knutsford to O'Br1en, Feb. 9, 
1891. (seeret). 
41 See note Jt, 
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generally depressed condition of the economy.42 The 
membars had just settled into their seats after the reading 
of the Speech from the Throne when Bond moved and D.J. 
Greene (W. Ferryland) seconded a motion to consider a 
resolution to the Colonial Secretary on the Convention 
with the United States. The Chairman of the Committee of 
the Whole, w. Whiteley (W. Harbour Grace)43 reported a 
series of resolutions based on a statement of the sequence 
of events involved in the negotiations. The resolutions 
called the delay in ratifying the treaty "entirely 
unjustifiable and as evidencing an utter disregard for the 
prosperity and well being of this colony." Further this 
delay could only be considered "as unfriendly and hostile, 
and as calculated to permanently disturb that loyalty for 
which this colony has, in the past, been remarkable, .~."44 
These were rem~ strong statements for a resolution to 
be sent to a higher body; indeed they were very ill-
concealed threats. The resolutions were accepted by the 
Legislative Council on the same day when the government 
42 Nfld. Assembly, Journal, 'Speech from the Throne', 
pp. 5-6. 
43 Party allegiance of members of the Assembly:is 
denoted as (Whitewayite-W.), (Opposition-a.), and (Independent-!.). Party affiliation is followed by the 
district represented. It should also be noted that 
districts returned one, two or three members. 
44 Nfld. Assembly, Journal, P· 9. 
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supporte~a in tha 'upp~r House' defeated an amendment by 
James S. Pitts, one of the leading figures in the St. 
John's business community, end a member of Thorburn's 
Executive Council from 1888 to 1889. Pitts had attempted 
to defer the resolutions until more information was laid 
before the Legislature; however, he was overruled by a vote 
of 4 to 2.45 
There followed the debate in reply to the Speech 
from the Throne. There were many expressions of support 
for Bond's efforts from both sides of the House of 
Assembly and the Legislative Council. On February 12, 
Captain Eli Dawe, (W. Harbour Grace) noted: II on the ••• 
question of trade relations between us and the United 
States, once :the Imperial Government had given us permission 
to negotiate a treaty, we never dreamt that, for the 
i~terests ; of another colony, we should be humiliated and 
sacrificed by the delay of the Imperial Government to 
"46' 
ratify the conventions made by our able Colonial Secretary. 
In the Legislative Council, a newly-appointed 
member, Dr. George Skelton, a Whitewayite, stated: "It is 
a matter of much regret that a treaty of reciprocal trade 
with the United States could not be looked upon as an 
45 Nfld. Legislative Council, Journal, 1891, PP• 13-6. 
46 Harbour Grace Standard, Feb. 27t 1891~ (The 
debates of the H~use of Assembly were publ1shed 1n local 
newspapers under a Government subsidy.) 
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accomplished fact; for he was sure that such a treaty 
would mean a great extension of our trade, far-reaching 
in its beneficial results. 1147 These were government 
supporters, but James Angel, a Member of the Legislative 
Council, and one of Thorburn's "midnight appointments" in 
December, 1889, "considered that it was through no fault 
of our delegates that the Reciprocity Treaty with the 
United States had not been effected. 1148 More critical 
was the approach taken by Moses Monroe, Member of 
Legislative Council, a prominent St. John's merchant and 
fish exporter, also Opposition Leader in the Council. 
Monroe agreed with reciprocity if it meant free bait for 
free fish although the Americans should not have exclusive 
rights to Newfoundland's bait and be in the position to 
compete with Newfoundland fishermen. Would the Americans 
carry bait to the French thus riddling the Bait Act? It 
would be quite legal.49 Indeed, many of Monroe's 
predictions did become reality later in 1891 and 1892. In 
1891, Bond removed bait restrictions from the American 
schooners, to remind the Canadians of his power to limit 
their fishery and to demonstrate to the Americans the value 
of the free bait supplies in Newfoundland. Monroe made a 
47 Harbour Grace Standard, Feb. 24, 1891. 
48 Harbour Grace Standard, Feb. 13, 1891. 
49 Harbour Grace Standard, March 9, 1891. 
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further statement on February 20. He noted that 
Newfoundland "bad all the necessary power, under the Bait 
Act, to effect the arrangement they desired, without 
reference to the home authorities at all. And he spoke 
advisedly when he said that Mr. Blaine was perfectly 
satisfied with our powers under that act, and was prepared 
to negotiate with us. n50 This suggestion for an informal~ . 
agreement, removing license fees in Newfoundland 
I 
progressively as import duties were reduced in the United 
States had been advanced previously in order to avoid the 
problems involved in negotiating an international agreement.51 
Monroe explained Bond's failure to achieve an informal but 
effective agreement by noting:"we cannot put old heads on 
young sboulders."52 ., 
There was yet another view to be taken; namely, 
those in Newfoundland who supported close connections with 
Canada, and ultimately Confederation. Of these the most 
prominent was Robert s. Munn of Harbour Grace, representing 
that district in the Assembly. Munn represented John Munn & 
Company, one of the largest fishing, sealing and supplying 
firms in Newfoundland. This firm bad connections with the 
Canadian flour trade, flour being one of the staples of 
50 Harbour Grace Standard, April 11, 1891. 
51~· 
52 See note V. 
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life in Newfoundland. The owners feared any deterioration 
in the relations between Newfoundland and Canada might 
allow American flo~r to supplant· it.53 With this very 
practical motive .in mind, Munn noted: "with regard to the 
American convention that if Canada was to be excluded, no 
member of this House ought to agree to it, on account of 
the very intimate trade relations we have with that 
country.n54-
The Leader of the Opposition in the House of 
Assembly, was A.B. Morine (Bonavista), a fervent advocate 
of Confederation with Canada, and a former lieutenant of 
Sir Charles Tupper who informed Tupper upon events in 
Newfoundland. Morine was also in the pay of the Canadian 
Government both as spy, and an opponent of legislation 
inimical to Canada.55 Morine, speaking in the House of 
Assembly on February 18 and 19, attacked Bond for promising 
53 Munn's brother William, in Montreal, had a 
personal correspondence with C.H. Tupper to mollify 
Newfoundland-Canadian relations. See1 Canada. House of Commons. Sessional Parers, 1892, No. ~3c, W.A. Munn to 
C.H. Tupper, Feb. 1,892; C.H. Tupper to W.A. Munn, Feb. 
20, 1892; Munn to Tupper, Feb. 24-, 1892; Munn to ~upper, 
Feb. 26, 1892; Tupper to Munn, Mar. 7, 1892. 
54- Harbour Grace Standard, March 9, 1891. 
55 Canada. MacKenzie Bowell Pa~ers, A.B. Morine to 
J.A. Macdonald, Nov. 29, 1893. · (Thisate must be incorrect 
as Macdonald died on June 6, 1891). 
., 
~ ... 
I 'f~ !•;:" 1?~': 
i .. 1 ~:·~~~: 
. H~ , I 
' ~l· . I 
; 2f : I 
.. _,. I i :\ i .i 
' '• i ~ I ,i 
' ' ! 
. I> I 
'::! ::!{ : 
.·:·'i :: 
'•. : ' i: . 
\. /!:· 
_·:_.J : ' 
' ., 
J ' 
. . I. • 
., .. , 
) ~ . 
,, 
f 
f I' 
~ 
I 
f 
. r 
I ,, 
.r 
' 
. . ! 
! 
; 
::. 
' 
1.10 
to give the Americans a monopoly on the bait fisheries of 
Fortune Bay when he bad promised the people of the region 
the contrary. In addition, Morine tried to create the 
impression that Bond and Whiteway were not united on the 
issue of reciprocity, especially Whiteway's lack of 
enthusiasm for the results of the Treaty of Washington of 
1871. Morine cited the statistics Whiteway had used to 
refute the usefulness of reciprocity in 1885. These 
figures showed that exports of cod fell from $367,000 per 
annum during the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 (1855-1866) to 
$348,281 per annum between 1867 and 18?3, and finally, 
slipped to $272,036 per annum under the Treaty of 
Washington (1874-1884).56 This assertion of Morine's was 
vigourously denied by Whiteway in his speech of February 
20 which w:i:ll"be considered later, and in some detail. 
While these opinions were being voiced about the 
Bond-Blaine negotiations, on February 19, the Speech in 
Reply to the Throne was presented to the Governor. The 
section regarding the reciprocity treaty was exceptionally 
offensive to· the Imperial Government in London, and to the 
Canadian Government. The text of the Reply noted that 
Newfoundland was the "oldest and most unfavourably treated 
56 Export figures per annum represent averages 
for the period stated, see Evening Telegram (St. John's), 
Feb. 20, 1891, and Fe.b. 21, 1891. 
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Colony of ' Her Majesty's Empire11 , and this treatment was 
due 11 to the ignorance prevailing in the mother country 
respecting Newfoundland". The Speech in Reply described 
Newfoundland's potential assets in the most favourable 
manner using such terms as 11 inexhaustible", "boundless", 
11 immense", 11magnificent", and "unsurpassed11 • Further, 
Newfoundland was "subservient to the party politics of a 
rival colony", even though':the Island had suffered "from 
the baneful effects of a century of misconstruction of 
French treaty rights on her shores."57 Governor O'Brien 
considered the Speech in Reply sufficiently obnoxious to 
send the Assembly a reprimand on February 23.58 
The belligerent mood of the Assembly was compounded 
by the controversy which developed around the presentation 
of the correspondence on reciprocity to the Assembly. On 
February 3, a resolution was passed by the Executive 
Council asking the Imperial Government to permit the 
withholding of the papers on reciprocity until the final 
fate of the ebnvention had been decided by London.59 This 
request fell on deaf ears in London; however, the dispatches 
were not presented to the Assembly by the Colonial Secretary, 
57 Nfld. Assembly, Journal, 1891, p. 16. 
58 Nfld. Assembly, Journal, 1891, P• 26. 
59 Nfld. Minutes of Executive Council (1890-1892), 
pp. 52-3; c.o. 880/12, O'Brien to Knutsford, Feb. 24, 1891. 
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Bond (W. Trinity) until March 31, obviously after he had 
given up hope of using them as a lever to move London to 
action.60 But Bond's actions in forcing through the 
resolutions of February 13, and February 19 caused O'Brien 
to question whether be was a responsible public official 
or he should be dismissed from office. However, O'Brien 
realized that if Bond was dismissed he would bring down 
the Government and enhance his own popularity.
6± 
Knutsford, at the Colonial Office, concurred with this · :~ " 
view.62 
Despite the insistence of the Governor, Bond gave 
notice of a motion on March 5, to discuss the three 
dispatches before the House of Assembly on the reciprocity 
convention.63 On Saturday, March 7, the House of Assembly 
adopted a series of resolutions. These resolutions ,.;ere 
not sent to the Legislative Council but embodied in an 
address to the Governor. The substance of the Address was 
a reiteration of the resolutions of February 13. The 
point of the address was that the time for considering the 
impact of the draft on Canada was over, and the Imperial 
Government was honour-bound to ratify the Convention, 
60 c.o •. 880/12, Knutsford to O'Brien, March 6, 
1891; Nfld. Assembly, Journal, 1891, P• 78 
61 c.o •. 880/12, O'Brien to Knutsford, Feb. 10, 
1891 (secret); O'Brien to Knutsford, Mar. 7, 1891. 
62 c.o.: 880/12, Knutsford to 0 'Brien, March 10, 1891. 
63 Nfld. Assembly, Journal, 1891, P• 39. 
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especially as it had notified Bond to return to Washington 
to see Blaine. 64 1 
This was not the end of the resolutions, for on 
April 1, the day after Bond tabled the correspondence on 
reciprocity, Morine moved that on the next sitting day the 
House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole to discuss 
the correspondence laid on the table.65 The main drift of 
the bombastic resolutions which resulted from this 
discussion was a justification of Bond' s conduct during the 
negotiations, and criticism of the methods of the Colonial 
Secretary, in London, in not honouring the instructions 
given to Bond. The second aspect of the resolution was a 
censure motion against Morine for an article he wrote in 
the Evening Herald, the organ of the Opposition which be 
edited. The article bad been extremely abusive of Bond's 
actions, especially involving the confusion of orders from 
London.~6 Both sections of the resolution served to support 
Bond's position by using the Government's large majority 
in the House of Assembly (20-6) to silence any opposition in 
tile Assembly. The attack on Morine was the Government's 
only method of hurting him after his editorial of April 1; 
although they might have bad in mind another issue of the 
64 Nfld. Assembly, Journa_l, 1891, 
'PP• 42-4. 
65 Nfld. Assembly, Journal, 1891, p • 
82. 
66 Nfld. Assembly, Journal, 
1891, P'P• 86-9. 
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Herald (March 18), in which Morine gave a very clear 
analysis of Bond's position on reciprocity and the reasons 
for his failure. Morine particularly pointed to Whiteway's 
jealousy of Bond's popularity, also Bond's inexperience to 
negotiate with the 'old soldiers' like Blaine and 
Macdonald.67 The actions of the Whitewayites on the Morine 
issue was distinctly petty, indicating that Morine had 
guessed the truth. 
There followed only one further resolution to the 
Imperial Government which gave notice of the Address to the 
Queen on March 4. The address was passed unanimously by 
the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council. The 
Address was an extremely formalized document, indicating 
that it was considered a formal gesture without much ;hope 
of success.68 
Another significant event was the resolution of 
thanks to the Nova Scotian Legislature for their resolution 
of sympathy over the failure of the Convention and the 
problems of the ::·French Shore. 69 Obviously relations between 
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were not irreparable, despite 
the fishery controversy; although the fact that the Fielding 
67 Evening Herald (St. John's), March 18, 1891; 
April 1, 18'91. 
68 Nfld. Assembly, Journal, 1891, PP• 100-1; Nfld. 
Council, Journal, 1891, p. E6. 
69 Nfld. Assembly, Journal, 1891, PP• 125-6. 
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Government in Nova Scotia was Liberal while the national 
government in Ottawa, of which Sir Charles Tupper was 
member, was Conservative, may have influenced Fielding's 
gesture tO\'Iard Newfoundland. 
These were the main actions of the Legislative ·; 
Session of 1891 on the reciprocity question. However, two 
vital speeches will now be treated in some detail, those 
by Bond and Wbiteway.7° The difference in weight Whiteway 
and Bond placed on the reciprocity negotiations was obvious 
from Whiteway's Speech of February 20. The version of 
this speech which appeared in the Whitewayite organ, the 
Evening Telegram of March 2, filled eight newspaper columns. 
The first five columns discussed exclusively the French 
Shore Question, the remaining columns treated the Bait Act, 
Reciprocity, the railroad, and a summary, in that order. 
Obviously Whiteway was interested primarily in the question 
of French rights, it was an immediate problem and a 'fait 
accompli' whereas the reciprocity treaty m:l;'ght have been a 
possible aid to the Island's economy. 
After a summation of the terms of the draft, 
\~hiteway proceeded to repair the damage of Morine's 
insinuations concerning his disagreements with Bond on the 
issue of reciprocity. Whiteway stated his belief in 
7° For Wbiteway's Speech, see Evening·Telegram 
(St. John's), March 2, 1891; for Bond's SpeeCh, see 
Evening Telegram, March 13, 1891. 
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reci1)rocity but he did not want to ""PaY too dearly" for it. 
11He (the Premier) was not so enthusiastic as some parties 
as to the advantage of the admission of our fish free into 
the United States, but that there would be an advantage 
\"as undoubted, but not the Eldorado some describe."7l 
Whiteway believed the amount of duty levied on fish products 
entering the United States was not an insurmountable 
barrier to exporters genuinely trying to com1)ete. At the 
same time, Moses Monroe, Opposition Leader in the Legislative 
Council, shi1)ped frozen herring to the United States in the 
\~inter of 1890-1891.72 Any failure of Newfoundland 
exporters to take advantage of the United States market, 
with or without the new tariff, Whiteway thought lay for 
the most part "in a lack of enterprise and energy amongst 
i! 73 
us in endeavouring to open new markets." 
Following Whiteway's Speech, Bond's address of 
March 6, 189174 was a justification of his actions during 
the reciprocity negotiations. He justified the need for 
reci1)rocity by referring to the increasing competition 
7l See note 11'. 
72 Harbour Grace Standard, March 26, 1891. 
73 See note '"'ll. 
74 Ibid. 
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offered to Newfoundland fish products by the French and 
Norwegian fisheries. The possible growth of mineral 
exports to the United States had to be considered in the 
terms of the treaty. The huge population of 60.5 millions 
in the United States seemed a limitless market for all the 
fish and mine.rals Newfoundland could produce. The main 
points of Bond's version of the events in London and 
\•lashington were: Bond, in London, visited the Colonial 
Office where he received an introduction to British 
Minister in Washington but he would not proceed without 
recognition as a delegate representing Newfoundland. On 
September 9, 1890, Bond received written orders to carry 
the Newfoundland Government's views to the British Minister 
in .. ~'Washington, and "to take steps ••• to accomplish the 
object in view".75 Bond obviously did not think these orders 
were sufficient for be waited for further instructions when 
he reached New York. The expected letters from London 
reached Bond on September 28 (the letters had been sent to 
Queensland in the South of Ireland while Bond sailed from 
Moville in the North). 
In Washington, Blaine was not enthusiastic but 
received Bond and later the draft convention. Bond claimed 
he overcame the opposition of the business interests in t he 
United States to reciprocity. He also hinted that the 
75 See note 70. 
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United States Cabinet was considering the draft; in fact, 
they might have accepted the draft if they had seen the 
British Minister act. The subsequent growth of opposition 
to the treaty in the United States was blamed on Pauncefote's 
failure to accept the treaty. Bond held that if the 
Imperial Government intended to refuse to ratify the treaty, 
it should have done so at once, not held the Newfoundland 
Government in suspense, unsure of its future plans. 
Governor O'Brien was attacked for his attempt to correct 
the Assembly when they presented their petition to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies.76 Bond's speech as a 
justification of his actions was lacking in an analysis of 
the reasons for his failure beyond the 'villans' in Canada 
and the • cowards' in Great Britain/ The crux of Bond's 
problem was his desire for a reciprocity treaty \'lhich 
caused him to read into his instructions from London, and 
Pauncefote's lack of control over his movements in 
Washington, permission to negotiate the best treaty be 
could with Blaine. Possibly Monroe's suggestion about 
Bond's lack of experience was very perceptive~~· 
With his reciprocity treaty stalemated in London, 
Bond could only make use of the bait fishery to force 
76 For Governor O'Brien's reprimand of the Assembly, 
see note 
?? See note 4f • 
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acceptance of his ~nvention. The existing Newfoundland 
bait policy bad been established by the Thorburn 
Administration in an effort to limit the penetration of the 
French fishery into Newfoundland bait supplies. The bill 
had been disallowed by London but was repassed in 1887 when 
Sir Robert Thorburn and Sir Ambrose Shea successfully 
importuned the Imperial Government to allow the bill. 
However, the Canadian Government had been disturbed, 
fearing the new act might be aimed at them; . yet Thorburn 
and Shea bad persuaded the Colonial Office to the contrary. 
The Act was not accepted by the Imperial Government until 
July 19, 1887, going into effect on January 2, 1888.7
8 
The Act was amended in 1888, and a consolidated and amended 
Act was passed by the Legislature on June 7, 1889.79 Since 
the Act of 1889 was the document on which future policy 
was developed, it is useful to consider the main points 
involved. The main parts of the Act were Sections III and 
IV. Section III permitted no licenses to be issued except 
78 See Thompson, French Shore, PP• 69-86. Also 
CSP., 1892/23c, Sir Ambrose Shea to S1r Robert Herbert, 
April 27, 1887. 
79 The Acts involved were: Nfld. Legislative Act~, 
1887, 50 Viet., Cap. I, "An Act to regulate the ~xpo:tat1o~ 
and Sale of Herring Caplin, Squid, and ot~er B~1t F1shes. 
(Passed Feb. 21 18B7), pp. 5-9. Nfld. Leg1slat1ve Ac£s 7 
1888, 51 Viet. Cap. IX, "An Act to amend an 4ct passe .1n 
the 50th year of the Reign of the present MaJesty, e~t1tled 
11 An Act to regulate the :Exportation and Sale of He:r
1
ng, 
Caplin and other Bait Fishes11 , PP• 75-8· Nfld. Le~slat1ve 
Acts, 1889, 52 Viet., Cap. VI, 11 An Act to Ame~d an e 
Consolidate the Laws relating to the Exportat1on and Sal 
of Bait Fishes". (Passed June 1, 1889), PP• 54-63. 
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by authority of the Governor-in-Council, and countersigned 
by the Colonial Secretary. Section IV provided that "the 
Governor in Council may, from time to time, by Proclamation, 
suspend or ... limit the operation · of the Act, and the issue 
of licenses thereunder, in relation to any district or 
part of this Colony, or coasts thereof, and for such 
period and in relation to the sale or exportation to such 
places or for such purposes and in such q~antities as 
shall appear expedient, and as shall be declared and defined 
in the Proclamation. n80 This proclamation, in effect, 
empO\'lered the Colonial Secretary, in the name of the 
Governor, to issue directions to his subordinates which 
might alter the bait regulations in::.a drastic manner. 
In regard to his new powers, on April 8, 1890, 
Bond, as Colonial Secretary, issued instructions to the 
officials enforcing the Bait Act which forced all persons 
engaged in the bait fishery to obtain one of three kinds 
of license. The first two kinds were issued to 
Newfoundland bank fishermen and punt fishermen respectively, 
these licenses were granted free of charge. The third 
type of license was to be issued to foreign fishermen 
(French, American, and Canadian). License fees for 
foreign ships could be purchased at a rate of one dollar 
per ton of vessel. This fee allowed the purchaser one 
80 Nfld. Legislative Acts, 1889, 52 Viet., Cap. VI, 
p. 56 • 
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barrel of bait per registered ton of vessel. Further, a 
ship could not receive a new license for three \'reeks after 
the issuance of the original licence.81 To adjust the 
quantity of bait sold to bankers, Governor O'Brien issued 
a proclamation limiting each purchase of bait to eight 
barrels of herring per dory carried, ten barrels of 
caplin, and four barrels of squid. A new license could be 
obtained only after a period of eighteen days for herring 
and fourteen days for caplin and squid. This proclamation 
was signed by Bond for the Governor on March 19 9 1891.
82 
Bond carried his bait policy further by a set of 
instructions to the officials enforcing the Bait Act.
8
3 
Under this Proclamation of March 19, Canadian fishermen 
had been classified with American and French fishe~men, as 
liable for restrictions levied on foreigners especially, 
bait licenses. By Bond's 'Instructions' of March 20, 1891, 
free licenses were to be issued only to Newfoundland deep-
sea and punt fishermen, plus American vessels in search of 
bait. Further it was stated: "No license shall be granted 
81 CSP. 1892/23c, "Report of Privy Council of 
C d II t 12'X 4 ana a,, Nov. 21, 189lt ~ PP• ./- • 
82 CSP 1892/23c "Proclamation, by order of Sir 
T. O'Brien Go~~rnor of N~wfoundland", Mar. 19, 1891. 
' 
83 Nfld. Minutes of the Executive Counci1.(1890-
1892), "Instructions !or Magistrates, custom~ bf!:Lcer~, 
etc., in relation to the Enforce~ent of ~he Ba:Lt Act., 
1889
11
• (A copy of these instruct:Lons - sl.~gle page- l.S to 
be found among the bound Minutes of Counc:Ll). 
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except to Newfoundland and United States fishing vessels, 
••• 
84 
·other aspects of the 'Instructions' such as the 
quantity of fish per baiting or the interval between 
baitings remained unaltered. This policy was introduced 
"to prevent misunderstandings".85 O'Brien ordered Bond to 
recall this 'Instruction' as it discriminated against 
Canada. But Bond, with the Government at his back, ignored 
the advice.86 Governor O'Brien believed the application 
of the Bait Act to Canada was the result of Canadian 
objections to the Bond-Blaine negotiations; plus the 
practice of Canadian schooners breaking the Newfoundland 
bait blockade of St. Pierre by carrying herring and other 
fishes from both Newfoundland and the Magdalen Islands to 
the French islands.8? The Executive Council in St. John's 
supported O'Brien's statement on the Bait Act with a 
minute of March 25, 1891 noting that it was too late to 
modify the new instructions as they bad gone · into 
operation.88 
84 
"Instructions • • • 'Bait Act', 1889" • 
1891. 
85 CSP., 1892/23c, Bond to C.H. Tupper, March 25, 
86 c.o. 194/219, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
July 20, 1891" • :' 
87 CSP., 1892/23c, O'Brien to Stanley, Nov. 21, 1891. 
88 Nfld., Minutes of the Executive Council (1890-2), 
March 25, 1891, PP• 66-7. 
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These bait instructions were an obvious attempt to 
demonstrate to the Canadians their vulnerability when 
deprived of Newfoundland bait supplies.89 In a manner t 
the Newfoundland Administration pressed by Bond either 
consciously or unconsciously were carrying out Blaine's 
tactics of applying pressure to one government by granting 
certain privileges to another. Unfortunately for the 
leadership in St. John's, while Blaine could adopt this 
~olicy, relying upon the size and strength of the United 
States, the perilous condition of Newfoundland's economy 
left its leaders little freedom of action. 
The immediate reaction to Bond's 'Instructions' 
in the Canadian press was decidedly hostile. The 
neighbouring Halifax Morning Herald noted: "It is 
evidently simply a case of retaliation against Canadian 
influence (which) destroyed Bond's alleged chances for 
negotiating his reciprocity treaty with the United 
States; ... "90 The Empire (Toronto) editorial of April 6 
was more bellicose: "The action of the Ne\.,rfoundland 
Government besid6s being a piece of spiteful retaliation 
because of Canada's successful protest against the 
B9 See also, editorial in Evenin Tele ram (St: 
John's), Feb. 1891, which stated t a t e ~overnment d1d. 
not want to alter the Bait Act but needed 1t as a lever 
1
n 
negotiating with foreign powers. 
90 csP., 1892/23c, Morning Herald (Halifax), April 
4, 1891. 
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Imperial assent being given to the Bond-Blaine reciprocity 
treaty, it is a gross breach of faith on the part of the 
Newfoundland administration with both Canada and England".91 
The Empire went further by claiming Bond's intentions were 
to advance the annexation of Newfoundland to the United 
States. One can only assum~ the Empire's staff was 
motivated by political considerations, it was the chief 
organ of the Conservative Party in English Canada, or by 
some of Bond's outbursts which likewise were probably the 
result of political considerations or personal disappoint-
ment. There were certainly no annexationist overtones in 
Bond's letter to Whiteway of June, 1891. 
The action of the Newfoundland Government had the 
effect of ·:forcing . the Canadians into retaliation against 
Newfoundland fish products entering Canada. This rise in 
duties was not carried out until the end of 1891 when 
Newfoundland fish would be entering Canada.92 In addition, 
the failure of Blaine's proposed Canadian-American talks on 
reciprocity in the Fall of 1891 bad been laid at the door 
of the Canadian protests on Bond-Blaine negotiations. The 
Canadians were blamed for spiteful retaliation after Bond's 
success. 
As might be predicted, the Canadian duties led to 
a further rise in Newfoundland duties on products entering 
91 CSP., 1892/23c, Empire (Toronto), April 6, 1891. 
92 Harbour Grace Standard, Dec. 11, 1891. 
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the Island from Canada.93 A study of the increases under 
the new tariff system indicates they were selective in 
nature. The increases were ~articularly drastic when 
levied on such sta~le items of the Newfoundland diet as 
flour, corn meal, and ~otatoes. Although they wer.e :meant to 
injure Canada, the first result of the new duties was to 
lay a crushing burden on the great mass of Newfoundlanders 
who existed at a subsistence level. To carry forward the 
mutual retaliation at the e~ense of the mass of the 
~eo~le indicates the ~ique e~erienced by the Newfoundland 
Government, es~ecially Bond • 
In fact, Bond's bait ~olicy, the stimulus for the 
economic war, was not the success be might have e~ected. 
When all competition was removed from the purchase of 
bait in Newfoundland, the Americans lowered the ~rices 
they were willing to ~ay Newfoundland bait fisbermen.94 
Not only this, but there was evidence that American 
fishermen were bribing Newfoundland Fishery Protection 
officers to allow them to take all the bait they wished, 
"'titbo~t respect to the law. 95 The unrestricted ~osition 
of the United States fishermen in Newfoundland could do 
93 Appendix J. 
94 Harbour Grace Standar~, Jan. 12, 1892; Jan. l5, 
1892. 
95 CSP., 1892/23c, J.S. Winter to C.H. Tu~~er, 
Jan. 2, 1892. 
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the local fishermen in Fortune Bay little good. Indeed, 
it depleted the stocks :. of herring which abounded in the 
area. Although his bait policy was an obvious mistake, 
Bond attempted to put the best side of the question in the 
House of Assembly on March ?, 1892 when be stated the 
following: 
By refusing Canadians bait under that Act we had 
clearly shown the people of the United States and 
Canada that they could not do without Newfoundland's 
supply of bait: that Canada was as dependent upon 
us as the United States for this necessary. We 
alone possessed that which Canada had boasted was 
hers, an unlimited supply of bait fishes, and today 
we stood in the proud position of having demonstrated 
to the world that we held the key of the situation 
and until we turned it Canada would never enter into 
a treaty for reciprocal relations with the United 
States based upon bait supply. 96 
While Bond was trying to batter his way into Fulton 
Market, Macdonald had been forced to accept separate 
negotiations with the United States. Not only were these 
talks separate from the Bond-Blaine negotiations, but 
Blaine had demanded that the discussions between himself 
and the 'unofficial' Canadian delegates should be considered 
confidential.9? This form of talks placed the Canadians 
at a decisive disadvantage, for with the agitation at home 
for some form of reciprocity and an approaching general 
election, they were vulnerable to any malevolent action 
96 Harbour ·Grace Standard, April 1, 1892. 
97 C.O. : 880/12, Pauncefote to F.O., Dee. 2?, 1B90. 
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taken by Blaine. About the nature of the talks, Blaine 
had stipulated: "If an agreement is reached all (is) well. 
If not, no official mention is to be made of the effort. 
Above all things it is important to avoid all public 
reference to the matter. This the President insists upon."98 
Macdonald wished to publish the Canadian proposals for 
reciprocity to support the Conservatives in the election; 
however, Blaine bad already refused to permit this as it 
would have been a breach of his agreement with Pauncefote 
of December 22.99 But the internal newspaper war in 
Canada between the Liberal Mail (Toronto) and the 
-
Conservative Empire (Toronto) bad already hinted that a 
reciprocity treaty was being negotiated by the Canadian 
Government.100 When the indiscretions of the Canadian 
newspapers were brought to Blaine's notice, added to 
Canadian intervention in the Bond-Blaine negotiations, be 
was furious. In order to sabotage Macdonald completely, 
Blaine published his letter to United States Representative 
Charles s. Baker of New York.101 The letter read: 
98 c.c. Tansill Canadian-American Relations: 
1877-1911 (Gloucester: Peter smith, 1964), p. 427. 
99 c.o • . 880/12, Pauncefote to Salisbury, Jan. 31, 
1891. 
100 R. c. Brown, _gc~anE;a~d:!!a;'~s~~~~~~~_:.:~:......:;~ 
Princeton: University Press, 
101 Charles s. Bat.er was one of the few remai~!~~er 
annexationists in the United State~ Cong~Ues~. D~~Y· of ' 
The Idea of Continental Union (Lex~ngton. n~vers~ 
Kentucky Press, 1960), Note . ;5, P• 217. 
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I authorize you to contradict the rumours you 
refer to. There are no negotiations \'lhatever on 
foot for a reciprocity treaty with Canada and 
you may be assured no such scheme for reciprocity 
with the Dominion confined to natural products 
will be entertained by this Government. We know 
nothing of Sir Charles Tupper's coming to 
Washington. 102 
This placed the Canadian Government in the position of 
deciding whether they would allow Blaine to embarrass them 
in the forthcoming election or whether they should 
disclose the terms of their proposal to Blaine in spite of 
Pauncefote's pledge of secrecy. 
As one might expect, Macdonald's use of reciprocity 
as an issue in the Election of 1891 eliminated any chance 
which reciprocity might have bad. Blaine objected 
officially to the use of reciprocity in the election.
103 
Further meetings were arranged in Washington, and then 
. 104 
delayed, finally postponed unt1l October of the same year. 
Quite obviously the administration in Washington had every 
intention of emphasizing its displeasure with the 
Canadian breach of faith. 
102 Cited in Brown, National Polici, P• 205. 
104 CSP 1891/38a Pauncefote to Stanley, April 
3, 1891· Pauncef~te to Stariley, April 5, 1891; Pauncefote 
to Staniey, April 6, 1891. 
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CHAP!'ER V 
RATIFICATION RESTS WITH LONDON 
With dissent in Newfoundland due to the ~ostponement 
of the Convention, the trade war between Canada and 
Newfoundland, and the failure of the reciprocity talks 
between the United States and Canada, the situation facing 
the Colonial Office was not optimistic. Without doubt if 
the Canadians and the Newfoundlanders bad reached a 
mutually satisfactory detente, then the British Government 
would have removed its ~rohibition, allowing the 6onvention 
to be ratified. As noted above, the prohibition of the 
Convention was the result of Canadian protests due to the 
lack of protection it would receive if the Convention 
were ratified. The Imperial Government chose to postpone 
acceptance of the treaty in lieu of some settlement of the 
problems between Newfoundland and Canada. 
During these negotiations, the Canadians bad 
advanced the claim that the Newfoundland-American talks 
would disrupt the principle of Imperial solidarity. Because 
of the results of this protest, it is necessary to look at 
the bases for the actions of the Imperial Government as a 
Conservative Administration. More particular concern will 
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be given to the process in London which led to the final 
decision to withhold approval from the Convention. 
The government in power in Great Britain was 
beaded by the Marquis of Salisbury. It bad been in power 
since 1886 and was to stay in power until 1892. As a 
Conservative administration in the late 1880's and 1890's, 
the government would have been strongly in favour of the 
maintenance of the Empire. /Salisbury was a supporter of 
the belief that the commercial prosperity of Britain was 
tied to the expansion of the Empire;1 This stand would 
place Salisbury firmly in the group which might be 
described as 'the Imperialists' which also included 
prominent memQers of the Liberal Party.2 
Despite the acceptance of Imperial unity, the 
colonie~ especially the older ones like Newfoundland, 
believed they possessed certain rights when their interests 
were involved. Indeed, in the area of commercial treaties, 
Newfoundlanders pointed to the dispa·tcb of Henry Labouchere, 
Colonial Secretary in 1857, which set forth the right of 
the colonies to be considered in negotiations with a 
foreign power: 
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••• namely that the rights at present enjoyed by 
the community of Newfoundland are not to be ceded 
or exchanged without their assent and that the 
constitutional mode of submitting measures for 
that assent is by laying before the Colonial 
Legislature • 
••• the consent of the community of Newfoundland 
is regarded by H.M.'s Government as the essential 
preliminary to any modification of their 
territorial or maritime rights. 3 
This was certainly a useful safeguard for 
Newfoundland and the other colonies, particularly in the 
light of the French Shore Question's being linked to a 
reciprocity agreement. However; subsequent history bad 
an unfortunate effect on this principle. The Canadians, 
in their efforts to expand the area of their own 
responsibilities in foreign affairs, bad angered successive 
regimes in the Foreign Office by their sometimes brisk 
methods in pressing their claims. The most significant 
incident came when Alexander T. Galt,4 the Canadian 
Minister of Finance, tried to seize control of a series of 
negotiations between Canada and the British West Indies. 
In fact, he instructed the Canadian negotiators to act as 
sole representatives of the Canadian side in the 
negotiations, instead of negotiating through the British 
3 D.M~L. Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada, 
1867-87 (Toronto: University Press, 1955), P• 217. 
4 Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt (1817-93)1 Canadian 
M.P. (1849) (1853-72), Minister of Finance (1~6?-72), 
High Commis;ioner to London (1880-3). 
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Governor. When the Colonial Office heard of Galt's actions 
' 
the reaction was fury at his presumption to con~ne the 
normal procedures. David Farr noted: "This episode in 
1865 coloured the Department's approach to the entire 
question of the colonies and the treaty-making power for 
the next two or three decades".5 Although in subsequent 
negotiations the Canadian delegates did achieve more and 
more freedom of action, the Imperial Government still 
retained the final approval of negotiations.
6 
However, 
with the change of High Commissioner from Galt to Sir 
Charles Tupper, in 1883, there was a change in the 
Colonial Office's attitude to the colonies which allowed 
Tupper much greater latitude in action during negotiations.? 
Despite the bilateral nature of the Canadian negotiations 
with foreign countries, some of their treaties benefited 
other colonies. In the Submarine Cable Conference of 1883 
Tupper achieved excellent terms for both Newfoundland and 
Canada. As time passed a great amount of freedom was 
permitted to colonial missions in negotiations as long as 
they proceeded through the good offices of the local 
British representative. 
5 Farr, Colonial Office, pp • 
220-1. 
6 Farr, Colonial Office, PP• 
223-7· 
7. Farr, Colonial Office, p. 230. 
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In the light of these attitudes to trade agreements 
between colonies and foreign countries, it is necessary to 
trace the consideration of the Bond-Blaine discussions 
within the Colonial Office • 
By the end of 1890 with the beginnings of the 
dispute over the trade negotiations, the officers at the 
Colonial Office were very concerned lest any suspension of 
the agreement reached between Newfoundland and the United 
States would render Newfoundland less amenable to a 
settlement of the French Fishery rights on the West Coast 
of the Island. The difficulties in settling this French 
Question bad proved insurmountable due to the irreconcilable 
views of the French fishing interests and the Newfoundlanders, 
especially as the French had not settled the treaty shore 
but were retarding the settlement and exploitation of that 
area by the Newfoundlanders. There was the. fear in London 
of riots on the treaty shore, leading to infinite 
diplomatic problems with the French. At the same time, it 
was proposed to postpone the Newfoundland Convention until 
the Canadian talks with the United States began since it 
was thought that the United States had no intention of 
giving Canada concessions for which she bad already paid 
Newfoundland.8 However, on the same day, the Minute of 
8 c.o. 194/21)
1 
"Memorandum, John Anderson to John 
Bramston, Dec. 13, 189o." 
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the Executive Council of Newfoundland, November 29, 
received in London on December 12th, was circulated 
through the departments of the Colonial Office.9 This 
aggressively-worded Minute from Newfoundland embittered · 
the previously friendly officials in the Colonial Office 
towards Newfoundland's aims. John Anderson, the author 
of the memorandum of the same day, believed the 
Newfoundlanders thought they could disrupt the whole 
Em~ire just to satisfy their aims.10 The Colonial 
Secretary, Lord Knutsford, noted more specifically: "The 
Colonial Ministers forget, when using such strong language, 
how steadily they oppose all our ~roposals in the matter 
of negotiating with the French. I think we might suggest 
to the F.O. the expediency of pressing on the negotiations 
between Canada and the u.s., as there is reason to fear 
disturbances in Newfoundland unless some arrangement with 
the U.S. & that colony can be made within a time."
11 
The 
result of the strident protests from Newfoundland was to 
force the Colonial Secretary to take the very action they 
were trying to prevent; namely, tying the ratification of 
9 Nfld. Minutes of the Executive Council (Nov. 
1890-Sept. 1892~ · Nov. 29, 1890, & Dec. 8, 1890, PP· 12-3. 
CSP., 1891/38, olBrien to Knutsford (Dec. 12, 1890). 
10 c.o. 194/217 Memorandum, signed J.A. (John 
Anderson), Dec. 13, 18~0 • 
11 See note l.P .• -~~~~e. "Memorandum, signT.d K. (Baron 
Knutsford, Colonial Secretary), Dec. 14, 1890. 
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the Reciprocity Convention directly to Newfoundland's 
.acceptance of an Anglo-French settlement of French rights 
in Newfoundland. This settlement would be drafted in 
London and Paris to suit the needs of these powers while 
the Newfoundland Government would be expected to accept 
it regardless of the appropriateness of the draft to 
Newfoundland problems. This type of exchange of 
reciprocity for an Anglo-French accord bad been suggested 
by the British Prime Ministe~, the Marquis of Salisbury, 
as early as August 8. The Colonial Office does not seem 
to have taken a very serious view of the proposal for it 
was not considered until December.12 As will be noted 
later, Lord Salisbury was not a man to give up when be had 
decided upon a course, and he was quite capable of acting 
ruthlessly if he thought someone was deliberately 
obstructing his purpose. At this moment, Lord Salisbury 
\'Tas in command of a well-entrenched party led by a man with 
definite ideas about bow he should proceed to deal with 
problems; if the Wbitewayites thought they could threaten 
the Imperial Government by creating a disturbance, they 
chose the wrong time. However quite obviously a survey 
of the existing political realities in Newfoundland 
indicated that despite any benefits of reciprocity, no 
12 c.o. 194/217, F.O. (T.V. Lister) to C.O. 
(Bramston), August 8, 1890. 
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administration could bind itself or its successors to the 
acceptance of a treaty on the French Shore Question. 
Following inquiries from London about modifications 
to the treaty in Washington, the Newfoundlanders seem to 
have misconstrued Knutsford's enquiry which referred to 
modifications before the treaty was accepted.
13 The 
attitude of the Government in London still was divided 
between the realization that "we can (not) consent to ;this 
proposal to treat Canada as a foreign country." However, 
"we ought to know whether Canada will grant Nfdld fish & 
minerals free entry as the u.s. proposes to do."
14 
There 
was a desire to press the Canadians to decide whether they 
wanted to participate in Blaine's private talks or to join 
in the Bond-Blaine negotiations~ Newfoundland could not be 
kept waiting indefinitely. 
With reference to the Speech in Reply to the Speech 
from the Throne, the Colonial Office believed that if the 
Speech from the Throne had mentioned the Imperial 
guarantee for the railroad, those who drafted it would 
have modified their language.15 In fact, throughout the 
13 CSP., 1891/38, O'Brien to Knutsford, (Jan. 3, 
1891); and Knutsford to O'Brien, Jan. 1, 1891. 
14 c.o. 194/218, "Memorandum: Anderson to Bramston, 
Jan. 5, 1891." 
15 c.o. 194/218, "Memorandum: Anderson to Bramston, 
Feb. 13, 1891." 
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negotiations the officials at the Colonial Office held to 
the belief that if all the information was available to 
the Assembly in St. John's, they would see the justice of 
the Imperial Government's case. This indicates a surprising 
ignorance of the easily-aroused xenophobia and the bitter 
hostility of party politics in Newfoundlandp' 
On January 17, the Colonial Office received O'Brien's 
note :.of January 6.16 The aroused state of public feeling 
was causing the Governor some concern. John Anderson at 
the Colonial Office also saw the shape of annexation rising 
in Newfoundland due to the propagandizing of Newfoundlanders 
who were living in the United States. Besides annexation, 
the recurrent budgetary deficits in Newfoundland, and the 
dependence on customs duties for revenue did not bold an 
attractive prospect for economic stability.• . Anderson 
disapproved of the railway until there was some hope that 
it would have something to carry. In fact, Anderson 
believed that the best investment for the Imperial 
Government would have been to encourage the exploitation 
of the arable land and forest areas of Newfoundland. 
Unfortunately, it would be difficult to exploit these 
areas without some means of transportation, such as a 
railway; yet the railway was slowly burdening the colony 
with a heavy debt. In fact, it was suggested that a 
16 c.o. 19~/218, "Memorandum: Anderson to Bramston, 
Jan. 18, 1891. 11 
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commission should be sent out from London to make a com~lete 
study of Newfoundland's economy with a view to finding the 
most useful areas in which the Im~erial Government might 
invest money in the Island. 
However, the greatest concern fell upon Lord 
Knutsford's Bill to settle the French Shore Question. The 
Bill bad been precipitated by the case of Baird vs Baldwin 
Walker in the Newfoundland Supreme Court. The court 
ruled that treaty obligations could not interfere with the 
legal rights of the citizen of a colony.17 This forced 
the Imperial Government to take action to permit it to 
carry out its treaty obligations with Fran~e, as well as 
provide machinery for an arbitration of the French Shore 
Question. There was considerable concern in the Colonial 
Office that the ~ro~osed •coercion Bill' would be ob jected 
to by tbe other colonial assemblies, or by the 'ultra 
Colonial sympatbisers' in the House of Commons, Westminister 
as a burden upon the rights of the colonial assemblies. 
This would be true particularly of the Canadian Government 
which possessed a large measure of self-government, except 
in foreign affairs. Beyond the desire to diminish t he 
importance of the •coercion bill' as a precedent 
threatening colonial self-government, the Salisbury 
17 For the case of Baird vs. Baldwin Walker , see 
Thompson, French Shore, P• 125. 
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Government wished to quiet those members of the House of 
Commons who might embarrass the Government over the issue. 
Anderson advanced the idea of a financial settlement to 
quiet the fears of the colonies and British M.P.s "by 
shutting the mouth of the Colony".18 Sir Robert Herbert 
agreed that something "of a friendly kind" should be done 
for Newfoundland. He attributed the trouble in 
Newfoundland "(1) to the Irish blood of her people (2) to 
(priest) Irish instigation (3) to United .States 
machinations".l9 
With reference to the reciprocity treaty, Anderson 
in his Minute of January 19, 1891 indicated: "He (Blaine) 
is evidently anxious for the treaty but knows that 
Newfoundland is still more anxious, and the omission of 
20 
crude minerals is intended as a spur to them". To 
believe Blaine sincerely wanted a treaty with Newfoundland 
made some agreement between Newfoundland, Canada and the 
United States a possible subject to negotiation. The 
writer has maintained that Blaine could not conceivably 
have envisioned this possibility due to his own political 
background and his .experience over the McKinley tariff. 
18 c.o. 194/218, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
Jan. 18, 1891." 
19 c.o. 194/218, "Minute: Herbert to Bramston, Jan. 
20, 1891 .. " 
20 c.o. 194/218, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
Jan. 19, 1891. 11 
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It might have been more realistic to realize Blaine's 
motive in omitting the mineral clause from the treaty was 
to exacex·bate relations between the three members of the 
British Empire. 
At the same time, Anderson was not greatly 
impressed by the Canadian argument based upon the idea of 
Imperial unity in negotiating with the United States. He 
agreed that in the past British North America bad been 
treated as a whole; however, he believed this was due to 
the lack of interest in Newfoundland toward trade with the 
United States as long as Newfoundland had a 'free hand' in 
the South American and European markets. He realized the 
increased competition in the European market caused 
Newfoundland to make use of her control of the bait supply 
to gain entrance into the United States market to 
compensate for the loss of markets in EUrope. As far as 
the free bait to the Americans proposal was concerned, the 
Canadians would not lose any more than they had during the 
reciprocity treaties in 1854 and 18?1. Indeed, Anderson 
suggested that the Canadians should stop expecting to get 
something for nothing, and if they wanted trade concessions 
from the United States they should expect to make 
concessions in return. Anderson believed that since the 
Canadians had allowed the terms of the private negotiations 
with Blaine to become known, it did not seem they would 
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accept the terms.21 Although it would be incorrect to say 
Newfoundland exporters had not bee~rested in the 
United States before 1890, the foreign com~etition of 
1880's consciously or unconsciously forced the Newfoundland 
Government to look for some means of selling their fish 
products and correcting the balance of ~ayments deficit • 
However, the American fish market demanded varieties of 
fish other than the dried cod which the Newfoundland 
economy was organized to produce throughout the nineteenth 
century. If the officer at the Colonial Office in charge 
of Newfoundland believed it was only a matter of changing 
Newfoundland's markets to strengthen the economy, instead 
of an almost complete shift in the ~roducts exported, then 
be demonstrated a severe limitation of knowledge which 
reflects on· the efficiency of the Colonial Office. 
By January 27, the Colonial Office bad come to the 
opinion that Newfoundland deserved the same treatment as 
Canada. However, the ~romise made to Canada to ~ost~one 
separate talks between the United States and Newfoundland 
until the United States and Canada could proceed at the 
same pace, forced the Imperial Government to "wait for 
Canada". Despite the acceptance of this principle of 
waiting for Canada, there ~as still the expectation of the 
signing of the ·:Bond-Blaine pact. At the same time, 
21 c.o. 194/218, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
Jan. 19, 1891." 
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Knutsford went as far as to suggest the period for which 
the Convention would run, five years.22 This certainly 
indicates a serious attitude toward the ratification of 
the Convention. E.B. Pennell, an Assistant Undersecretary 
at the Colonial Office, remarked: "I don't think this can 
be considered until we get Canada's reply- But I think 
that directly we do so the Newfd. Q~nvention ought to be 
signed even if Canada objects."23 Sir Robert Herbert, the 
Permanent Under Secretary, agreed with Penne11,
24 
also 
citing Sir William Wbiteway's pledge to sign an agreement 
with Canada after the Convention with the United States 
was ratified. The proposed agreement would have placed 
the Canadians on the same basis as the United States with 
regard to the Newfoundland bait fishery.
2
5 
This attitude of sympathy for Newfoundland and the 
decision to ratify the Bond-Blaine agreement after the 
Canadian answer had been received was ~ill in evidence by 
the end of January. On the 30th., Anderson penned a 
minute strongly appreciative of the problems facing 
Newfoundland and cynical of the damage Canada would sustain 
22 c.o . . 194/218, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
Jan. 19, 1891 (marginal note, signed K. (Knutsford). 
23 c.o •. 194/218, "Minute: E.B. Pennell to Bramston, 
Jan. 22, 1891." . 
24 c.o •. · 194/218, "Minute: Robert Herbert to 
Bramston, Jan. 27, 1891." 
25 see Nfld., Minutes of Executive Council (1890-2), 
pp. 37-8. 
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by the signing of the Convention. He noted, in part: "The 
danger to Canada is ~urely hypothetical, the loss to 
Newfoundland will be very substantial, and she can least 
afford it."26 All Canada had to do was to double he:r. 
fishing bounties to offset any loss due to the treaty, 
while to veto the treaty would im~overish the "half-starved 
fishermen of Newfoundland". Pennell believed the fishery 
Convention should be signed, with or without Canadian 
approval. Sir Robert Herbert concurred in this opinion.
2
7 
Whatever the approval of the Colonial Office, the 
decision on the reciprocity treaty was taken at the begin-
ning of February by the Cabinet. In minutes of February 1 
to February 6, there was disapproval of Bond's contention 
about his being given powers to negotiate with the United 
States.28 Anderson believed Bond's actions had "put 
himself into a fix" and in revenge for the non~ratification 
of the treaty be would disrupt politics in Newfoundland, 
if not wreck Whiteway's Government by leading his 
supporters over to the Opposition. Incredibly enough, 
almost as an afterthought, Anderson noted his belief that 
26 c.o. ~ 194/218, "Minute: J. Anderson to J. 
Bramston, Jan. 30, 1891." 
27 c.o • . 194/218, "Minute: E.B. Pennell to Bramston, 
Jan. 30, 1891", · "Minute: Robert Herbert to Bramston, Jan. 
30, 1891." 
28 c.o •. 194/218, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
Feb. 1, 1891"; "'Note: J. Bramston, Feb. 4, 1891; Note: R. 
Herbert, Feb. 6, 1891. 
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11H.M.'s Government have decided not to sign the convention 
at present.29 From this comment the lack of influence of 
the Colonial Office became apparent when its policy was 
. 
placed before the Cabinet; for despite general support for 
Newfoundland, the Colonial Office did not have sufficient 
influence to carry the stand through the Cabinet. 
The appearance of Bond's Report as Colonial 
Secretary was the occasion for an analysis of Newfoundland's 
problems and prospects. The problems of budgetary deficit, 
increasing population and lack of exploitation of the 
interior and the West Coast of the Island were reviewed. 
However, Anderson believed the Island~s many mineral 
deposits and extensive tracts of arable . land could be 
exploited and settled. He also suggested that "the 
thinking part of the Colony would 'be glad to see their 
constitution abolished, & a decent system of Government 
introduced-•••. n_3° One can only assume by this statement 
was meant some sort of commission of government with which 
tbe Colonial Office already had threatened the Newfoundland 
Government. The group of people indicated were the 
"merchant-class" who had lost their political power after 
the introduction of manhood suffrage in 1889. The attitude 
expressed in the minute indicated a decided l ack of 
29 c.o • . 194/218, nMinute: Anderson to Bramston1 11 
Feb. 3, 1891"; "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, Feb. 3, 1~91 · 
:;o c.o. , 194/218, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
Feb. 25, 1891." 
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confidence in the ability of Newfoundlanders to govern 
themselves on the basis of universal suffrage. This 
certainly was the attitude of the Colonial Office since 
both Herbert and Knutsford signed the minute without 
expressing disagreement.31 
The decision not to ~roceed with the Newfoundland 
Convention lay with the Cabinet due to the effect a refusal 
might have bad on the relations between the British Em~ire 
and the United States. If the Colonial Office was 
concerned by the relations between Newfoundland and Canada, 
Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office was concerned with 
relations with the United States. It bas been shown how 
within the Colonial Office there was a decided inclination 
to sup~ort Newfoundland's treaty bid, while only a 
reluctant desire to acquire a tem~orary post~onement of the 
Convention to allow the Canadian Government to make known 
the basis of its objections to the Convention. The opinion 
in the Colonial Office tended to disapprove of the pre-
emptory demands of the Canadian Government simply because 
Canada was larger and more po~ulous than Newfoundland • 
Although it was usual for colonial problems to be 
settled by the Colonial Office, in the case of the 
Newfoundland fisheries dispute, the ~resence of foreign 
31 c.o . . 194/218, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston,. 
Feb. 27, 1891"; ' also signed: R.G.W .H. (Herbert), Feb. 28, 
K. (Knutsford), 28/2. 
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nations made it a matter of more im~ortance, and Lord 
Salisbury habitually ~resented his solutions to cabinet 
before he ~ut them into effect. In fact be would usually 
defer to the o~inion of the cabinet if it was o~~osed to 
his ~ro~osed action.32 In a cabinet meeting, the realities 
of the situation would be thoroughly examined by men of 
very different o~inions. This was ~articularly true with 
regard to the need to work out an agreement which would 
~lease both Canada and Newfoundland in order to avoid 
internal squabbling within the Em~ire and to reach some 
satisfactory arrangement with the United States. HO\•rever, 
Blaine could not be allowed to divide ~arts of the Em~ire 
against themselves. It was not impossible that Salisbury's 
relations with Newfoundland on the French Shore Question, 
may have poisoned his mind against Newfoundland. He noted 
in writing to Knutsford, in February, 1890: "As to the 
Newfoundland negotiation (the French Shore), ••• I am in 
des~air. Trying to bring a colony and a foreign country 
to terms is very like negotiating between Lord Claricorde 
and the Land League."33 This may well have been that the 
vociferous nature of Newfoundland's ~rotests to the 
Imperial Government so irritated Lord Salisbury that he 
32 Blakeley, Colonial Office, P• 311. 
33 Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert · Mar uis of 6 
Salisburl (London: Hodder & tougbton, 1 t ' I~i6n~;y3~f· 
The .Earl of Claricorde was one of th~ mos reac a ue 
the British landlords in Ireland,I\'I~J.~e n;~~o~:~~s~e o~ga~ization. 
declared illegal in 1881, \'ras an rJ.s 
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would not be kindly disposed to any claims from Newfoundland • 
Lord Salisbury believed in efficient and businessliltev 
government, quite the opposite of the corruption and bombast 
which were the essential aspects of Newfoundland politics. 
Certainly his Lordship would have had little sympathy for 
the deviousness practised in Newfoundland, especially in 
light of the relative importance be would attach to his 
many responsibilities in England and in Foreign Affairs. 
As a man with large holdings of agricultural lands whose 
operation he supervised closely, and who demanded financial 
stability before proceeding with any project, be was 
obviously also disturbed by the rumours of impending 
financial collapse which emanated from St. John's during 
1891.34 However ., be may have disapproved of the attitude 
of both the Canadians and the Newfoundlanders, being aware 
of the disparity of importance of both, he decided to allow 
the Convention to be suspended until the Canadians were 
satisfied.35 
Throughout these negotiations, the Imperial 
Government left open the possibility that at some future 
time the negotiations would be more acceptable. Indeed, 
34 A.L. Kennedy, Salisbury 1810-1903~ Portrait of 
a Statesman __ (]j_o_n_don: John Murray, f953, pp.4-5. 
35 Brown, National Policy, P• 200. 
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hope was held for the postponed talks between Canada and 
the United States which were to continue in \vashington in 
October, 1891.36 However, having learned from the 
difficulties which led to the Bond-Blaine Controversy, 
the Imperial Government could not commit itself to any 
particular course of action but to consider "any 
representations which maybe made them by the Govt:• of 
Nfld ...... 37 They did not omit the standard for 
considering any proposals from Newfoundland - "the best 
interests of the Empire" ) 8 
Although the Colonial Office could only adopt a 
wait and see policy toward negotiations between the United 
States and Canada, the Colonial Secretary, Lord ,·Knutsford, 
still held firm views on the etbicacy of Newfoundland's 
claims for reciprocity. "There is to my mind (he noted) 
great force in the arguments put forward by Newfoundland 
and if Canada does not enter upon negotiations with the 
u.s., the question whether this convention should not be 
· 1 · d d 11 39 Here 
ratified will have to be ser~ous y recons~ ere • 
36 c.o •. , 194/219, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
July 16, 1891." 
37 c.o •. 194/219, "Minute: Anderson to Bramston, 
July 27, 1891"; ·signed F.F. 28/7, J.B. 29/7, R.G.W.H. 
July 29, K. 30/7. 
38 194/219 "M'nute· Anderson to Bramston, c.o. . ' ~ . 
July 27, 1891." 
39 c.o. 194/218, "Minute: Knutsford to Bramston, 
Nov. 28, 1891." 
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was Knutsford's o?inion throughout the negotiations oyer 
the Bond-Blaine Convention but he was unable to resist the 
more vigorous members of Cabinet.· 
Having decided to postpone indefinitely the 
ratification of the Bond-Blaine Convention, it was 
nece~sary for the Colonial Secretary to make a public 
statement upon the cabinet's reasons for withholding its 
approval. The occasion for such a statement came in the 
House of Lords upon a question by the Earl of Dunraven40 
into the status of the Bond-Blaine negotiations. In his 
speech, Knutsford merely rehearsed the already well-known 
facts of the case. The Imperial Government had no 
objections to the negotiation of separate treaties between 
a colony and a foreign country; however, the interes~of 
the non-participating members of the Empire must not be 
injured. Further
1
"the leave given to negotiate does not 
carry with it an engagement to sanction the arrangement 
when made. n41 But further, in this· particular case, "Mr • 
Bond bad no instructions from Her. Majesty's Government, 
but it (Salisbury's letter of introduction) was made for 
the purpose of communicating with Her Majesty's Minister 
40 The Earl of nunraven (1841-1926), was Parliamentary 
Under Secretary for the Colonies (1885-6) and (1886-7). 
He was in Newfoundland on a hunting trip in 1880. 
41 Great Britain, Hansard's ParliamentarY Debates, 
CCCL (1891), pp. 818-20. 
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in \~ashington. n42 Bond was to communicate his plans to 
the British Minister who would decide if be should transmit 
them officially to Blaine; Bond bad no instructions to 
treat directly with Blaine. "The Dominion Government" had 
protested the acceptance of the Convention very strongly; 
however, his Lordship did not specify the nature of the 
Canadian objections, probably to avoid embroiling himself 
. in questions on the detail of the Government's actions. 
The only comments were made by the Earl of Kimberley, a 
former Colonial Secretary, and at the time, Liberal leader 
in the House of Lords. Kimberley, although acknowledging 
the correctness of the Government's actions in withholding 
ratification of the treaty, was concerned about the 
results which occurred when a colony's hopes were raised 
only to be shattered. The result of this situation was 
inevitable discontent in the colony. Kimberley admitted 
the fallability of governments, but he hoped the greatest 
possible care would be taken to avoid such events in the 
future.43 So the Government a~ed any embarrassment over 
the issue and the draft was consigned to the status of an 
unsigned tre~ty which might be reintroduced at some future 
date. 
42 Hansard's Debates, CCCL, PP• 818-20. 
43 Hansard's Debates, CCCL, P• 821. 
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After the failure of the Canadian-American talks 
to materialize in October, 1891, the Executive Council of 
Newfoundland, in February, 1892, sent a minute to London 
urging ratification. However, they were rebuffed by the 
Colonial Office, ~articularly after the minute had accused 
the Colonial Office of a breach of faith in not acce~ting 
the Convention.44 
The discussion of the Bond-Blaine negotiations 
continued very intermittently through 1891 and 1892. on ~: 
some occasions the officials at the Colonial Office 
believed an accord might be reached between Newfoundland 
and Canada to permit the signing of the Convention; on 
other occasions the actions of the Government in St. John's 
caused such annoyance in London that the treaty might have 
been rejected permanently. Although throughout the 
discussions Lord Knutsford retained his belief in the 
ethicacy of a reciprocity treaty, no occasion suitable for 
confirming the Convention arose.~5 
44 c.o. , 19~/221~ "Minute: Bramston to A.W. Harvey, 
in London, Feb. 6, 1892.' 
45 c o _ 194/221 "Minute: Ander,sotr to Bramston, 
(March 22 1S92) see al;o attached notes; "Minute: Anderson 
to Bramst6n (Ma;ch 25 1892", see also attache~ notes; 
marginal no~e, K. (Knutsford), in Minute of Apr1l, 1892. 
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CONGLUSION 
In 1891, the Imperial Government postponed 
indefinitely the ratification of the Bond-Blaine Convention. 
~he reason for this postponement was the feeling that the 
Newfoundland initiative would disrupt the concept of 
Imperial solidarity on the North American continent. This 
view had been held by the Canadian Government during the 
Newfoundland-American negotiations, and the suspension of 
the draft treaty was an explicit acceptance of the 
Canadian position. However, the concern of the Canadian 
Government lay with the fact that they were facing an 
election and under pressure to institute reciprocity talks 
with the United States. If the Bond-Blaine Convention was 
ratified before the Canadian-American discussions began, 
the Canadians would lose a valuable bargaining point in the 
bait ·fisheries of Newfoundland. 
The Canadians were attempting to negotiate with the 
United States Secretary of State, James G. Blaine. But by 
1891, Blaine had obtained free access to the Newfoundland 
bait fisheries from the Island government when Bond placed 
American fishermen on the same terms as Newfoundland 
fishermen and had laid a license fee on all other countries 
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using the bait supplies of Newfoundland. This was the 
ideal solution for Blaine for he would not be faced with the 
problem of asking Congress to accept the free entrance of 
Newfoundland fish products into the United States in 
exchange for free bait supplies. 
At the same time, the British Government was 
divided on its course of action toward Newfoundland. The 
officials at the Colonial Office who supervised the c 
Government of Newfoundland usually were sympathetic to its 
objectives. This was true of the Bond-Blaine talks which 
were strongly supported by the Colonial Secretary, Lord 
Knutsford. However, Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Secretary, appears to have been interested in the 
negotiations only so far as they had an impact on the 
internal stability of the Empire, and peaceful relations 
with foreign countries. Lord Salisbury's opinion that the 
draft treaty should not be ratified was confirmed by the 
other members of his government. 
However, the main source of the difficulties 
concerning reciprocity lay with the initiative, with Bond 
and the Newfoundland Government, Bond's treaty sought to 
bre~k the age-old circle of Imperial responsibilities, 
foreign treaty rights, and economic depression which 
frustrated any unilateral action by the Newfoundland 
.. . • . 
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Government which might improve the Island's economy. With 
all foreign negotiations by colonies in the hands of the 
British Government, too many objections could be raised 
which had priority over Newfoundl~nd's interests. Indeed 
' 
during the Bond-Blaine talks, the United States Government 
demanded unrestricted access to the Newfoundland fisheries 
without competition from any other country. Since the 
announced purpose of this demand was to eliminate the French 
and Canadian fishing rights in Newfoundland, there was 
little chance that the Imperial Government would agree to 
such a demand. In fact, the negotiations demonstrated that 
Bond's efforts had failed to alter the principle of 
Imperial unity in negotiations with foreign countries. 
Yet for the Whitewayite Party in Newfoundland, the 
process of undertaking negotiations with the United States 
was of very considerable political value. Even the 
rejection of the Convention by the Imperial Government was 
useful in uniting the population behind the party in power. 
The publicity involved also improved the status of Bond 
both within his party and Newfoundland as a whole. 
However, in an attemp·li to create political capital out of 
his actions while negotiating with Blaine, Bond made many 
enemies in London among the politicians and off icials who 
were responsible for deciding and implementing I mperial 
· .. i ~ .-.. 
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policy. In thinking first of his political future, Bond 
reduced his stature in the eyes of the Imperial Government 
and with it the hope for the cooperation needed to settle 
the problem of reciprocity. 
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APPENDIX A 
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES: 1783 
Article III. It is agreed that the ~eople of the 
United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the 
"right" to take fish of every kind on the Grand Bank, and 
on all the other banks of Newfoundland: also in the Gul~h 
of Saint Lawrence, and at all other ~laces in the sea 
where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time 
heretofore to fish. And also that the inhabitants of the 
United States shall have "liberty" to take fish of every 
kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British 
fishermen shall use (but not to dry or cure the same on 
I 
... ··---· -·----···~:..:..::;; 
that island) and also on the coasts, bays and creeks of all 
other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America; and 
that the American fishermen shall have "liberty" to dry 
and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours and 
creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so 
long as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as 
the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not 
be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at 
such settlements, without a previous agreement for that 
..•.. · ·· · · ···· · ·. · ,., c: .. o .• •··. · .......... : • .. • · ' _ .. , ..... :-~:· .. ;~·:::,. ::· =:." :·7ec·=·"' 
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purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors or possessors 
of the ground.1 
1 · (ed ) Documents of American ... ) 
H.s. · Commageyr, k· App'leton-Century-Crofts, 196? ' 
History (7th ed.; New or · 
Vol. I, p. 118. 
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APPENDIX B (1) 
TREATY OF UTRECHT:: 1713 
Article 13. The Island called Newfoundland, with 
the adjacent islands, shall, from this time forward, belong 
of right wholly to Great Britain; and to that end the town 
and fortress of Placentia, and whatever other places in the 
said island, are in possession of the French, shall be 
yielded and given up.... Nor shall the Most Christian 
King, his Heirs and Successors, or any of their subjects, 
at any time hereafter lay claim to any right to the said 
islands, or to any part of it, or them. Moreover, it 
shall not be lawful for the subjects of France to fortify 
any place in the said Island of Newfoundland, or to 
any buildings there, besides stages made of boards, and 
huts necessary and usual for drying of fish; or to resort 
to the said island beyond the time necessary for fishing 
and drying of fish. But it shall be allowed to the 
subjects of France, to catch fish, and to dry them on land, 
in that part only, and in no other besides that, of the :;; 
said island of Newfoundland, which stretches from the 
place called Cape Bonavista, to the northern point of the 
said island, and from thence running down by the western 
·. 
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side, reaches as far as the place called Point Riche, 
But the island called Cape Breton, as also all others, 
both in the mouth of the river of St. Lawrence and in the 
Gulf of the same name, shall hereafter belong of right to 
the French; and the Most Christian Kings shall have all 
manner of liberty to fortify any place or places there.
1 
1 
h ~h ~P. problem jn 
· F F Thompson ~e Frenco 
• " ' · •ty of 
Newfoundland: An Imperial Study (T(~~~n!~~t¥~~!e~~1Appendix 
Toronto Press, 1961), Append1X 1 . l) 
B are taken from Thompson's Append1x • 
•. J i., , 
-... · ·';'~· 
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APPENDIX B (2) 
TREATY OF PARIS, 10 FEBRUARY, 1763 
Article 5· The subjects of France shall have the 
liberty of fishing and drying, on a· part of the coasts of 
the Island of Newfoundland, such as it is specified in 
Article 13, of the Treaty of Utrcht; which article is 
renewed and confirmed by the present Treaty (except what 
relates to th~ Island of Cape Breton, as well as to the 
other islands and coasts in the mouth and in the gulf of 
St. Lawrence). And His Britannic Majesty consents to 
leave to the subjects of the Most Christian King the 
liberty of fishing in the gulf of St. Lawrence, etc. 
Article 6. The King of Great Britain cedes the 
Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, in full right to His 
Most Christian Majesty, to serve as a shelter to the 
French fishermen; and His said Most Christian Majesty 
engages not to fortify the said Islands; to erect no 
buildings upon them, but merely for the co~venience of 
the fishery; and to keep upon them a guard of fifty men 
only for the police • 
--- -· .: ... _:_•.::··.-·.~ 
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APPENDIX B ( 3) 
Article 4. His Majesty the King of Great Britain 
is maintained in His rights to the Island of :Newfoundland, 
and to the adjacent Islands, as the whole were assured to 
Him by the Thirteenth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht; 
excepting the Islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which 
are ceded in full right, by the present Treaty to His 
Most Christian Majesty. 
Article 5. His Majesty, the Most Christian King, 
in order to prevent the quarrels which have hitherto arisen 
between the two Nations of England and France, consents to 
renounce the right of fishing, which belongs to him in 
virtue of the aforesaid Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, 
from Cape Bonavista to Cape St. John, situated on the 
eastern coast of Newfoundland, in fifty degrees North 
latitude; and His Majesty the King of Great Britain 
consents on His part, that the fishery assigned to the 
subjects of His Most Christian ~1ajesty, beginning at the 
said Cape St. John, passing to the North, and descending 
by the western coast of the Island of Newfoundland, shall 
extend to the place called Cape ~ay, situated in forty-
seven degrees, fifty minutes latitude. The French 
fishermen shall enjoy the fishery which is assigned to 
-! 
: : 
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them by the present Article, as they had the right to 
enjoy that which was assigned to them by the Treaty of 
Utrecht. 
.. ·. 
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APPENDIX B (4) 
TREATY OF PARIS, 3 SEP.rEMBER, 1783 
DECLARATION OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY 
The King having entirely agreed with His Most 
Christian Majesty upon the Articles of the Definitive 
Treaty, will seek every means which shall not only insure 
the execution thereof, with His accustomed good faith and 
punctually, but will besides give, on His part, all 
possible efficacy to the principles which shall prevent 
even the least foundation of dispute for the future. 
To this end, and in order that the fishermen of 
the two nations may not give cause for daily quarrels, His 
Britannic Majesty will take the most positive measures for 
preventing His subjects from interrupting in any manner by 
their competition, the fishery of the French, during the 
temporary exercise of it which is granted to them, upon 
the coasts of the Island of Newfoundland; and He will, for 
this purpose, cause the fixed settlements which shall be 
formed there, to be removed. His Britannic Majesty will 
give orders, that :the French fishermen be not incommoded, 
in cutting the wood necessary for the repair of their 
scaffolds, huts, and fishing vessels. 
-~-
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The Thirteenth Article of the Treaty of Utrecht, 
and ~he method of carrying on the fishery which bas at all 
times been acknowledged, shall be the plan upon which the 
fishery shall be carried on there; it shall not be deviated 
from by either party; the French fishermen building only 
their scaffolds, confining themselves to the repair of 
their fishing vessels, and not wintering there; the subjects 
of His Britannic Majesty, on their part, not molesting, in 
any manner, the French fishermen, during their fishing, 
nor injuring their scaffolds during their absence. 
The King of Great Britain, in ceding the Islands 
of St. Pierre and Miquelon to France, regards them as 
ceded for the purpose of serving as a real shelter to the 
French fishermen, and in full confidence that these 
possessions will not become an object of jealousy between 
the two nations; and that the fishery between the said 
Islands~ and that of Newfoundland, shall be limited to the 
middle of the channel. 
I. 
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. ~· . 
}:. 
166 
APPENDIX B ( 5) 
TREATY OF PARIS, 3 SEPTEMBER, 1783 
COUNTER DECLARATION OF HIS MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY 
The ~rinci~les which have guided the King, in the 
\'lhole course of the negotiations which ~receded the re-
establishment of ~eace, must have convinced the King of 
Great Britain that His Majesty has had no other design than 
to render it solid and lasting, by presenting as much a·s · 
~ossible, in the four quarters of the world, every subject 
of discussion and quarrel. The King of Great Britain 
undoubtedly places too much confidence in the uprightness 
of His Majesty's intentions, not to rely upon His constant 
attention ~ to ~revent the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon 
from becoming an object of jealousy between the two nations. 
As to the fishery on the coasts of Newfoundland, 
which has been the object of the new arrangements settled 
by the two Sovereigns u~on this matter, it is sufficiently 
ascertained by the fifth Article of the Treaty of Peace 
signed this day, and by the Declaration likewise delivered 
today, by His Majesty declares that He is fully satisfied 
on this bead. 
. i 
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In regard to the fishery between the Island of 
Newfoundland, and those of St. Pierre and Miquelon, it is 
not to be carried on, by either party, but to the middle 
of the channel, and His Majesty will give the most 
positive orders, that the French fishermen shall not go 
beyond this line. His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; and His Majesty is 
firmly persuaded that the King of Great Britain will give 
like orders to the English fishermen. 
. . ' 
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APPENDIX C 
SELECTED NEWFOUNDLAND FISH EXPORTS - 18891 
FISH: Cod: Boneless: Canada: 157 boxes 
Portugal: 100 11 
257 II 
Cod: Dried: Portugal 267,231 qtls. Brazil 262,501 II 
B.W. Indies 112,392 II 
Spain 87,736 II 
Gibraltar 46,408 II 
Italy . 15,622 II . 
Sp. W. Indies: 7,446 II 
U. Kingdom 28,368 II 
U. States 31,411 II 
Canada 23,999 II 
Greece 4,350 
II 
Sicily 2,200 
II 
889,,574 II 
Cod: Green: United States: 
1,900 qt1s. 
Canada 1,795 II 
3,695 II 
FISH: Haddock: B.W. Indies: 
657 qt1s. 
U. States 58 " 
715 II 
$ 125 
$1,202,539 
1,320,004 
382,132 
368,491 
191,913 
65,612 
32,222 
85,104 
138,208 
95,636 . 
13,050 
9,240 
:! 
0', 
·.! 
·, 
.. 
$3,904,151 . 
$ 5,542 
$ 1,430 
,
' 
. 
~ 
' 
~ 
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$ 
.. 
FISH: Halibut: Canada 427 
.. 
u. States 153 
B.\~ • Indies 20 
u. Kingdom 10 
610 
Herring: Bulk: 
Canada . 2,453 barrels 2,453 . 
u. States: 1,915 II 1,915 .. 
. ~-. 
4,368 II 4,368 ·, .. : .•; 
~ :"i.t 
·'· 
Frozen: 
u. States: 22,786 II 22,786 
;•.:, 
:J;" 
Canada 5,900 II 5,900 
. ... 
: :.· i: :;.· 
~ }: 
28,686 " 28,686 
; ~ 
:! 
r, : 
f 
Pickled: 
· Canada 64,985 " 162,463 
.. 
i' 
B.\~ • Indies 10,572 
II 26,044 :t' ' · { 
u. States 8,076 
tJ !I 20,190 i 
.•. 
u. Kingdom 577 
II 1,443 ' 
Sp. w. Indies 181 
II 352 .r 
Portugal 13 
II 33 .. 
Italy 210 
II 525 
84,614 II 211,050 :':· 
! 
·i 
Tinned: 
Canada 294 cases 
u. Kingdom 3 
II 
297 " 594 
FISH: Salmon: Pickled: 
Tinned: 
Trout: 
FURS: 
LOBSTERS: Tinned: 
170 
B.W. Indies 
Italy 
U. States 
u. Kingdom 
Canada 
Sp. \v. Indies 
u. States 
U. Kingdom 
U. States 
Canada 
::B.W. Indies 
U. States 
Canada 
U. Kingdom 
Canada 
u. States 
Hamburg 
France 
St. Pierre 
486 Tierces 
105 II 
951 II 
974 II 
981 II 
10 II 
3,507 II 
265 cases 
49 II 
314 
1,150 barrels 
389 II 
5 II 
1,544 II 
33,699 cases 
23,146 II 
11,721 II 
3,641 II 
3,887 II 
122 II 
76,016 II 
s 
9,?20 
2,100 
19,033 
19,486 
19,627 
200 
70,216 
1,570 
9,200 
3,214 
46 
12,459 
28,809 
3,156 
31,965 
208,933 
143,508 
72,670 
22,570 
24,099 
756 
470,536 
.. : .. 
.. ;·.· 
~:: 
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OIL: Cod: 
Refined: 
Seal: 
171 
U. Kingdom 
Canada 
U. States 
U. Kingdom 
Canada 
U. States -
B. vl. Indies 
U. Kingdom 
Canada 
Hamburg 
France 
ORES: Copper: Ingots: u. Kingdom 
France 
U. States 
Regulus: 
U. States 
Green: 
U. States 
Iron Pyrites: U. States 
SEAL SKINS: U. Kingdom Canada 
2,963<14 tuns 
281 II 
71 " 
II 
3,315 ~ II 
5,753 gals. 
6,700 II 
1,201 II 
35 II 
13,689 II 
3,889 tuns 
276~ II 
154 
1243/411 
4,lj.lj.4" II 
1,143 tons 
180 II 
20 II 
2,34-3 II 
767 tons 
2,306 
7,530 
334,536 
1,091 
-;35,6'?/ 
II 
$ 
213,354-
20,232 
5,130 
238,716 
5,4-75 
326,676 
23,226 
12,936 
10,479 
--373,317 
205,740 
32,4-00 
3,600 
241,740 
68,490 
46,120 
64,000 
301,082.4 
981.9 
;c>2,o64 
1 Nfld. Assembly, !ournal, 1890, Appendix, PP• 73-85· 
; ~ 
I 
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YEAR 
1805 
1810 
1815 
1820 
1825 
1830 
1831 
1836 
1840 
1842 
1843 
1844 
1846 
1850 
1852 
1855 
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APPENDIX D 
SEAL FISHERY 
CATCH YEAR 
81,088 1860 
118,080 1862 
126,315 1871 
213,674 1872 
295,352 1876 
558,942 1880 
686,836 1881 
384,321 1882 
631,385 1883 
344,613 1884 
651,370 1885 
685,530 1886 
265,169 1887 
442,392 1888 
534,378 1889 
293,083 1890 
1 First steamships used in 1863. 
2 Only steamships used after 1883 
3 Harbour Grace Standard, March 29, 1892. 
-·· - ----~ .: 
CATCH 
444,202 
268,4261 
537,084 
278,372 
500,000 
223,793 
447,903 
200,500 
258,297 
208,8782 
128,496 
188,157 
230,355 
286,464 
306,338 
202,0663 
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APPENDIX E 
CONVENTION OF 1818 
Article I. Whereas differences have arisen 
respecting the liberty claimed by the United States, for 
the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, and cure fish, on 
certain coasts, bays, harbours, and creeks of His Britannic 
Majesty's Dominions in America; it is agreed between the 
high contracting powers, that the inhabitants of the said 
United States shall have, for ever, in common with the 
subjects of His Britannic Majesty, the liberty to take 
fish of every kind, on that part of the southern coast of 
Newfoundland which extends from Cape Ray to the Rameau 
Islands, on the western and northern coasts of Newfoundland, 
from the Cape Ray to the Quirpon Islands, on the shores of 
the Magdalen Islands, and also on the coasts, bays, 
harbours, and creeks, from Mount Joly, on the southern 
coast of Labrador, to and through the Straits of Belle 
Isle, and thence northwardly indefinitely along the coast; 
without prejudice, however, to any of the exclusive rights 
of the Hudson's Bay Company; and that the American 
fishermen shall have liberty, for ever, to dry ?cure fish 
in any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of the 
..... . . .. ... ;: -·· 
.·· 
. . :: ..... ~. 
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' • . 
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southern part of the coast of Newfoundland, hereafter 
described, and of the coast of Labrador; but so soon as 
the same, or any portion thereof shall be settled, it shall 
not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at 
such portions so settled, without previous agreement for 
such purposes, with :the inhabitants, proprietors, or 
possessors of the ground. And the United States hereby 
renounces, for ever, any liberty heretofore enjoyed or 
claimed by the United States thereof, to take, dry, or cure 
fish, on or within three miles of any of the coasts, bays, 
creeks, or harbours of His Britannic Majesty's Dominion in 
Americar not included tdthin the above-mentioned limits; 
provided, however, that the American fishermen shall be 
permitted to enter such bays or harbours, for the ~ur~ose 
of shelter and of repairing damages therein, of procuring 
wood, and obtaining water, and for no other pur~oses 
whatsoever. But they shall be under such restrictions as 
may be necessary to prevent there making, drying, or curing 
fish therein, or in any other manner whatsoever abusing the 
1 privileges hereby reserved to them. · 
~: 1 Great Britain. Foreign Office, Records and 
Proceedings of the Halifax Commission: 1877 (London: n.p., 
1878), p. 57. 
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APPENDIX F (1) 
FISHERY ARTICLES OF THE RECIPROCITY TREATY 
OF SEPI'EMBER 9, 1854. 
Article I. It is agreed by the High Contracting 
Parties that, in addition to the liberty secured to the 
United. States fishermen by the above-mentioned Convention 
of October 20, 1818, of taking, curing, and drying fish on 
certain coasts of the British North American Colonies 
therein defined, the inhabitants of the United States 
shall have, in common with the subjects of Her Britannic 
Majesty, the liberty to take fish of every kind, exce~t 
shell-fi~h, on the sea-coasts and shores, and in the bays, 
harbors, and creeks of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
Prince Edward 1 s Island, and of the several islands 'I; here-
unto adjacent, without being restricted to any distance 
from the shore, with permission to land upon the coasts 
and shores of those Colonies and the island thereof, and 
also upon the Magdalen Islands, for the ~urpose of drying 
their nets and curing their fish; ~rovided that, in so 
doing, they do not interfere with the rights of private 
property, or with British fishermen in the peaceable use of 
any of -the same coast in their occupancy for the same purpose. 
--------------------------------------------------------------
, 
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It is agreed by the High Contracting Powers that 
British subjects shall have, in common with the citizens 
of the United States, liberty to take fish of every kind 
except shell-fish, on the Eastern sea-coasts and shores of 
the United States North of the 36th. ~arallel in North 
Latitude, and onthe several islands thereunto adjacent, and 
in the bays, harbors, and creeks of said sea-coasts and 
shores of the United States and said islands, without being 
restricted to any distance from the shore; with permission 
to land upon the said coasts of the United States a~d of 
the islands in parts said, for the purpose of drying their 
nets and curing their fish, provided that in doing so they 
do not interfere with the rights of ~rivate property, or 
with the fisheries of the United States in peaceable use of 
any part of the said coasts in their occupancy for the said 
purpose. 
ARTICLE III 
It is agreed that the articles enumerated in the 
schedule therunto annexed, being the growth and produce. of 
the aforesaid British Colonies or of the United States, 
shall be admitted into each country respectively free of 
duty: 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Fish of all kinds 
Products of fish, and of all other creatures living 
in the water 
Ores of metals, of all kinds 
----------------------------------------------~------------
Fish-oil··' 
-----------------------------------------------------------
ARTICLE VI 
And it is hereby further agreed that the provisions 
and stipulations of the foregoing Articles shall extend to 
the island of Newfoundland, so far as they are applicable 
to ttat colony. 1 
---------~;.;..·· ..c.·· f o· :..-• -·· ··--
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APPENDIX F ( 2) 
TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NEWFOUNDLAND 
(In i 1,000) 
Imports from u.s. Exports to U.s. 
1850 153 20 
1851 201 
20 
1853 177 
4-1 
1854- 237 
28 
1855 354-
79 
1856 388 
109 
1858 323 
113 
1859 361 
106 
1860 364-
81 
1862 34-5 
4-7 
1863 34-4-
60 
1864- 306 
4-1 
1865 34-8 
109 
1866 291 
881 
ti.Gt&. z ~wamPi;;&;~ 6 · : .• ~; .. ----- .... --. 
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APPENDIX G 
FISHERIES CLAUSES OF THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON OF 1871 
ARTICLE XVIII 
It is agreed by the high contracting parties that, 
in addition to the liberty secured to United States 
fishermen ·by the convention between the United States and 
Great Britain, signed at London on the 20th day of October, 
1818, of taking, curing, and drying fish on certain coa·sts 
of the British North American colonies therein defined, the 
inhabitants of the United States shall have, in common with 
the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, the liberty, for the 
term of years mentioned in Article XXXIII of this treaty, 
to take fish of every kind, except shell-fish, on the sea-
coasts and shores, and in the bays, harbors, and creeks, 
of the provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, 
and the colony of Prince Edward's Island, and of the 
several islands thereunto adjacent, without being 
restricted to any distance from the shore, with permission 
to land upon the said coasts and shores and islands, and 
. ' 
! : 
also upon the Magdalen Isl~nds, for the purpose of drying 
their nets and curing their fish; provided that in so doing, ~.(····.·~ 
they do not interfere with the rights of private property, ~ 
I 
_..,;: ' 
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or with British fishermen, in the peaceable use of any 
part of the said coasts in their occupancy for the same 
purpose. 
ARTICLE XIX 
It is agreed by the high contracting parties that 
British subjects shall have, in common with the citizens of 
the United States, the liberty, for the term of years 
mentioned in Article XXXIII of this treaty, to take fish of 
every kind, except shell-fish, on the eastern sea-coasts 
.... -·· ·-- ~~ .. : ...•. ~..:·· 
and shores of the United States north of the thirty-ninth 
parallel of north latitude, and on the shores of the several 
islands thereunto adjacent, and in the bays, harbors, and 
creeks of the said sea-coasts and shores o~ the United 
States and of the said islands, without being restricted to 
any distance from the shore, vlith permission to land upon 
the said coasts of the United States and of the islands 
aforesaid, for the purpose of drying their nets and curing 
their fish, provided that, in so doing, they do not interfere 
with the rights of private property, or with the fishermen 
of the United States in the peaceable use of any part of the 
said coasts in their occupancy for the same purpose. 
. . ;_.: -- .' . .. '· 
.. --- --- - --·--··'-
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ARTICLE XX 
It is agreed that the places designed by the 
commissioners appointed under the first article of the 
treaty between the United States and Great Britain 
' 
concluded at Washington on the 5th of June, 1854, upon the 
coasts of Her Britannic Majesty's dominions and the United 
States, as ~laces reserved from th~ common right of fishing 
under that treaty, shall be regarded as in like manner 
reserved from the common right of fishing under the 
~receding articles. 
ARTICLE XXI 
It is agreed that, for the term of years mentioned 
in Article XXXIII of this treaty, fish oil and fish of all 
kinds, (except fish of the inland· lakes, and of the rivers 
falling into them, and except fish preserved in oil,) 
being the produce of the fisheries of the United States, 
or of the Dominion of Canada, or of Prince Edward's Island, 
shall be admitted into each country, respectively, free of 
duty. 
ARTICLE XXXII 
It is further agreed that the provisions and 
stipulations of Articles XVIII to XXV of this treaty, 
inclusive, shall extend to the colony of Newfoundland, so 
far as they are applicable.
1 
1 United States. Department of ~tate, !orei~ ) 
Relations (Washington: Government Print>ng Off1ee,11 • 
pp. 523-4 and P• 528. 
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APPENDIX H 
MODUS VIVENDI OF 1888 
1. For a period not exceeding two years from the 
present date, the privilege of entering the bays and harbors 
of the Atlantic coasts of Canada and Newfoundland shall be 
granted to the United States fishing vessels by annual 
licenses at a fee of $ 1~ per ton - for the follO\..ring 
purposes: 
The purchase of bait, ice, seines, lines, and all 
other supplies and outfits. 
Transhipment of catch and shipping of crews. 
2. If, during the continuance of this arrangement, 
the United States should remove the duties on fish, fish-
oil, whale and seal-oil "(and their coverings, packages, etc.) 
the said licenses shall be issued free of charge. 
3. United States fishing vessels entering the bays 
and harbors of the Atlantic coasts of Canada or of Nevrfound-
land for any of the four purposes mentioned in Article I of 
the convention of October 20, 1818, and not remaining 
therein more than t"enty-four hOurs, shall not be required 
to enter or clear at the custom bouse, providing that they 
do not communicate \•rith the shore. 
133 
4. Forfeiture to be exacted only for the offense 
of fishing or preparing to fish in territorial waters. 
5. This arrangement to take effect on soon as the 
necessary measures can be completed ·oy the Colonial 
authorities. 
Washington, February 15, 1888.1 
1 F. Snow, Treaties and Topics in American 
(B t ~oston Book Co., 1894), P• 467. Diplomacx os on: D 
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APPENDIX I 
RESULTS OF ELECTION OF NOV. 6, 18891 
BAY DE VERDE (2 members) 
\'/bite (W) 
Woods (w)+ 
March (G)* 
Crocker (G) 
- 820 votes 
- 773 II 
- 476 II 
- 399 II 
BONAVISTA (3 members) 
Morison (G)* - 1429 votes 
Blandford (W)- 1382 11 
Morine (G)* - 1333 " 
Johnson (W) - 1283 11 
Vincent (G) - 1228 11 
Davis .· (w) - 1144 11 
BURGI.:~ AND Ll\POILE (1 member) 
Murray (I) 
Mott (I) 
659 votes 
- 164 II 
BURIN (2 members) 
Rothwell (W) - 684 votes 
Tait (W) - 678 '! 
Lemessurier (G)'"579 11 
McNeily (G)* - 552 11 
CARBONEAR (1 member) 
Duff (W) - 436 votes 
Penny (G)*++ - 284 11 
Moore (I) 67 " 
FERRYLAND (2 members) 
Shea (I)* - 727 votes 
Greene (I)*- 491 11 
Furlong. (W)- 425 11 
Condon (I) - 363 11 
FOGO ( 1 member) 
Rolls (G) - 554 votes 
Skelton (\~)- 313 11 
FORTUNE BAY (1 member) 
Studdy (W) - 693 votes 
Fraser (G) - 261 11 
HARBOUR GRACE (3 members) 
Whiteley (W)-1367 votes 
Eli Dawe (\'1) -1342 11 
Munn (G) -1259 11 
C. Dawe (G)*- 685 11 
\'linter (G)++ -604 11 
HARBOUR MAIN (2 members) 
F. Morris (W) - 1448 votes 
woodford (W) - 1360 11 
Fenelon (G)++ - 180 " 
.... · 
PLACENTIA AND ST. MARY 1 S (3 members) 
185 
Emerson (W) * 
- 1,077 votes 
- 1,018 
994 
0 'Dwyer (\~) + 
McGrath (W)* 
Donnelly (G)*++ -
Literman (G) 
Tobin (G) 
897 
555 
515 
PORT~DE-GRAVE (1 member) 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
Clift (W) 638 votes 
Horwood (G) 564 11 
ST. BARBE (1 member) 
Fearn (W) 616 votes 
Bradshaw (G)* 122 11 
ST. GEORGE'S BAY (1 member) 
Carty (G) · - (No Contest) 
ST. JOHN'S EAST (3 members) 
Murphy (W)* 
- 1747 votes 
Dearin (W) ** 
- 1716 II 
Hallaren (W) 
- 1469 II 
O'Mara (G)* 
-
854 II 
Furlong (G) 819 II 
St. John (G) ·609 II 
Parsons (I) 2 233 II 
ST • JOHN 'S li/EST (3 membens) 
E. Morris (\V)•:t: · 
- 1556 votes 
Day (W) 
- 1326 II 
Gearin (\v) 
- 1054 II 
Scott (G)* 
- 957 II 
Callanan (G)* 741 II 
Shea (I) 137 II 
Brien (I) 
- 117 II 
TRINITY (3 members) 
Sir W. Whiteway ~'0 (W)**+ - 2094 votes 
Bond (W)*+ - 1908 11 
Webber (W) - 1760 11 
Grieve {G)* ?89 11 
Watson (G)* 746 11 
R. Thorburn (G)*+! 698 11 
TWILLINGATE (3 members) 
.. 
Burgess (W) - 1174 votes 
Thompson (W) - 1140 11 
Peyton (VI) - 1088 " 
Knight (G)* - 769 
McKay (G)* - 732 
Goodridge (G)* ++ - 720 
1 c.o., 194/212, Enclosure in O'Brien to Knutsford, 
Nov. 14, 1889. 
2 * Incumbent. ** Ex-member, not incumbent 
+ Member of Whiteway's Cabinet 
++Member of Thorburn's Cabinet. 
. . . - ·- . '""'-. 
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APPENDIX -J 
FINAL DUTIES UNDER NEWFOUNDLAND TARIFF ACT 
Old Rate 
Flour $ .30 
Pork 1.75 
Butter 3.00 
Tobacco 20.05 
Kerosene .05 
Corn Meal .25 
Hay 20% 
Oats • 05 
Potatoes .05 
Turnips .10 
.24-
New Rate 
$ • 75 
.75 
• 75 
5.00 
.05 
.25~ 
5.00 
.10 
.25 
.25 
• 4-0 
Final Rate 
$ 1.05 '/bl • 
2.50 II 
3.75 /Cwt • 
II 
.10 /gal. 
.50~/bl. 
.15 /bus • 
• 30 I II 
• 35 I II 
.64 /doz • 
Cabbages 
. (Other vegetables increased from 10 to 30%)
1 
1 Harbour Grace Standard, Dec. 11, 1891. 
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